The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

A scoping study covering Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda
The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

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# Table of Contents

**Acronyms and abbreviations** viii  
**Acknowledgements** xi  
**Foreword** xii  
**Executive summary** xiv  

**Chapter 1. Introduction and background** 1  
1.1 Overview ............................................................... 1  
1.2 IGAD migration governance architecture ......................... 1  
1.2.1 Challenges for mainstreaming labour migration in development planning ................. 4  
1.3 Objectives of the study ............................................... 7  
1.4 Research design ...................................................... 8  

**Chapter 2. Literature review** 13  
2.1 Introduction ............................................................ 13  
2.2 The link between skills development and skills recognition ................. 14  
2.2.1 Skills recognition in developing countries. ....................... 16  
2.2.2 Informal sector ....................................................... 16  
2.2.3 Regulated professions .............................................. 17  
2.3 The role of TVET institutions in an inclusive approach .................. 18  
2.4 Recognition systems ................................................. 21  
2.4.1 Knowledge, skill, and competence ................................ 22  
2.4.2 Recognition of learning ............................................ 22  
2.4.3 Qualifications and qualifications frameworks ..................... 23  
2.4.4 Credential evaluation ............................................. 25  
2.4.5 Regional conventions ............................................. 27  
2.4.6 Recognition agreements .......................................... 28  
2.4.7 Professional standards and occupational licensing ................. 30  
2.4.8 Other forms of recognition with future potential .................. 30  
2.4.9 Recognition of prior learning ..................................... 32  
2.4.10 The relevance of recognition methodologies to skills mobility in IGAD .................. 33  
2.4.11 Regional comparison with SADC and ECOWAS ................... 35
Chapter 3. Country reviews

3.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 39

3.2 Ethiopia country report ....................................................... 41
  3.2.1 Context in Ethiopia ......................................................... 41
  3.2.2 Skills development in Ethiopia .......................................... 42
  3.2.3 Distribution of refugees and migrants in Ethiopia ............... 46
  3.2.4 Labour market demand in Ethiopia .................................... 49
  3.2.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Ethiopia ....... 51
  3.2.6 Overarching observations: Ethiopia .................................. 53

3.3 The Sudan country report .................................................... 54
  3.3.1 Context in the Sudan ....................................................... 54
  3.3.2 Skills development in the Sudan ...................................... 55
  3.3.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Sudan .......... 57
  3.3.4 Labour market demand in the Sudan ............................... 60
  3.3.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in the Sudan .... 60
  3.3.6 Overarching observations: The Sudan ............................ 61

3.4 Djibouti country report ....................................................... 61
  3.4.1 Context in Djibouti ........................................................ 61
  3.4.2 Skills development in Djibouti ........................................ 63
  3.4.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Djibouti ............. 64
  3.4.4 Labour market demand in Djibouti .................................. 65
  3.4.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Djibouti .... 67
  3.4.6 Overarching observations: Djibouti ............................... 68

3.5 Uganda country report ....................................................... 69
  3.5.1 Context in Uganda ......................................................... 69
  3.5.2 Skills development in Uganda ........................................ 70
  3.5.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Uganda .......... 71
  3.5.4 Labour market demand in Uganda ................................. 75
  3.5.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Uganda .... 76
  3.5.6 Overarching observations: Uganda ................................. 77

3.6 Kenya country report ........................................................ 78
  3.6.1 Context in Kenya .......................................................... 78
  3.6.2 Skills development in Kenya .......................................... 79
  3.6.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Kenya ............... 80
  3.6.4 Labour market demand in Kenya .................................... 81
Chapter 4. Findings and recommendations

4.1 Introduction ........................................ 121

4.2 Cross-cutting findings and recommendations .................................... 121
   4.2.1 Integrate migrants early in skills development and employment .......... 122
   4.2.2 Take stock of migrants’ skills ................................................. 123
   4.2.3 Approach skills recognition in its multiplicity ................................ 124
   4.2.4 Develop inclusive labour market information systems ...................... 125
   4.2.5 Use new technology to automate migrant data collection .................. 127
   4.2.6 Develop tailor-made approaches for skills development and skills recognition for migrant workers and refugees ................................. 128
   4.2.7 Extend the benefits of more open policies on access and rights ............ 130
   4.2.8 Prioritize the development of TVET systems in Member States ............ 130
   4.2.9 Listen to migrants ................................................................... 131
   4.2.10 Take a broad view of the role of IGAD ...................................... 131

4.3 Concluding comments ......................................................................... 132

References ......................................................................................... 135
List of Tables

Table 1. Overview of individuals interviewed during country visits (including selected focus groups) ... 10
Table 2. Urban population in seven IGAD Member States, 2015 ......................................................... 19
Table 3. Employment-to-population ratio in seven IGAD Member States, 1991 and 2016 ............... 20
Table 4. Female labour force participation rate (ages 15 and older) in seven IGAD Member States, 2015 ................................................................. 20
Table 5. Primary and lower secondary completion rates as a percentage of the relevant age group in seven IGAD Member States, 2015 ................................................................. 21
Table 6. Number of students in public and private TVET institutes in Ethiopia in 2015 ................. 43
Table 7. Uganda’s diaspora disaggregated by country, 2016 ............................................................ 72
Table 8. Refugees in Uganda by country of origin, as of the end of June 2016 ................................. 73
Table 9. Refugees in Uganda by age group, as of the end of June 2016 ............................................. 73
Table 10. Refugees in Uganda by gender, as of the end of June 2016 ................................................. 74
Table 11. Somalia national income figures, 2015–2020 ................................................................. 84
Table 12. Enrolment in universities against the demands of the youth bulge ............................... 87
Table 13. Size of populations of concern ......................................................................................... 92
Table 14. Occupations categories in Somalia by numbers of workers and gender ....................... 95
Table 15. Number and percentage of students per institution type in South Sudan, 2016 ............ 103
Table 16. Public unit costs by level of education, 2013–14 ............................................................. 103
Table 17. Average annual fees paid by students per school type, 2015 ............................................. 104
Table 18. Indicative list of stakeholders involved in vocational provisioning ............................... 108
Table 19. Estimated numbers of South Sudan refugees in six neighbouring States .................... 110
Table 20. Refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries in South Sudan, by country of origin (2018/19) ...................................................................................... 111
Table 21. General conditions and education conditions experience by South Sudanese refugee communities .................................................................................. 113
Table 22. Youth employment (ages 15–24 years), by employment category and urban/rural location (%) .............................................................................. 116
List of Figures

Figure 1. Overview of individuals interviewed during country visits (including selected focus groups) . . . . xiv
Figure 2. Refugees and asylum-seekers in Ethiopia as of 30 Sept. 2017 ........................................ 47
Figure 3. Labour force participation in Somalia by educational attainment, 2014 (%) .................................. 96
Figure 4. Mapping the institutional environment and sources of demand for TVET ............................. 105
Figure 5. Map showing population movements: between South Sudan and the region and within the borders of South Sudan, late 2018 ................................................................. 111
Figure 6. Phases of market emergence in Juba .................................................................................. 117
## Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACQF</td>
<td>African Continental Qualifications Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Alternative Education System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQRF</td>
<td>ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTVET</td>
<td>business, technical, and vocational education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>community-based organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDEFOP</td>
<td>European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Competent Recognition Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIT</td>
<td>Directorate of Industrial Training [Uganda]</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>Education Sector Development Programmes [Ethiopia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Strategic Plan [Somalia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>faith-based organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTP</td>
<td>Growth and Transformation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced people</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD-MIGA</td>
<td>IGAD Migration Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Educational Planning</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISCO</td>
<td>International Standard Classification of Occupations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japanese International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JLMP</td>
<td>Joint Labour Migration Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNEA</td>
<td>Kenya National Employment Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNQA</td>
<td>Kenyan National Qualification Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Korea International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Lycée Industriel et Commercial [Djibouti]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENFOP</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education and Professional Training [Djibouti]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOCYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports [South Sudan]</td>
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<td>MOECHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education [Somalia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology [South Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOGLSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development [Uganda]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOGEI</td>
<td>Ministry of General Education and Instruction [South Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOLPSHRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resources Development [South Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOLSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs [Somalia]</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRA</td>
<td>mutual recognition agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSEs</td>
<td>micro and small enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Development Strategy [South Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Employment Policy [Somalia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non–governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NITA</td>
<td>National Industrial Training Authority [Kenya]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOKUT</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NQF</td>
<td>national qualifications framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCACC</td>
<td>Occupational Competency Assessment and Certification Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Practically Acquired Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASDEP</td>
<td>Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Point of Concentration</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-ARCISS</td>
<td>Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>regional economic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMMS</td>
<td>Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPL</td>
<td>recognition of prior learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCF</td>
<td>SADC Qualifications Framework</td>
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<td>SAQA</td>
<td>South African Qualifications Authority</td>
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The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCVTA</td>
<td>Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeships [Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>technical and vocational education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVETA</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority [Kenya]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO-UNEVOC</td>
<td>UNESCO International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVQF</td>
<td>Ugandan Vocational Qualifications Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>VQF</td>
<td>Vocational Qualifications Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTCs</td>
<td>vocational training centres [Sudan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Joint Programme on Youth Employment Somalia</td>
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Foreword

Qualifications operate as a form of currency and facilitate trade in skills in the labour markets. Lack of trusted third-party information about their skills often forces jobseekers to engage in the labour market at a huge disadvantage. This is particularly true for migrants – and even more so for refugees – who are often at a severe disadvantage when it comes to their ability to provide evidence of their qualification. They may acquire the desired skills and/or be able to execute those skills, but cannot back their claims of competence, with certificate in particular in cases where the qualification awarded in another country is not automatically recognized in the host country. In this context, recognition systems play an important part in generating information about people's skills that enables them to participate in the labour market in ways that allow them to be equitably rewarded for the skills they possess and contribute to the development of the country.

In light of this, drawing on substantial work of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other actors in this area, this report examines potential role of skills development and skills recognition for supporting and extending the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility within and between IGAD Member States. It contains seven country chapters, which include a brief overview of the geographical and political factors that have a direct influence on each country's ability to provide skills development opportunities, not only to its own citizens, but also migrants and refugees, particularly through Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET). It also provided an overview of the systems and processes in place to develop and recognize the skills of citizens and non-citizens and an overview of the skills dimensions of national labour markets.

This report on “The potentials of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility: A scoping study covering Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda” is the fruit of the collaboration between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the IGAD Secretariat as part of the project on “Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD Region: Improving Opportunities for Regular Labour Mobility” financed by the European Union. It forms part of the knowledge-generation component of the project, and aims to generate an evidence base for improving labour migration and mobility governance in the IGAD region, which is characterized by forced displacement, mixed migration flows and limited options for regular labour migration and mobility.
Boosting opportunities for labour mobility through an IGAD Free Movement of Persons Protocol should contribute to promote regional integration and reduce pressure on national labour markets that are unable to provide sufficient decent work opportunities. When opportunities for regular migration increase in the IGAD region, more citizens can migrate and increase their decent work opportunities including recognitions of their skills and qualifications across the board. In addition, countries of destination within IGAD and beyond could benefit from labour and skills that they require for socio-economic development.

We believe the findings of this study will provide a comprehensive overview and state of play regarding skills development and recognition, and significantly contribute to the implementation of the IGAD Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

We thank the European Union for its financial support; governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda; the social partners in these IGAD Member States for generously sharing knowledge and information.

IGAD secretariat
Ms. Fathia Alwan
Director, Social Development and Health

ILO
Mr. Alexio Musindo
Director, ILO CO-Addis
Executive summary

This scoping study focuses on the potential role of skills development and skills recognition for supporting and extending the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility within and between the Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD is the successor of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was created in 1986 by Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda, with South Sudan joining in 2011. \(^1\) Drawing on substantial work of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other actors in this area, the study uses the lens of skills recognition and focuses it specifically on seven IGAD countries.

Included in this study report are country chapters on Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda (see chapter 3). These country reports include a brief overview of the geographical and political factors that have a direct influence on each country’s ability to provide skills development opportunities, not only to its own citizens, but also migrants and refugees, particularly through Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET). Also provided are an overview of the systems and processes in place to develop and recognize the skills of citizens and non-citizens; the distribution of migrants and refugees in each country, and an overview of labour market demand.

\(^1\) It should be noted that Eritrea is also an IGAD Member State, but it is not covered within the scope of the study.
While it is recognized that the IGAD Secretariat is currently undertaking consultations for a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the research finds that mainstreaming labour migration in development planning is a weakness that must be addressed in the region. It is strongly argued in this report that interventions specifically designed to support the skills development of migrants, in a region with relatively low capacity to offer quality education and training to its own citizens, will further place strain on Member States and ultimately not be sustainable or realistic. It is further argued that however effective systems to support migrants and refugees may be, these systems will inevitably have to be developed from, or be dependent on, government systems established for skilling purposes or for the purpose of improving labour market functioning. It is common cause that IGAD Member States seem to lack valid and reliable management information on migration in their own boundaries and within the region, which has hampered effective management and planning of migration strategies. To this must be added a paucity of labour market information. For mainstreaming labour migration, possession of a viable domestic labour market information system is essential.

While qualifications operate as a form of currency in the labour market, especially where the qualifications are of a high quality from reputable, trusted education institutions, migrants – and even more so refugees – are often at a severe disadvantage to provide evidence of such achievements. Opacity of changes in domestic and foreign occupational systems and seemingly irrelevant or out of date qualifications, both at home and abroad, discourage exploration of the options. At present, the increasing volume and spatial diffusion of job- and work-driven migration across the globe makes it difficult to appreciate how in previous decades employers had limited knowledge or experience in managing the qualification profile of their workforce proactively, either within the country or across international borders.

The findings presented in the report are based on three main tenets:

- Stable national systems, with robust, implemented governance frameworks, form the basis for any regional process and must be supported at all costs.
- IGAD, as a regional body, can play an effective role by setting common standards for qualifications and skills as well as by developing normative policy instruments.
- Between these national and regional levels, there exists a unique opportunity to draw on innovative new measures being developed in other parts of the world. Considering that such interventions are also being driven by international priorities, the opportunity to adapt them to IGAD is very real and will also be cost effective.

The following findings and associated recommendations are presented in more detail in chapter 4 of the report:

1. **Integrate migrants early** – Findings from the case studies strongly corroborated international research that the sooner migrants can be integrated in the labour market in the receiving country, the sooner they can contribute meaningfully. Recommendation 1.1 argues that a comprehensive migration architecture for IGAD should include the early integration of migrants as an important strategic priority.

---

2. The generic term "migrant" is used throughout this report (as defined in OECD, 2016); while "refugee" is used according to the definition provided in the Geneva Convention of 1951.
2. **Take stock of migrants’ skills** – Migrants, and more so refugees, are unlikely to have documentary evidence of their formally acquired skills and even less likely for non-formal learning. A move towards prior skills assessment, or recognition of prior learning (RPL), is in line with the African Union Commission (AUC) directive that RPL be considered for migrants. **Recommendation 2.1** proposes strengthening points of entry data-capturing mechanisms. IGAD countries should capture migrant, refugee, and asylum-seekers’ demographic profiles for planning and provisioning purposes. Such processes further rely on the existence of such points of entry, which in many cases are not in place, or at least, are not functionally in place. Despite this weakness across IGAD, the ability to capture adequate and reliable data is the only long-term solution for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD region. **Recommendation 2.2** proposes the establishment a centralized facility in IGAD, working with the AUC, should be able to support other Member States and provide guidance and instruments for the recognition of skills. Ideally, this should involve the identification of an existing centre of excellence in one of the Member States. An alternative option would be to establish some capacity in this regard at the IGAD level, with at least one RPL expert from the region based at (or seconded to) the IGAD Secretariat. It is proposed that the Centre should develop capacity and/or partnerships to focus specifically on the recognition of work experience for employment purposes, and that the results be located within a labour market information system in a searchable format to employers specifically, and to governments more broadly.

3. **Approach skills recognition in its multiplicity** – There exist different forms of recognition, many of which are being used in the international context, ranging from long established approaches to more modern ones to approaches that are only starting to gain traction. IGAD has the opportunity to leapfrog other countries and regions by learning from these developments and contextualizing the application thereof in the region. **Recommendation 3.1** proposes that the feasibility, benefits, and costs of a regional qualifications framework for IGAD should be explored. Overall, the country visits by the research team point to the need for a combination of common regional standards, strengthened national systems, and innovative projects. The regional suite of qualifications should draw on existing qualifications that are offered in Member States and that are well recognized by employers. After some consultation and contextualization, these qualifications can be offered regionally. **Recommendation 3.2** argues for a more detailed review of the innovations being introduced by credentialing agencies in other migration contexts such as in Germany and Norway. **Recommendation 3.3** proposes that the potential role of the Addis Convention in promoting the recognition of higher education qualifications, including some skills-based qualifications, across IGAD countries should be explored by the IGAD Secretariat. In this regard it is proposed that professionals’ associations be included as they play an important role in standard setting, and skills recognition. The recent recommendation on the recognition of refugees’ qualifications under the Lisbon Recognition Convention for higher education (Council of Europe and UNESCO, 2017) is a very good example of how skills recognition can be promoted under the broader ambit of a regional convention. The IGAD Secretariat is encouraged to raise this option with the AUC and other continental bodies. **Recommendation 3.4**: In addressing the central challenges of generating skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility, it is necessary to recognize the pivotal role of social partners in the skills systems of IGAD. Through having workers and employers’ organizations actively involved at different levels is key to ensure the usefulness, relevance and quality of skills development and recognition systems. Recent research has been undertaken to improve understanding of
how trade unions and employer bodies have engaged in the development of national skills policies (Bridgford, 2017; ILO, 2018c).

4. Develop inclusive labour market information systems – Across the country case studies, we observed that in different configurations, various institutions in each IGAD country generate information relevant to the labour market and employment as part of their internal processes. These data and databases could be taken to be the foundations of a nascent national labour market information environment. Recommendation 4.1 proposes that standardized refugee and migrant information systems are developed in relation to these national initiatives. Recommendation 4.2 emphasizes that information systems must be developed within a sufficient institutional base that can provide support, continuity, and quality. Recommendation 4.3 adds that the strategic approach would be to include refugee and migrant data into existing systems, such as health and schooling systems. In this regard it is proposed that a research programme on the labour market is designed and implemented. Such a programme could be housed in an IGAD Centre of Excellence and potentially serve as a platform for systematic evaluation studies – including tracer studies – such as to investigate the impact of the TVET system on employment, wage income, and its relevance to economic and social needs was emphasized. Recommendation 4.4 proposes that it is key to strengthen the capacities of national statistical offices and other target institutions in IGAD countries to improve their understanding of international statistics standards and International Conference of Labour Statisticians guidelines concerning statistics on international labour migration.

5. Use new technology to automate migrant data collection – Newly available technologies for automating identification of humans, such as biometric methods (including iris recognition), are being tested in several contexts, including in Ethiopia. Recommendation 5.1 proposes that a project is initiated to learn more from the technology-driven solutions that are currently being developed internationally, and examine how these could be used for migrants within the IGAD context. Recent UNESCO research in this area can provide a useful point of departure (UNESCO, 2018a).

6. Develop tailor-made approaches for skills development for migrants – Skills development opportunities for citizens in IGAD countries are very limited. To expect that these opportunities would, in some way, be able to also cater for migrants is unrealistic. Systematically developed pilot skills programmes for migrants and refugees in both countries of origin and destination are a viable option, while ensuring that they are embedded in the relevant national skills system. Should IGAD and its Member States want to take this process forward, such programmes should include well-defined RPL processes that can be trusted by employers. Recommendation 6.1 proposes that at least one tailor-made skills training initiative in IGAD be undertaken as a pilot project in an area that has the best chance of success. Recommendation 6.2 explores the option of specific multilateral recognition arrangements for relevant sectors, such as agriculture as a core sector of IGAD country economies, or for occupations most affected by migration across IGAD, drawing on similar international attempts. Recommendation 6.3 proposes that TVET skilling should be mainstreamed as far as possible for groups that have experienced conflict.

7. Extend the benefits of more open policies on access and rights – Policy development with respect to migration needs to be informed by the commitment on the part of all parties to ensuring that the rights to access to key opportunities, resources, and statuses
are progressively extended through reference to fundamental principles and rights at work and social protections in the globalized context. A lack of coordination between these functions seems to be experienced by migrants, and in particular by refugees. In this regard, Uganda is a good example where refugees are not compelled to be interned in refugee camps, and are claimed to be able to integrate freely, while also having rights to buy land. Recommendation 7.1 proposes a case study focusing on the process in Uganda and drawing from ILO programmes in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey that would be of benefit to other IGAD countries. The study should include a focus on government communication concerning matters related to foreign workers.

8. Prioritize the development of TVET systems in Member States – TVET systems in Member States tend to be underdeveloped in relation to social needs and economic skills demands. A robust labour migration governance architecture for IGAD is very dependent on the TVET capacity in Member States. While bolt-on interventions (i.e. interventions that are largely ad hoc and do not form part of a more holistic planning process) in the region may have some short-term gains, they will ultimately not succeed. Recommendation 8.1 emphasizes that IGAD Member States must prioritize systematic, long-term, and well planned TVET infrastructure and capacity development. Recommendation 8.2 adds to this, by suggesting that investment growth should be focused not merely on growth for its own sake, but growth in labour absorbing capacity of the economy. Investment in sectors that are appropriate to the needs of the economies of IGAD countries and that are labour intensive can make a meaningful difference.

9. Listen to migrants – It is not evident that any substantial effort has been made to engage migrants directly, less so refugees. While there are limitations to such a direct interaction, any intervention mechanisms will be incomplete if it does not take into consideration migrants’ own experience. Recommendation 9.1 proposes that focused research using participatory methods be conducted to better understand the needs of migrants and how they can be supported. The complexities associated with different languages should be considered, including the ability of interpreters to gather reliable information.

10. Take a broad view of the role of IGAD – Refugee and migration phenomena are multilateral; it makes sense for affected countries that share common borders and therefore common economic interests to work collaboratively. This is the fundamental premise of IGAD. Admittedly, IGAD can be put forward as the preeminent unit for dealing with migration events because these events traverse the entire region. Some IGAD Member States are party to multiple regional economic communities (e.g., Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda are also part of the EAC) and must therefore also respond to multiple protocols, even when there might be incoherence in some cases. Recommendation 10.1 proposes the multilateral approach and coordination role of IGAD be strengthened by making use of existing migration governance architecture of IGAD, such as the IGAD Regional Consultation Process and Regional Migration Coordination Committee, and further take efforts to enhance coordination with similar structures of other regional economic communities. Recommendation 10.2 proposes that IGAD needs to closely examine existing protocols and programmes of other regional economic communities that its Member States are party to. This complexity needs to be carefully examined and managed. Lastly, Recommendation 10.3 argues for the enhancement of bilateral initiatives and programmes among IGAD Member
States, including collaboration arrangements among Member States themselves within the broader scope of regional integration and development.

Despite advances in constructing overarching frameworks, setting priorities for action as well as making interventions, we argue that a weakness of Member States’ tactics toward migration is that they are not “mainstreaming labour migration in development planning” (Global Migration Group, 2010). While a full mapping exercise that follows the route of a migrant worker, for example, from outside the IGAD region, is beyond the scope of this assessment, the research highlights the many layers that a migrant must traverse to reach the point where they interact with the TVET system, either perhaps as a student or as an RPL applicant. The research clearly shows that there are numerous potential barriers to migrants’ access to free flow of labour in Member States and to the recognition of skills with regard to employment. Put differently, it will be essential for States to work on all levels at which movement is possible. The ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), and the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (2006) form the foundation of such attempts.

Skills development and skills recognition have the potential to support and extend the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility within and between Member States of IGAD, but only when the interrelationships between the concepts are understood and then developed and implemented in a coordinated and realistic manner – and also linked to national systems of education and training, in order to ensure sustainability. Further, there is a need to better coordinate labour migration policies with those of employment, education, and training. This requires cooperation between national education and labour ministries and with other ministries that have responsibility for migration policy, as well as employers’ and workers’ organizations. The adoption of a protocol on the free movement of people will be critical in this regard.
Chapter 1. Introduction and background

1.1 Overview

This report consists of three main chapters. This first chapter provides the introduction to the study and elaborates on the research design, specifically to allow for replicability in and comparison with other regions of the world. The second chapter is a condensed version of a literature review that was conducted as part of the study. The third chapter presents an overview of the findings from the five countries, focusing on the systems and programmes for skills development in relation to migrants. The last chapter provides an overview of the findings as well as recommendations for improved skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD region.

1.2 IGAD migration governance architecture

The scoping study presented in this report focuses on the potential role of skills development and skills recognition for supporting and extending the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility within and between seven Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda. The research builds specifically on the normative instruments developed by IGAD for the governance of migration over more than a decade, including the following:

a. The creation of an enabling environment for the free movement of goods, services, and people, and the establishment of rights of residence (per article 7 of the Agreement that established IGAD).

b. The IGAD Regional Consultative Process on migration initiated in 2008, which was created to offer Member States a platform for dialogue and cooperation. Decisions and recommendations that emanate from the Regional Consultative Process are endorsed by IGAD policy organs, ensuring action is taken (ILO, 2017a). The Regional Consultative Process is enacted through a Regional Migration Coordination Committee and through National Coordination Mechanisms in each of the Member States.

c. A Regional Migration Policy Framework adopted in 2012, which provides a normative framework for the treatment of migrants, including internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees in all IGAD Member States (IGAD, 2012).

d. The IGAD Migration Action Plan 2015–2020 that the IGAD Secretariat introduced to identify regionally validated priorities across Member States (IGAD, 2014).

The instruments referenced above show how over a decade or more, strenuous efforts have been made to develop a comprehensive structure of policy frameworks and institutional

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3 The eight IGAD Member State – Eritrea – is not covered under the scope of the study.

4 But also to non-state actors (UN, AUC, other RECs, other transit and destination countries and regions, academia, civil societies e.t.c.)
mechanisms that together comprise the IGAD Migration Governance Architecture (IGAD-MIGA). To do this, IGAD has worked towards strengthening migration governance through national and regional efforts:

The IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework recognizes that strengthening cooperation and coordination in migration management at both national and regional levels is vital to improved migration governance in the region (IGAD, 2012).

At the regional level, immediately below the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the following structures play a vital role in overseeing the implementation of the IGAD-MIGA (IGAD, 2016a):

- the Council of Ministers;
- the Committee of Ambassadors that oversees all migration actions;
- the Sectoral Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration, which complements the functions of two of the regional platforms mentioned above:
  - Regional Migration Coordination Committee – a political platform to facilitate information sharing and coordination among IGAD Member States and institutions with migration-related functions and responsibilities; and
  - Regional Consultative Process – an informal, non-binding mechanism with the overall objective of facilitating dialogue and regional cooperation on migration management by creating a platform through which information is exchanged, best practices are shared, and solutions to common challenges are pursued.
- the IGAD Secretariat; and
- the IGAD Technical Working Group on Migration, comprising experts from the IGAD Secretariat and IGAD Specialized Institutes, which work together on the day-to-day functioning of the IGAD MIGA and the IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework. These Specialized Institutes include the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism; the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre; the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development; and the IGAD Security Sector Programme.

The IGAD-MIGA has been clearly well developed according to the IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework. The IGAD-MIGA “requires strong national structures that are linked to the IGAD super-structure on migration management” (IGAD, 2012, p. 53). This is especially the case with respect to the migration of labour, as argued in the IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework: “Labour migration lies at the heart of national migration policies, legislation, structures and labour regulations especially at the destinations thereby affecting the process itself and in particular affecting the lives of migrants and their dependents” (IGAD, 2012, p. 26). Governance of labour migration gives emphasis to harmonizing, integrating, and co-coordinating national legislation, policies, structures, and programmes “to realise migration policy coherence” in the region (IGAD, 2012, p. 65).

Accordingly, at the national level of each IGAD Member State, the National Coordination Mechanisms embedded in Ministries of Interior and Offices of Prime Ministers in some Member States as well as other national coordination platforms related to migration are in a state of concerted development. Strategic Priority 2 of the IGAD Migration Action Plan 2015–2020 specifically targets the aim to “build effective national migration governance architecture”. The key actions being undertaken by Member States are to: (1) develop
a National Migration Action Plan; (2) establish a National Coordination Mechanism for Migration by expanding National Inter-Ministerial Migration Taskforces; and (3) have each National Coordination Mechanism for Migration deliberate on capacity needs assessment reports conducted by IGAD and by the National Consultative Conferences.

Building and capacitating the overall IGAD governance system, with an emphasis on strengthening Member States’ national systems, will include the following actions set out in the Migration Action Plan 2015–2020 (IGAD, 2014, p. 22):

- conduct needs assessments on the capacity of Member States for effective migration governance;
- reorganize national taskforces and establish National Coordination Mechanisms for Migration;
- assist Member States in building capacity based on the gaps identified in the needs assessments;
- conduct training needs assessments and analyses for effective migration governance;
- Regional Consultative Process deliberations on capacity needs assessment reports related to effective migration governance; and
- provide capacity-building training courses for Member States on migration governance and border management.

To these must be added the importance of capacitating the development of evidence-based systems and information systems to support national labour migration policies and legislation (IGAD, 2012).

The impetus towards strengthening IGAD migration governance has further been supported through the overall objective of the 7th Regional Consultative Process to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among IGAD Member States towards greater understanding and policy coherence on labour migration, specifically in strengthening national and regional coordination efforts in the IGAD region to better address regional initiatives and programmes (IGAD, 2016b; IGAD, 2016c). The Regional Consultative Process recognized that in IGAD Member States there are different government institutions/agencies responsible for the different facets of migration (including labour migration), and that Member States need to make the operational statuses of counterpart National Coordination Mechanisms equivalent, while also noting that each migration issue will probably require a unique governance regime. Related to these national developments, progress simultaneously depends on how the IGAD Secretariat in Djibouti can enhance its capability to manage the development of skills and recognition in the region regarding both policy and practice.

At a Special Summit of IGAD in Nairobi in March 2017, Heads of State of the sub-region met to discuss refugees as a single agenda item. They adopted the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia, as well as its comprehensive Plan of Action, committing to jointly pursue a regional approach to address the protracted situation of Somali refugees. Under the leadership of IGAD, and with the support from the European Union, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and many other partners, this led to the regional application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). The first regional thematic conference
on refugee education was held in Djibouti in December 2017, and resulted in the adoption of the Djibouti Declaration on Regional Refugee Education and its associated Plan of Action, including the landmark commitment of all IGAD Member States to include refugees in national education plans (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

The IGAD Secretariat is currently undertaking consultations for a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. Despite these advances in constructing overarching frameworks for migration, setting priorities for action, and making interventions, it is recognized that a weakness among Member States’ tactics toward migration is that they are not mainstreaming labour migration into development planning (ILO, 2017a). This is an important point that will be revisited throughout this research, as it will be argued that bolt-on interventions (i.e., interventions that are largely ad hoc and do not form part of a more holistic planning process) in a region with relatively low capacity to offer quality education and training to its own citizens will further place strain on Member States and ultimately not be sustainable nor realistic. With this broader challenge in mind, it is intended that this research will contribute meaningfully to the development of a migration governance architecture that can harmonize the developmental potential of migration and the well-being of migrants, including IDPs (citizens) and refugees, in the IGAD region.

1.2.1 Challenges for mainstreaming labour migration in development planning

This scoping study has potential to extend progress in IGAD’s governance of migration, and in particular to contribute towards understanding how labour migration could be mainstreamed in development planning. Of importance would be to take into account how labour market conditions across the member countries might respond in ways that are not anticipated by governance architects.

Exploratory scoping of labour market dynamics in the presence of migrant skills is useful to inform the development of governance instruments – whether policy, legislation, or regulation – within the ambit of free movement of persons and regional integration. This involves exploring, on the one hand, how migrants of all skills levels interact with the labour market(s) in each country, and on the other hand, exploring how employers treat migrants seeking employment opportunities. This scoping study thus attempted to probe how migrants of different skills levels impact on labour markets in each of the participating countries across two dimensions: (1) the contribution of migrant labour skills to greater productivity; and (2) the impact of migrant labour on employment rates of residents. This kind of approach brings into focus the costs and benefits of introducing low-, intermediate-, and high-skilled migrants into national, occupational, or local labour markets.

A further approach toward understanding the implications of investing in mainstreaming labour migration is to map out the chain of governance-related interventions that are required to mainstream a skilled migrant along a path from arrival/entry into sovereign national territory through to being fairly recruited and legally employed by a formal business, and in some cases, also to being reintegrated in their country of origin. To this analysis is added the investment required to capacitate the value-chain of governance cooperation and institutional development needed to improve inter-State and intra-regional cooperation on governance of labour migration. This might include provision, for example, to minimize
adverse labour market impacts of informal economy exploitation of irregular migrant workers. This scoping study sought to identify the features, main actors, and processes involved in mainstreaming labour migration to harness productivity and social benefits for participants. The intention was to provide policy advice on putting in place a labour migration governance framework that facilitates opportunities for adequate skills development and recognition among IGAD Member States.

Designing systems of governance for mainstreaming international skilled migration would have to account for multiple contexts. Therefore, the optimal configuration of policy, legislation, and regulation would likely differ in relation to the unique set of interactions between migrating populations and their host countries and labour markets. As has been observed, human migration is intrinsically about the relocation of skills, and therefore will constantly require efforts to track the elusive equilibrium between the total skills needs of the receiving labour market in relation to the skills offered by incoming migrants. If the labour migration governance system is not responsive to labour market needs, such migrants can add to existing stocks of unemployed and expected graduate production. Labour migration governance systems should be responsive to labour market needs to ensure migrant workers are filling labour shortages, and that they are privy to the same treatment, rights, and opportunities as nationals.

It is further important to note that migration is largely driven by the search for decent work opportunities (rather than being an intentional relocation of skills). In such situations, the challenge of matching skills with opportunities should not be underestimated as a mere technical exercise. In many migration scenarios, there is a high likelihood of conflicting economic, social, or political interests that impact on how migrant jobseekers are received. Local workers, local unemployed people, and employers within the local labour market, as well as sector bodies, unions, local authorities, and political lobbies/pressure groups can influence the number and identity of migrant workers accommodated as well as the conditions according to which these workers are afforded work opportunities. In extreme circumstances, migrants may experience local labour market conditions so inhospitable that they only find exploitative, irregular, short-term, informal, and unprotected jobs with low wages in poor working conditions. These adverse circumstances may also admit human rights abuses related to forced labour, child labour, and/or human trafficking.

From the perspective of migrants, such a worst-case scenario obliges them to treat work as a means to an end – as an unpalatable necessity for survival. That is, as an opportunity to earn meagre wages sufficient to resource their onward journey. This pattern denies the local economy the benefits that can be accrued through attracting migrants – as potential skilled labour resources – to stay and become employed long enough for their skills and experience to be absorbed and to benefit local product and service value chains. The circumstances alluded to above may also manifest as a result of gaps in the policy, legislative, and regulatory frameworks of the territories or regions through which migrants are moving. In other situations where legislation is open to incorporation of migrant workers, there may be challenges to bringing the intentions to fruition, including: limited capacity of the State at different levels to implement the legislation; lack of buy-in from employers; cultural forms of resistance from local communities; poor awareness of the potential value of what migrants can offer; lack of systems to recognise migrants’ skills; and resistance from unemployed nationals or locals.

Then there is the barrier of information access. Large numbers of people are caught up in different migration flows that experience information deficits in multiple dimensions.
Typically, limited knowledge of the labour market is one such deficit with respect to, for instance, the types of work guarantees and conditions that are enabled by legislation or regulations, or information about the actual opportunities available in the local labour market. Without these types of information, migrants are vulnerable to being channelled towards work circumstances in which they suffer exploitation. Difficulties with accessing information may be further complicated for migrants whose linguistic, ethnic and religious affinities are distinctive in the local circumstances. Even local jobseekers may commonly face a similar set of challenges with regard to accessing labour market information.

Last – though by no means least – on the matter of information availability, it is common cause that IGAD Member States seem to lack valid and reliable management of information on migration within their own boundaries and within the region, which has hampered effective planning and management of migration strategies. To this must be added a paucity of labour market information. For mainstreaming labour migration, possession of a viable domestic labour market information system is essential. Labour market information resources are unevenly distributed across IGAD. Whereas Kenya has the Kenya Labour Market Information System, other Member States have made slower progress towards institutionalizing capacity for a labour market information system and for collecting information on the informal economy (ILO, 2015b).

Given the centrality of good data systems, African Union Member States, including members of IGAD, have been encouraged to develop regional and country roadmaps for the implementation of a Labour Market Information System Harmonization and Coordination Framework (ILO, 2015b). This will be a useful instrument in taking full account of multiple forms of migration, including: the many semi-skilled workers that are mobile within the IGAD region and further afield; returnees from countries within IGAD (ILO, 2017b); migrants in the Middle East; those repatriated from the European Union (EU); those from the diaspora; and vulnerable pastoralists who have lost access to their traditional lands through climate change.

The documentation on migration governance shares a common assumption that harmonized laws and common agreements on labour migration are needed to cooperatively manage the mobility of people in IGAD countries, but these must be shaped according to a common rationale and agreed upon process, international labour standards, social dialogue, and accurate data (ILO, 2017a). These common agreements would help to address central questions, such as those posed at the third meeting of the IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration in 2013 (IGAD, 2013, p. 8):

- How will we calibrate effective border management to foster regional growth?
- How will we align migration protocols (Free Movement) to speak to national interests and policy?
- How will we deliver efficient labour mobility?
- How will we establish border management frameworks that respond to irregular movements?
- How will we harmonize our migration management mechanisms considering the disparate national priorities and levels of development?

To fulfil the purpose of facilitating labour mobility, these questions have to be addressed from a labour migration perspective.

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5 See [www.labourmarket.go.ke](http://www.labourmarket.go.ke) [accessed 2 November 2017].
1.3 Objectives of the study

In the context of migration, the challenge for governments is to be able, willing, and committed to bring migrant populations into interaction with the domestic labour market. This requires governments to find ways of guiding and supporting migrant populations with disparate skills and work inclinations into relationship with the formal employment system. It is important to the host government to explore ways of constructing policy, legislative, and regulatory provisions that can incentivize increased integration of migrants into local and national labour markets.

This scoping study was commissioned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and took place between 2017 and 2019, with the specific aim of investigating the potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility. Drawing on substantial work of the ILO and other actors from across the globe in this area, the study uses the lens of skills recognition and focuses it specifically on seven of the IGAD countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda. As a region that has been affected by a range of environmental and political factors, high population growth with a high percentage of youths, and weak links between supply and demand of skills (ILO, 2017a), the IGAD region presents a unique context in which a meaningful contribution can be made to knowledge building as well as operational implementation of skills development and recognition on the African continent.

For this reason, the ILO has initiated the “Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD Region: Improving Opportunities for Regular Labour Mobility” as a project with the overall objective to “improve opportunities for regulated labour mobility and decent work within IGAD countries through the development of models of intervention, in the broader context of the regional integration process” (ILO, 2017c, p. 3). The ILO in close collaboration with IGAD is conducting a series of studies as part of the knowledge-building component of the project, which seeks to deepen understanding of migration and labour market dynamics in the region, including the constraints and opportunities for employment creation and causes of skills shortages.

The scoping study presented in this report forms part of the knowledge-building component, and has three main objectives:

1. To review the status of IGAD policies on the free flow of skilled labour in Member States, in particular for technical/vocational skills (i.e., high-, semi-skilled, and low-skilled labour);
2. To review the current country systems, programmes, and activities on skills development (e.g., skills policies, standards, and recognition systems) and to analyse their implications with respect to promoting mutual recognition of skills for both departing and returning migrant workers;
3. To provide recommendations on the way forward for improved skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD region.
1.4 Research design

The scoping study was based on a method according to which the activities of a migrant jobseeker were described as a series of stages. The aim of setting out such a cycle was to identify the particular challenges faced by migrants as they transition closer to their goal of decent employment. As these activities were mapped out, it became possible to identify specific points where governments could intervene to facilitate the desire of migrants to find decent work.

Our key research questions were as follows:
1. What is the fit between the skills of a migrant and demand of the destination labour market?
2. How does the type of migration (forced, voluntary) impact on whether migrants can prepare for employment by doing training or ensuring they have their proof of qualification available/with them?
3. How can people who migrate internationally, but equally those who migrate within their own country, benefit from recognition systems to have their personal basket of skills formally recognized?
4. What skills training is offered to return migrants in order to facilitate their reintegration into the national labour market?

While there are some strategies that a government might, in principle, be willing to adopt to incorporate job seeking migrants, a critical challenge for governments is scarcity of information about migrants. Since information about migrants may assist in designing appropriate programmes for their inclusion in the national economy, it was important to designate specific points at which migrants would have to interact with government as opportunities for obtaining essential data. Such a mapping process proved useful in identifying the particular points in a migrant’s journey where they would benefit from access to information in order to make decisions.

Accordingly, if the steps job seeking migrants might take towards their goal are documented, government may be in a position to offer information that enables migrants to make decisions and that also highlights productive options. Of particular interest are sequences of interventions that government may adopt to increase the chances that migrants can successfully transition from arrival in a new destination to a situation wherein they have obtained a job with reasonable conditions and even future prospects.

A full mapping exercise that followed the route of a migrant worker, for example, from outside the IGAD region, was beyond the scope of this assessment. However, the perspective taken highlights the other layers that a migrant must traverse to reach the point where they interact with the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems in other IGAD countries, either perhaps as a student or as an applicant for an opportunity to assess their skills and prior experience. What this implies is that there are numerous potential barriers to labour migration and migrants’ access to free flow of labour in IGAD Member States. Put differently, it will be essential for States to work on all levels at which movement is possible. The value chain of free movement transactions leading to labour market access must have full integrity, otherwise it can fail to achieve its purpose or work at less than optimal efficiency. Alternatively, even if opportunities were created for migrants to gain recognition
of prior learning (RPL), migrants might find that employers would not accept their paper credentials, either because employers lack of awareness of the validity of those credentials or because they prefer to employ informal migrant labour at an extortionate lower rate due to lack of enforcement by the authorities to discourage this practice.

The central issues addressed in this study were the subject of a relatively wide range of multilateral agencies, all of which have substantial internet profiles. Therefore, a large volume of primary and secondary documents was acquired from various sources identified in the course of the literature review. Relatively recent country profiles for IGAD Member States on themes related to the focus of this study – such as migration, TVET system development, labour market performance, youth demographics, employment and unemployment, and others – have been published by an array of multilateral organizations, including IGAD, the ILO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the African Union, the World Bank, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). These resources provided a standardized and comparable grounding in basic contextual information, allowing comparative perspectives across the countries. Applying Boolean logic search operators and query modifiers provided opportunity to source official publications, grey literature, and scholarly publications.

Core data collection methods in the fieldwork phase included: interviews, focus group interviews, and observation (see table 1). Thus, primary data collection was mainly through qualitative methods, supplemented by quantitative data. Instruments were developed to structure interviews that enabled researchers to elicit information regarding the particular targeted questions and issues. Also, semi-structured interviews were conducted with focus groups where possible. Researchers also took extensive field notes. Interviews were arranged with:

a. officials in identified government departments and supporting institutions;
b. officials in TVET colleges;
c. labour market participants, namely employed workers (migrants where possible), unemployed jobseekers, employers, and worker organizations;
d. industry representative bodies;
e. training organizations; and
f. multilateral organizations whose core business is related to the key themes of this scoping study, such as the ILO, UNESCO, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), amongst others.

IGAD Secretariat options to interview relevant smaller non–governmental organization (NGO) and community-based organization (CBO) representatives were taken up where opportunities arose. Time constraints prevented coverage of this full cross-section of players in each country case study.

The country reports include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda. These reports include:

a. a brief overview of the geographical and political factors that have a direct influence on the country’s ability to provide skills development opportunities, not only to its own citizens, but also to migrants and refugees;
b. the range of skills development institutions and qualifications available and how these are organized;
c. data permitting, an overview of the geographical location of migrants and refugees, and in a few instances, the known skills distributions;
d. the demand in the country for specific skills, which, in turn, allows for matching of those held by migrants and refugees;
e. the systems and processes in place to recognize the skills of non-citizens; and
f. a few key observations that are specific to the country.

The bulk of interviews took place with government ministries and institutions, since management of social phenomena such as migration is predominantly the mandate of government. The team relied on local assistance to arrange the majority of interviews and focus groups. The core research team conducted the country case study visits with logistical support from the team at the ILO Country Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The ILO Office in Addis Ababa has a regional mandate as the ILO Country Office for Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and the ILO Office in Dar es Salaam for the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. Support from the ILO Addis Ababa Office included coordination at a country level with their respective contact points in Djibouti, Kenya, the Sudan, and Uganda. ILO Addis Ababa Country Office personnel liaised with their counterparts in the participating countries, who in turn took responsibility for arranging interviews. The research took place between November 2017 and March 2019 and included a one-week country visit to each of the study countries.

Table 1. Overview of individuals interviewed during country visits (including selected focus groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IGAD country</th>
<th>Government (TVET agencies, Labour, TVET colleges)</th>
<th>Other government (Interior Affairs, Investment, etc.)</th>
<th>Development agencies (UNESCO, ILO, GIZ, etc.)</th>
<th>Private employers</th>
<th>Business associations, unions, and forums</th>
<th>Other (incl. NGOs)</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Secretariat and regional implementation bodies</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: – = nil.
The use of the term “migrant”

The interpretation of the generic term “migrant”, as used in this report, is based on a consideration of ILO and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definitions.

The OECD (2016, p. 7) defines a migrant as follows:

The term “migrant” is a generic term for anyone moving to another country with the intention of staying for a certain period of time – not, in other words, tourists or business visitors. It includes both permanent and temporary migrants with a valid residence permit or visa, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants who do not belong to any of the three groups.

The term “migrant worker” is defined by Article 11(1) of the ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143) as follows: A person who migrates or who has migrated from one country to another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his own account and includes any person regularly admitted as a migrant worker.

Further, the analysis in this report is informed by the ILO’s Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration (ILO, 2018b), which is concerned with standardizing usage of terms relevant to migration so as to ensure comparability and accuracy. Accordingly, the term “refugee” is used to specifically refer to the definition provided in the Geneva Convention of 1951. Migrants without documentation may not have applied for formal protection, are unable to or are prevented from doing so, or prefer not to.
Chapter 2. Literature review

2.1 Introduction

Governance of migration has been, and will remain, a great challenge for States and federations of States, especially under conditions of globalization and climate change wherein the economic boundaries of the nation-state no longer coincide with its political boundaries (Deeg, 2006). The ILO observes that labour migration “is an increasingly complex and dynamic phenomenon taking place within and between all regions of the world” (ILO, 2017d, p. 5). For example, in terms of the scale and direction of migration “the volume of South–South migration (migration between developing countries) is larger than migration from the South to high-income countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development” (World Bank, 2011a, p. ix).

In the African context, the African Union’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa (AU, 2006a, revised 2017) and African Common Position on Migration and Development (2006) facilitate and guide national-, regional-, and continental-level actions on migration (see Lavenex et al., 2015). Despite the dedicated move towards developing a strong migration governance framework, challenges with implementation are currently experienced nationally and at regional economic community levels as well as at the continental level. Since human migration intrinsically involves the movement of skills, specific attention must be given on a national and regional level to design governance measures that contribute to a distribution of skills that optimizes demand and supply matching and mutually enables migrant integration, both socially and economically.

We note that there is a vast body of literature on migration as a broad topic, but in this scoping study, we considered migration specifically from a skills recognition perspective. This more specific focus is in line with the scope of the study and was done to develop a better understanding of skills development and recognition systems in the context of migration, mobility, and free movement of persons in the IGAD region.

We also take note that designing systems of governance for mainstreaming international skilled migration and mobility would have to account for multiple contexts. Therefore, the optimal configuration of policy, legislation, and regulation would likely differ in relation to the unique set of interactions between migrating populations and their host countries and labour markets. As has been observed above, human migration is intrinsically about the relocation of skills and therefore will constantly require efforts to track the elusive equilibrium between the total skills needs of the receiving labour market in relation to the skills offered by incoming migrants, who potentially add to existing stocks of unemployed and expected graduate production.
In the next section we present a synopsis of the available literature on skills development and TVET from a migration perspective as we consider the implications for IGAD. This is followed by a review of skills recognition systems, also based on the available literature, and then a concluding section that reviews the implications of a better understanding of skills development and recognition systems for migration in IGAD.

2.2 The link between skills development and skills recognition

At the time when the structure of this literature review was set out, the aim was to conduct a review of the TVET systems in the IGAD region and how these systems have developed in response to social and economic factors. However, it was realized that generating data to support this kind of approach at the literature review phase was very limited, since there is a paucity of material available. It became apparent that only through personal contact and discussion with role-players during the fieldwork phase could the team expect to source information in sufficient depth. We can refer to TVET in two ways: on the one hand, the TVET sector as an institutional form that produces graduates with TVET skills and qualifications; and on the other hand, there is the domain of technical and vocational skills that can be learned or acquired practically anywhere, whether at home, on the job, or through formal organized paid work or otherwise. The African Union (AU) Continental Strategy for Education (2016–25) acknowledges that TVET should cover all aspects of skills development and acquisition, be it formal, non-formal, or informal, and that most skills acquisition happens in the informal economy – an observation that holds true in the IGAD countries as well. In our view, the latter understanding needs to be expressed while acknowledging the formal institutional form. Therefore, this section:

- observes how recognition systems – or perhaps facilities – can be used in validating the informally learned skills of labour market participants and in confirming possession of skills by workers who have lost their physical certificates;
- argues for the utility of skills recognition systems for generating better information for the labour market, which makes the market more effective;
- further argues that skills recognition systems have a positive contribution to make to facilitating the labour market in developing countries/regions and in supporting adequate compensation for skills, which can contribute to improved income, greater productivity, social mobility, and better economic performance of firms;
- notes that skills recognition systems will contribute to improve opportunities for jobseekers to find work in contexts of migration;
- observes that for skills recognition systems to work optimally, they must be supported by other systems of recognition, including recognition of the skills certification route by labour market participants, especially employers; and
- observes that skills recognition systems need to be linked to a well-developed and structured national qualifications system. In the context of high levels of international migration, it would be important to also undergo a process through which member countries within a particular region should negotiate a common regional qualifications framework that is served by a common recognition system.
To start, we need to answer the question, “What is the meaning of skills recognition?” There are several ways of addressing this question. Skills recognition can be presented as a means of dealing with an information gap involving a qualified individual who cannot provide evidence of their skills provenance. Skills recognition can also be presented as a very important set of techniques that can be used to identify individuals who have acquired marketable skills without formal training. In this respect, skills recognition is an important instrument for ameliorating disadvantage at the individual level and for enabling an individual to compete for wages that are commensurate with their skills. In these terms, it is an important mechanism for social recognition, for individual economic inclusion, and ultimately for economic upliftment to the benefit of all dependents of the individual whose skills are so recognized. Importantly, skills recognition provides for the national or regional labour force to be enriched by the formal inclusion of skills in the market, and therefore represents a broadening of the choice of employers and a deepening of the availability of skills (see Lavenex et al., 2015). This is a positive contribution to increasing the potential productivity and output prospects in the economy. The challenges of skills recognition highlighted in this discussion are addressed through ILO recommendations concerning human resources development (ILO, 2004), as well as the ILO principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration (ILO, 2006) and the ILO guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market (ILO, 2016).

Firstly, explicit reference is made to skills recognition systems and how these systems may be applied to identify, verify, and diagnose skills that are demonstrated by individuals who do not have documentation that attests to their having legitimately acquired their skills in the process of fulfilling the requirements of a technical/vocational qualification. In such cases, skills recognition systems may be utilized to identify and verify skills demonstrated by individuals who acquired their skills through a learning process that was:

- formal, but cannot be verified;
- non-formal, where the learning was structured, but the opportunity was never provided for recognition; or
- informal, where no structured learning opportunities existed, but the individual was able to acquire skills through daily activities.

While qualifications operate as a form of currency in the labour market, especially where the qualifications are of a high quality from reputable education institutions and can be trusted, migrants – and even more so refugees – are often at a severe disadvantage when it comes to their ability to provide evidence of such achievements. Qualifications facilitate trade in skills in a market where ultimately the price paid for skilled labour is related to demand and supply factors applying to a qualification at a given point in time and space (Werquin, 2010; NOKUT, 2016). Skills recognition systems have an important role to play in labour market environments where jobseekers are disadvantaged by having lost documentary proof of their having obtained a given qualification, or where jobseekers have acquired the desired skills and can execute these skills to the same degree of precision and repetition as a formally accredited worker, but cannot back their claims of competence with an institutional guarantee. This also applies to cases where the qualification was awarded in another country and is not automatically recognized in the host country.

The functionality of a labour market depends on the quality of its information. Recognition systems play an important part in generating information about people’s skills that enables
them to participate in the labour market in ways that allow them to be equitably rewarded for the skills they possess. Lack of trusted third-party information about their skills forces jobseekers to engage in the labour market at a huge disadvantage, as they either cannot compete for jobs or, where they are made job offers, are forced to accept work at highly discounted rates in relation to their real skills levels. Lack of information or poor information can therefore disadvantage labour market participants. The predicament of having lost a document, or worse, of not having any accreditation, can have serious consequences for the affected jobseekers, depending on whether their daily lived environment includes easy and low-cost access to reliable information and communication technologies and supporting sub-systems, especially electricity. In contexts with such access, electronic document systems have almost entirely obviated the need for jobseekers to physically produce authenticated original documentary proof of their qualifications. While we are acutely aware that the IGAD context is less susceptible to such solutions, we are of the view that they are becoming increasingly cost effective and less dependent on local infrastructure.

2.2.1 Skills recognition in developing countries

However, these conditions do not hold across wide expanses of the globe where humans engage in more informal wage labour whose base price and quality is not necessarily underwritten by qualifications. In such contexts individuals often have the skills but have not undergone formal training to acquire the skills and credentials. This is commonly a problem of poverty, where households could not afford to pay for the tuition costs of school or vocational college programmes that would culminate in certification. In these circumstances, households would also struggle to support learners or students because of the associated costs of books, equipment, and transport. In worst-case circumstances, the household would not be able to bear the opportunity costs incurred through withholding the labour contribution of a household member so as to allow them to study.

The value and contribution of skills recognition has been described above using examples of individuals who might benefit from such an opportunity. Therefore, it is important to put the potential of skills recognition into the context of the economy by asking what the cumulative impact of widespread skills recognition may be. Developed countries that offer high quality education that is free or almost freely available and which guarantee universal access may have a relatively limited need for skills recognition. On the other hand, countries that stand to benefit are those where there are significant populations of people with limited access to formal training and who have accumulated experience in workplaces, where they have acquired technical and vocational skills outside of a formal certification process. Those who also stand to benefit would be workers who have undergone in-house training with an employer that is internally recognized but would not be acknowledged in the open labour market.

2.2.2 Informal sector

Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of a working skills recognition system are the workers who acquire on-the-job skills in the informal economy (Werquin, 2010). This is not to say that there would be no informal economy workers with qualifications obtained from credible and recognized institutions. The informal economy, being the space within which informal
businesses operate, generates an informal labour market for skills that is not necessarily constrained by the requirements for formally documented skills – as may be the case in the formal sector. The key point here is that the informal economy labour force is likely to contain large numbers of workers who might want to have their skills recognized so that they can compete more widely for employment across both the informal and formal labour markets. It is also evident that developing country economies have larger informal economies with relatively wide ranges of goods and services on offer, and which generate demand for certain types of skills.

Internationally, a lack of recognition of formal qualifications across borders long persisted as a result of a variety of conditions. In many individual countries, thinking along an international dimension was retarded by lack of awareness that qualification and recognition mechanisms existed. In other instances, the utility of recognition and validation procedures existing in other countries was not given much credence. The opacity of changes in domestic and foreign occupational systems and seemingly irrelevant or out of date qualifications, both at home and abroad, discouraged exploration of the options available. At present, the increasing volume and spatial diffusion of job- and work-driven migration across the globe makes it difficult to appreciate how, in previous decades, not only jobseekers but also employers had limited knowledge or experience in managing the qualification profile of their workforce proactively, either within the country or across international borders.

Since recognition systems were not yet viewed by governments as frontline instruments to facilitate labour migration, the very idea of entitlement to this service or opportunity had not emerged. Since qualification and recognition systems – if they existed in coherent form – were not yet being promoted, there was a dearth of complete and reliable information, and as a result the recognition process was viewed as risky (Ecorys, 2016). The usefulness of recognition and validation procedures in refugee and migration circumstances would have limited value unless paired with trustworthy and stable transition processes and open access to such procedures. The rapid evolution of recognition systems and well signposted and supported qualification and recognition processes in the EU, for instance, contrast strongly with conditions experienced in developing country contexts, such as in the IGAD region.

### 2.2.3 Regulated professions

Another important facet of migration is the occupationally specific regulated labour markets that were isolated from each other in instances where formal certification presented an entry barrier to the occupational labour market. This applied, for instance, in cases of occupational licensing, such as in regulated trades and professions (e.g., accountants, nurses, engineers). It is argued that to advance regional economic integration, arrangements need to go beyond trade in goods and incorporate the free movement of labour, and that distribution of human capital according to workforce needs can lift economic activity. Efforts in this direction are underway in Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and also in the East African Community (EAC), where member countries agree regarding each other’s requirements, certificates, and licenses, as they are harmonized, considered equivalent, or adhere to an international standard (Cronjé, 2015).
2.3 The role of TVET institutions in an inclusive approach

The discussion above takes as given that informal and non-formal technical and vocational learning will continue to support accumulation of skills alongside the formal public TVET system and also private TVET offerings. There are many routes for these individuals – more for some than others – to acquire technical and vocational skills; though practically, the ability to take advantage of such opportunities will not be equal on account of an individual’s particular positioning (age, gender, location, household resources, work experience, employment status, qualifications, personal time resources, government policy, etc.). Individuals are likely to opt to make study and learning choices based on their “positioning” and also based on their expectations, self-confidence, and the role that technical and vocational education plays in their plans.

In the context of this study, it is important to acknowledge the high levels of both general education and technical vocational education demand that can be found presently and for the foreseeable future among populations in the IGAD region. Therefore, in principle, investment by individuals in acquiring more technical and vocational skills of reasonable quality should be encouraged, irrespective of whether these skills are acquired through formal, non-formal, or informal channels – public or private. This argument is advanced on the assumption that formal and non-formal types of learning may be designed differently to address defined participants’ needs and anticipated outcomes within defined resource constraints. The design modalities of learning would include (as adapted from Simkins, 1977): purpose; duration (occurrence single or multiple cycle); full/part time; credentialed or not; timing; content; pedagogy (teacher-centred or learner-centred); individualized/standardized; theoretical/hands on/information-based; based on prerequisites; method of evaluation; and delivery method.

This starting point is adopted to avoid excluding any fit to (learner) purpose learning or training opportunity of sufficient quality. In the TVET institutions, the approach to providing skills should therefore not be limited to a restrictive formal approach. The TVET sector may be increasingly viewed as an institutional form that produces graduates with TVET skills and qualifications, from certificates to diplomas to graduate levels. On the other hand, as observed above, there is the domain of technical and vocational skills that can be learned or acquired practically anywhere, whether at home, on the job, through formal organized paid work, in the informal economy, or in the community.

This takes a holistic and systemic approach to skills development and skills recognition challenges. This means that the skills development and recognition needs of migrants cannot be viewed in isolation, and must be viewed in relation to the skills and recognition needs of citizens of working age. This is emphasized because of the evident youth unemployment and underemployment challenges that are pressurizing every national labour market in the IGAD community. Further, it is necessary to treat migrant skills development and skills recognition issues concurrent with the situation in each domestic labour market, and to not create parallel systems for migrant workers and nationals.
There is mixed availability of information about the TVET systems of the IGAD Member States. A good example of this state of affairs is taken from the UNESCO International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (UNESCO-UNEVOC) World TVET Database, which carries an invaluable store of national TVET system studies on a country-by-country basis. However, among the IGAD member countries, only Uganda (2014) and Kenya (2013) have national overviews in the database (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2015a; 2015b). This is by no means intended as a criticism of UNESCO-UNEVOC, as expansion of the database depends on collaboration with local institutions that are invited to submit and other local institutions that validate these studies.

Therefore, this literature review focused on using data that offered sufficient comparability across the seven study countries to highlight parameters in the population (e.g., youth, location, gender, highest school leaving grade) that would offer challenges for each national TVET system in meeting demand from citizens and migrants alike.

Apart from Djibouti, which is the most highly urbanized State, urbanization is at 40 per cent and below in IGAD Member States (table 2). This means that all technical and vocational training interventions must take account of a dispersed population with relatively limited income in comparison with compacted urban populations that are relatively easy to service.

### Table 2. Urban population in seven IGAD Member States, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Urban population (in millions)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>% growth 1990–2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>19.447</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12.103</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5.501</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>5.502</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>13.065</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>6.464</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, 2016a

In every Member State, youth populations have lower employment ratios than that of the total working age population. There is wide variation from country to country with regard to the severity of the problem (table 3). It should also be noted that part of the 15- to 24-year-old age group would be out of the labour force because they are in education (and therefore not seeking employment).
Table 3. Employment-to-population ratio in seven IGAD Member States, 1991 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Total working age population % ages 15 and older</th>
<th>Youth population % ages 15–24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available.
Source: World Bank, 2016a

The key thematic focus of table 4 below is gender disparities in labour force participation in IGAD as reflected by female participation rates and by the percentage of female workers in the actual labour force. Low female participation in the labour force presents a loss of productivity and also a narrowing of the life opportunities for young women. Differences are starkest in the Sudan.

Table 4. Female labour force participation rate (ages 15 and older) in seven IGAD Member States, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate% ages 15 and older</th>
<th>Number of female workers (millions)</th>
<th>Female % of labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available.
Source: World Bank, 2016a

Table 5 directs attention to the prospects of young people in IGAD countries who (as of 2015) had not completed their primary schooling or who had not completed their lower secondary schooling. In the case of both groups, their chances of accessing higher education – or even TVET opportunities, depending on the minimum schooling level demanded – represent a massive challenge.
Table 5. Primary and lower secondary completion rates as a percentage of the relevant age group in seven IGAD Member States, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th>Lower secondary</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>Female (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>105(^1)</td>
<td>106(^1)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan(^2)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- n.a. = not available.
- \(^1\) This figure includes over-age and under-age learners completing.
- \(^2\) Most recent value provided if data for the specified year or full period are not available; or growth rate is calculated for less than the full period.

Source: World Bank, 2016a; 2018

This section on TVET seeks to take a broader approach. In doing so, we can usefully identify the populations in the case study countries that might be expected to resort to TVET training or might need some form of technical and vocational training assistance. Skills development and recognition systems must respond to the institutional and labour market ecology in which they are embedded. The concern here would be about where skills recognition systems have limited traction.

Finally, on a more hopeful note, it is important to acknowledge that the emergence of large-scale qualification recognition systems is continuing and expanding in the developing world. These systems, it seems, can validate various forms of learning – subject to important technical and data requirements. It should be possible – or at least nearly so – to validate an individual’s accumulated learning over their lifelong learning trajectory. In the IGAD context, this view might be altered to validating an individual’s accumulated learning to support sustainable employment opportunities.

2.4 Recognition systems

In this section we reflect on the use of the term “recognition”, what is being recognized, and the systems and approaches that have been followed internationally. We also look at emerging innovations that could potentially offer IGAD an opportunity to leapfrog other countries and regions that are following more conventional approaches. This section concludes with a review of the recognition systems currently within the IGAD region.
2.4.1 Knowledge, skill, and competence

In a vocational context, skills recognition is usually foregrounded, but it must be kept in mind that human learning involves at least three broadly agreed domains: knowledge, skills, and competences. The three domains form an interrelated set that represents what a person knows, can do, and can apply within a given context. A technical debate on the differences between the domains and their use in the international context will not be explored here; suffice to say, that except for some minor differences and combinations, most countries use these domains as summarized below (Keevy and Chakroun, 2015, p. 189–192):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>ability to recall and present information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skill</td>
<td>ability to do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competence</td>
<td>application of knowledge and skills in context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering the potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility, the three domains are useful to consider. The classification and description used within the vocational context specifically needs to “permit legibility and comparability with other countries qualifications for the mobility of individuals” (UNESCO, ECOWAS, and UNDP, 2013, p. 16). The role and contribution of transferable skills, information and communication technology (ICT) skills, and green skills within the global context is also important to note (Grainger, 2015).

2.4.2 Recognition of learning

The main considerations here are: What is the construct we are trying to recognize? How can this construct be recognized? And then also: What are the international trends in this regard? Building on the description of knowledge, skill, and competence above, the term “recognition of learning” is defined as follows (Keevy and Chakroun, 2015, p. 191):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition of Learning</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>recognition of learning</td>
<td>the principles and processes through which the knowledge, skills, and competences of a person are made visible, mediated, and assessed for the purposes of certification, progression, and professional standing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modern society attributes great value to the formal recognition of learning, with qualifications serving as an agreed and trusted proxy for the knowledge, skills, and competencies of individuals. The challenge in many parts of the world – and more acutely so in the case of migrants – is that this proxy is often weakly constituted and, more often than not, very difficult to verify. An important aspect of recognition is the legitimacy, also referred to as the competence, of the body that provides the surety for the process. We will return to this point later in this paper, as it is a critical consideration, particularly when the more conventional recognition approaches found in many developed countries are not fully in place.

The global spread of national, regional, and transnational qualifications frameworks to recognize qualifications in a manner that increases transparency and international comparability is an important means through which some of these weaknesses have been addressed over the last three decades. But there have been other approaches and more are sure to develop as our thinking evolves. The prominent role of credential evaluation agencies
to translate foreign credentials into locally accepted currency is important to note. Other recognition methodologies include “regional conventions, trade recognition agreements, professional standards, learning metrics, as well as occupational and educational classification systems” (Keevy and Chakroun, 2015, p. 112). More recently, the use of digital credentials has also come to the fore to recognize learning in new and innovative ways (Keevy and Chakroun, 2018). RPL is also important to note in this context. A brief reflection on each of these systems is provided in the discussion below – each elaboration is preceded by a high-level definition as a point of reference.

2.4.3 Qualifications and qualifications frameworks

qualification

the formal outcome of an assessment and validation process, which is obtained when a competent body determines that an individual has achieved learning outcomes to a given standard (European Commission, 2016, p. 1)

qualifications framework

hierarchical classification of the levels of formal learning programmes and their associated qualifications and certificates (Coles et al., 2014, p. 17).

The origins of what we today know as qualifications and qualifications frameworks can be traced to the late 1980s, when the notion of a national qualifications framework (NQF) emerged in the United Kingdom, with its intellectual roots in the competence approach to vocational education that originated in England. The idea was developed that all qualifications could be expressed in terms of outcomes, without prescribing learning pathways or programmes (Young, 2005, as cited in Keevy and Chakroun, 2015). The first generation of NQFs were established in Australia, England, Ireland, New Zealand, and Scotland between 1989 and 1994 (Coles et al., 2014). In many cases, these NQFs were seen to be defaulting on their initial promises (McBride and Keevy, 2010), and active opposition from critics, often from the higher education sector, resulted in changes to the original concepts, notably, in Australia. In Ireland and Scotland the challenges were less intense, while in England, New Zealand, and South Africa significant changes have been necessary, some as recently as 2009. Despite the criticism and challenges, NQF development and implementation has not remained limited to the first-generation countries (CEDEFOP, 2010; Chakroun, 2010). Qualifications framework development has now become a global phenomenon, with nearly 60 per cent of countries (130) across the world involved in national processes. In addition, at least four regions are engaged in regional qualifications framework development, and some 80 countries are involved in developing transnational qualifications frameworks.

A number of key features of qualifications, as understood in this way, stand out (adapted from CEDEFOP, 2012):

- Qualifications are based on learning outcomes – A qualification must clarify what the holder is expected to know, be able to do, and understand.
- Qualifications are linked to assessment and validation processes – A qualification must be based on reliable and valid assessment procedures able to capture the essence of the knowledge, skills and competences held by an individual learner.
Qualifications are based on agreed standards – Standards are the reference point around which the entire qualification process turns and are critical for relevance of the qualification to future users, including the labour market.

Qualifications are awarded following a recognition process – A qualification is a “paper of value”, and its currency depends on a formal stamp of approval or recognition. Recognition can be seen as the final step in the qualification process, confirming that the process has been appropriately carried out, and that the qualification can be trusted.

Competent bodies award qualifications and oversee the quality of delivery.

As noted by Coles et al. (2014), more advanced NQFs can also play a role in facilitating stakeholder interactions, in creating coherent qualifications systems, in ensuring fit-for-purpose qualifications, in supporting wider quality assurance processes, in recognizing learning gained outside formal education and training, and in driving broader educational reforms. Importantly for this study on labour mobility in IGAD, NQFs can also make national qualifications systems more transparent to foreigners. A key feature of qualifications frameworks is a separation of “the training process from the certification process to give legibility and describe the content and the value of the learning outcomes of the owner of a qualification”, thereby enabling outsiders to adapt to “the context of the systems and the countries” (UNESCO, ECOWAS, and UNDP, 2013, p. 16).

The ILO has itself commissioned extensive research into the area of qualifications frameworks (see Allais, Raffe and Young, 2009; Allais et al., 2009; Allais, 2010; 2017). The main findings from this research are probably best described as being cautiously optimistic. Concerns are raised about the promises of NQFs, while “very little has been documented about the effectiveness of NQFs in bringing about change in skills development systems or about their actual use by employers, workers, and training providers” (Allais, Raffe, and Young, 2009, p. v).

Strong claims continue to be made about what NQFs can do. If policy-makers in other countries are to learn from the experience of the first qualifications frameworks, it is necessary to have some sense of whether they have in fact achieved their objectives, and how (Allais et al., 2009, p. 4).

In more recent research, it is acknowledged that there is “some evidence of impact, including possible indirect effects” (Allais, 2017). The fact that extensive policy borrowing has taken place is also a key theme in the research (see Allais, Raffe, and Young, 2009, and Chakroun, 2010). The view is also expressed that NQFs are not quick fixes, and caution should be taken before embarking on development and implementation when other parts of the education and training system may be weak and in need of funding and support. For many reasons, these and other findings are important for the current study on the role of skills development and skills recognition for supporting and extending the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility. A regional system must take into account that employers need to trust the qualifications that are being offered. Importantly, the possession of qualifications is also increasingly vital to gain access to labour markets:

And what has worked in the past may not carry on working. As diplomas and certificates become more and more necessary to gain access to labour markets, their possession also becomes less and less sufficient. For example, in France, a combination of qualification inflation, growing youth unemployment, and the growth of short-term contracts, may counteract embedded agreements about training levels and occupational levels (Allais, 2017, p. 55).
The “upward drift of TVET” is another important factor, as employers are not always able to express what they require in skills development, resulting in unrealistic expectations and ultimately in a lack of trust in and reduced employability of the qualifications holder (Allais, 2017). The ILO places strong emphasis on the building of institutions and strong relationships with social partners. We are in strong agreement with this point, and it forms a central theme of this report.

Another point to keep in mind is that fixation on establishing an NQF in the form implemented by some early starter countries should be cautioned against. NQFs take many forms and quite often require only minimal adjustments to function effectively, without the need to radically transform the existing system:

> The incremental development of qualifications frameworks, building on existing systems, and not making unnecessary changes where there is trust in and understanding of systems and qualifications, are also important. Perhaps most importantly, the study clearly demonstrates the importance of the holistic approaches to the reform of work and of TVET systems, which the ILO has supported in principle for many years. (Allais, 2017, p. 4).

International qualifications are also important to mention here. This is a growing trend (see CEDEFOP, 2012) but fits rather uncomfortably with more established qualifications systems that are tightly managed by State agencies and arguably are also slower to adapt to new trends. Qualifications being offered across borders can play an important role in regions where there is extensive migration and national systems are underdeveloped.

### 2.4.4 Credential evaluation

**Credential evaluation** analysis and written appraisal by a competent body of an individual's foreign qualifications (SAQA, 2006, p. 5)

The evaluation of credentials is not limited to the recognition of qualifications, but may include professional designations and also, in some cases, non-formal and informal learning. Credential evaluation precedes the emergence of qualifications frameworks by several decades. The recognition of foreign qualifications involves: (1) a process leading to understanding of what a particular qualification signals, and (2) the result of that process, which is a decision to accept the qualification for a specific purpose – i.e., an acknowledgement of its appropriateness for that purpose. The activities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

While one role-player may have both the competency to evaluate and the jurisdiction to recognize specific qualifications, another may only have the competency to evaluate or the jurisdiction to recognize. A decision-making body needs adequate knowledge, criteria, and resources to allow for an in-house evaluation, if it does not engage the services of an external evaluation partner. Dialogue with employers and organized labour is critical to ensure the trustworthiness of the body that has been mandated to serve as the competent body.

The credential evaluation approach is based on international guidelines as contained, inter alia, in the Lisbon Recognition Convention (1997), which differentiates between National Information Centres (NICs) and Competent Recognition Authorities (CRAs). This Convention applies to higher education in Europe, but has an equivalent in Africa, the Arusha Convention for Africa (1981) (which was renamed and updated to the Addis Convention in 2014). The
The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

The approach used for credential evaluation is important to Africa – and to migration in IGAD in particular – as it provides an alternative, admittedly more formal, route to skills recognition. It is also the dominant route being developed in OECD countries to handle the influx of migrants:

Across the OECD, much has been done to facilitate the transferability of foreign qualifications and skills including, most recently, for educated refugees arriving from war-ridden zones in the Middle East and Africa. The possibility to have foreign qualifications recognised now exists almost everywhere in the OECD. However, in many member countries the process can be a long one and, involving many actors, can be off-putting in its lack of transparency. Recent policy developments in the field of qualification recognition has therefore focused on speeding up the process, streamlining the recognition system and raising awareness of recognition procedures (OECD, 2017, p. 11).

Under the Lisbon Recognition Convention approach, NICs evaluate and offer advice intended to be as universally applicable as possible, but do not make binding decisions; while CRAs make binding decisions on recognition. The evaluation of foreign qualifications (the first of the two aspects outlined above) is a typical NIC function. Regarding CRAs, the “competent” portion of the term refers to a legal status and/or common agreement within a community of practice that allows the CRA to make determinations and application decisions. In some cases, CRAs may have the technical ability to determine the extent of “sameness” or substantial differences between qualifications, but these processes would ideally be closely aligned to those promoted by the NIC. CRAs generally refer information on decisions to the NIC that fulfils a guiding function.

Importantly, a distinction is made internationally between CRAs for academic recognition and CRAs for professional recognition (Rauhvargers, 2003 as cited in SAQA, 2005). CRAs for academic recognition include higher education institutions and their representative bodies, and they generally have a focus on two levels: (1) undergraduate, where the emphasis is on access qualifications at school leaving level and their suitability for admission into higher education programmes, and where determinations are made by matriculation boards and similar bodies; and (2) postgraduate, where the suitability of access qualifications is determined by the faculties, schools, or departments of individual institutions. The purpose of CRAs for professional recognition is to determine whether a foreign qualification holder possesses sufficient skills and competencies to pursue a profession or career in a receiving country. Two different types of professional CRAs are distinguished:

1. de jure professional recognition – The recognition of qualifications in professions in respect of law which regulates either the education leading to the pursuit of the profession, the pursuit of the profession itself, or both; and
2. de facto professional recognition – The recognition of foreign qualifications for employment purposes, where neither the professional activity nor the relevant education are regulated by law (Rauhvargers, 2003 as cited in SAQA, 2005, p. 13).

Examples of CRAs for professional recognition include professional teaching councils, statutory and non-statutory professional bodies, employers, and professional associations.

Taking developments in OECD countries into account, it is important to note that credential evaluation bodies – both NICs and CRAs – have a critical role to play in assisting qualified migrants (OECD, 2017). Given that most of the conceptual understandings and systems stem from the Lisbon Recognition Convention on higher education, more limited guidance exists for professional/vocational qualifications internationally. It is also acknowledged that
in the IGAD context, the majority of migrants are undocumented (IOM, 2015a), and who, as a group, will have very limited access to credential evaluation bodies. Further, considering the fact that IGAD countries do not have established credential evaluation bodies outside of the ministries that perform this role, this discussion seems irrelevant.

That said, our view is that caution must be taken to not ignore this specific approach to recognition of skills. As mentioned above, the foundation for skills recognition at present in Northern countries is in this area. Innovations linked to this form of recognition, including digital tracking and information sharing across free international platforms, may hold potential for IGAD, even if the context differs. We will return to this point in the last chapter.

### 2.4.5 Regional conventions

Regional conventions the principles and norms concerning the recognition of qualifications at regional and interregional levels

Initiatives to support recognition of qualifications date back to the post-World War II years. Much of this activity concerned university qualifications and has been led by UNESCO (Keevy and Chakroun, 2015). Examples include the Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (1974), and the Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas, Degrees and other Academic Qualifications in Higher Education in the African States (1981), which was originally known as the Arusha Recognition Convention, but was revised in 2014 and is now known as the Addis Convention.

In the field of TVET, UNESCO’s 1989 Convention on Technical and Vocational Education considers that one element of international cooperation should be that “the Contracting States agree ... to promote approaches to achieving the recognition of equivalences of qualifications acquired through technical and vocational education” (Article 6 it’s the). In addition, UNESCO’s 2001 Recommendation concerning Technical and Vocational Education also called on Member States to establish “a system of equivalencies whereby credit is given for completion of any approved programme, and recognition is granted to educational and/ or professional qualifications and work experience” (UNESCO, 2002, p. 30).

The ILO also has a range of instruments in place that encourage skills recognition. This includes the Human Resources Development Recommendation, 2004 (No. 195), which calls on member States to establish a framework for the recognition and certification of skills – including prior learning and previous experience – irrespective of the countries where they were acquired and whether formally or informally. In a 2012 resolution on youth employment made at the 101st Session of the International Labour Conference, the ILO also recommended that governments give serious consideration to developing systems of RPL for non-formal education and skills acquired on the job (ILO, 2012). Other examples of ILO focus on skills recognition include, but are not limited to:

- A 2014 recommendation by the Committee for the Recurrent Discussion on Employment of the International Labour Conference states that employment policy may include policies for system of skills recognition (ILO, 2015e);

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6 For an example of deployment of the NIC/CRA model in the African context, one could look at South Africa's implementation in the TVET sector.

The 2014 report from the 103rd Session of the International Labour Conference *Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy* states that “it is necessary to develop institutions and mechanisms that assess the skills and competencies acquired by workers so that they can be validated and recognized through certification” (ILO, 2014b, p. 43).

The Global Skills Partnership launched jointly in 2015 by the ILO, the IOM, and UNESCO, in association with the International Organisation of Employers and the International Trade Union Confederation, focuses on mobilizing technical expertise of the three organizations towards supporting stakeholders to develop and recognize the skills of migrant workers with a particular focus on women and youths (ILO, IOM, and UNESCO, 2018).

In some regions, recognition conventions and qualifications frameworks relate to each other, yet also exist independent of each other. As mentioned above, there are existing examples such as the relationship between the Lisbon Recognition Convention for higher education and the European Qualifications Framework, or the relationship between the Arusha Recognition Convention and the SADC Regional Qualifications Framework. The intention by UNESCO to develop a global standard-setting instrument on the recognition of higher education qualifications and the proposal for a set of world reference levels is also important to note. In this regard it is important to note that achieving uniform qualification levels, while a noble aim, is still at an early stage, as expressed by Keevy and Chakroun (2015, p. 166): “The wide diversity in the organizations and bodies involved in developing qualifications and using level descriptors should not be underestimated.”

### 2.4.6 Recognition agreements

**trade recognition agreements** international agreements to promote trade in goods and services

The ILO (2007, as cited in Keevy, Chakroun, and Deij, 2010) considers three types of recognition agreements:

- **Unilateral recognition:** The most common form of assessing migrant workers’ skills and competencies. Here a destination country of inward labour market migration decides on its own which skills and qualifications it will recognize. Many recognition schemes have public policy objectives like ensuring quality and standards of services and protecting consumer and national interests.

- **Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs):** Formal agreements between countries of origin and destination that focus on reciprocal recognition of certifications and competences of migrant workers. A wide range of MRAs exists, mainly in regulated professions.

- **Trade/regional integration agreements:** Agreements concluded in the context of regional integration, and thereby encourage the development of mutually acceptable standards and criteria for licensing and certification and provide recommendations on mutual recognition.

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7 Also applicable here is the recent Recommendation on the Recognition of Qualifications Held by Refugees, Displaced Persons and Persons in a Refugee-like Situation, which operates under the Lisbon Recognition Convention (Council of Europe and UNESCO, 2017).
To date, MRAs have generally not been used for the recognition of learning, but there is a growing trend towards integration across all approaches discussed in this paper, including with regard MRAs. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region is the best-known example of where an MRA has formed the foundation for the recognition of skills, starting with the ASEAN Framework Arrangement on Services that was signed in 1995. The arrangement is aimed at substantially eliminating restrictions to trades in services among ASEAN countries, to improve efficiency and competitiveness in a manner consistent with the General Agreement on Trades and Services. Overall, eight MRAs were adopted in ASEAN for eight professional categories between 2007 and 2013, with tourism being the only one that includes TVET qualifications. These agreements define the competences that tourism professionals need in order to have their qualification recognized in another ASEAN country and ultimately work abroad (ILO and AUC, 2016). In addition, ASEAN Member States opted in 2015 to develop an ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF), which includes a set of regional level descriptors, and this process will also involve referencing of Member State NQFs to the regional AQRF. There are also regional model competency standards for core competencies, which were developed through the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ILO, 2015d).

Importantly, neither the AQRF nor the MRAs guarantee market access for intra-regional migrant workers in ASEAN, as policies and regulatory frameworks that constrain and impede skilled labour mobility remain in place. These include: requirements and procedures for employment visas and employment passes; constitutional provisions reserving jobs for nationals; policies that close or impose numerical caps on foreign professionals in sectors and occupations; economic and labour market tests that constrain employment of foreigners and require them to be replaced by locals within a stipulated period; licensing regulations of professional associations; and language proficiency requirements (ILO, 2014b).

In East Africa, the Common Market Protocol provides for EAC partner States to mutually recognize qualifications, experience, requirements, and licenses or certificates granted, as well as for partner States to designate competent bodies to enter into MRAs to facilitate movement of professionals. Progress is mixed across the different professions, with some professional bodies cooperating according to signed MRAs – e.g., accountants, engineers, architects. In other cases, fully fledged professional bodies do not necessarily exist as yet (Cronjé, 2015). Cronjé argues that if mutual recognition is achieved, “then regulatory and professional bodies (provided they exist) must be required to cooperate to make movement of professionals a reality” (2015, p. 17). Clearly, the longevity, resource base, and capacity of professional bodies to drive an MRA themselves may not necessarily be viable.

Furthermore, there are currently numerous impediments to the implementation of the Common Market Protocol, including: the high cost of work permits; processing time variations; and that EAC work permits do not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens of the EAC. Harmonization of these conditions as well as instituting common work permit classes and formats must still be achieved. Further, social security and other worker benefits are still to be harmonized. Seemingly frustrated by slow progress, in 2013 Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda adopted a progressive initiative that led to the abolition of work permit fees. Rwanda and Kenya extended this concession to all EAC citizens. Uganda granted the concession only to Kenyan and Rwandan citizens (Cronjé, 2015).
2.4.7 Professional standards and occupational licensing

**professional standards**

Professional bodies and public authorities use professional standards and related criteria to award professional designations to individuals that meet the requirements.

**occupational licensing**

The process of compulsory registration of certain categories of workers for them to access and recognize their occupations (or certain tasks of their occupations), based on a required level of competencies (Richmond, 2015).

The term "licence" (i.e., a licence to practice, which can be revoked) is frequently used incorrectly as a synonym for "qualification" or "certificate (a statement of competence that cannot be revoked unless fraud is committed). In general, the term “to license” (or “to grant license”) means “to give permission”. A licence may be granted by a party (licensor) to another party (licencsee) as an element of an agreement. A licence may be issued by public authorities, or professional bodies, or unions authorized to do so, to allow an activity that would otherwise be forbidden. Hence, a license is the strictest way to regulate access to the labour market. It may require paying a fee; meeting certain technical, financial, or institutional requirements; and/or proving a capability. For any licensing system to work, it is crucial to ensure the surety, transparency, and reliability for such processes. Unions and professional bodies have a critical role to play in developing, setting, and adhering to standards and licensing processes.

In the case of migrants, it is important to consider the recognition of skills earned outside the country of employment as well as in the destination country (in the case of returning migrants). This recognition covers both academic and professional titles; while professional recognition covers regulated and non-regulated professions (ILO, 2013a and 2013b).

Regulated trades therefore undergo stricter quality assurance by national bodies than non-regulated ones, which is why mutual recognition for regulated trades might be easier to achieve.

2.4.8 Other forms of recognition with future potential

**learning metrics**

International skills surveys and related statistical studies.

**occupational and educational classification systems**

Criterion-based, internationally agreed systems that recognize occupations.

**digital credential**

Electronic or paper-based representation of the different types of learning acquired and mastered by an individual – a paper-based representation is referred to as a transcript.
Learning metrics, classification systems, and digital credentials are three other tools that can potentially inform recognition systems but may have less direct relevance in the IGAD context. Considering their potential, we have opted to include them here for the sake of completeness and potentially for further consideration at a future point.

Learning metrics provide an alternative recognition approach that could be of more value in countries and regions where the other approaches are weak or absent. Examples include: the Learning Metrics Task Force convened by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institute in the United States; and also the OECD's Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies. Another example is Skills Toward Employment and Productivity (STEP), which is a framework developed by the World Bank to “help policymakers, analysts, and researchers think through the design of systems to impart skills that enhance productivity and growth” (World Bank, 2010, p. 1). These international assessments are limited to literacy, numeracy, and other core skills, but still provide authorities with important information that can inform skills planning and the direction of recognition systems.

WorldSkills International offers a different perspective on the measurement of skills, in that skills competitions are used to determine the level of competence. A WorldSkills Standards Specification framework has been developed based on a Nordic inclusive, professionalized model of education and training (Nokelainen et al., 2012), and this provides the conceptual basis for the competitions. This framework is linked to Level 5 of the European Qualifications Framework and Australian Qualifications Framework. Key features of the WorldSkills Standards Specification framework include the requirement for each standards specification to be based on an occupation or work role; the inclusion of high-level skills that feature prominently in the level descriptors; and a form of presentation that enables WorldSkills International and its members to connect each skill competition to national and regional contexts and TVET systems. WorldSkills has gained traction in the last few years as the “Oscars of Skills”, as is evident in the recent annual event held in the United Arab Emirates.

Examples of classification systems include the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) developed by the ILO in 1988 and updated in 2008. ISCO-08 uses two basic criteria to arrange occupations into the major, sub-major, minor, and unit groups of the ISCO classification structure: skill level and skill specialization. “Skill” is defined as the ability to carry out the tasks and duties of a given job. “Skill level” is a function of the complexity and range of the tasks and duties to be performed. “Skill specialization” is considered in terms of the field of knowledge required, the tools and machinery used, the materials worked on or with, and the kinds of goods and services produced. ISCO could potentially contribute to the international recognition of skills by providing a commonly understood reference point.

The intersection between traditional qualifications (also referred to as macro credentials) and the new and fast evolving area of digital credentials (also referred to as micro credentials) is a dynamic and evolving space, with a range of government, inter-government, for-profit, and non-profit actors vying for attention. Numerous examples can be listed, but Europass (and soon Europass+2) stand out for its integration of platforms, including CVs, qualifications, and self-assessment tools.

Digital credentials may be viewed as something only applicable to advanced economies, but migrants and refugees stand to benefit from digital credentials. As an example, Kiron, a
non-profit organization based in Germany and financed by crowdsourcing, stands out as an example of an institution that has been able to explore this potential (Vincent-Lancrin, 2016). Kiron, in partnership with 22 universities, offers refugees the option to obtain an accredited university degree free of charge, using a combination of online and offline learning. For the first two years, students can select a number of existing massive open online courses (or MOOCs) of their choice, which Kiron then modifies.

2.4.9 Recognition of prior learning

Recognition of prior learning is a process of identifying, documenting, assessing, and certifying formal, informal, and non-formal learning outcomes against standards used in formal education and training (ILO, 2017b, p. 93).

Validation of non-formal and informal learning, also referred to as recognition of prior learning (RPL), attempts to make visible the relevant knowledge and experience held by an individual, irrespective of the context where the learning originally took place. For an employer, it is a question of human resource management; for an individual, it is a question of having their skills and competences valued; and for society, it is a question of making full use of existing knowledge and experience, thus avoiding waste and duplication. Gradually, validation of non-formal and informal learning is becoming a key aspect of lifelong learning policies. Lifelong learning, it is asserted, requires that learning outcomes from different settings and contexts can be linked together. As long as learning, skills, and competences acquired outside formal education and training remain invisible and poorly valued, the ambition of lifelong learning cannot be achieved (Colardyn and Bjornavold, 2004).

RPL relies on making learning explicit through the codification of knowledge, skills, and competences in qualifications. RPL is premised on the differentiation of different types of learning as defined by the OECD: formal, non-formal, and informal (Werquin, 2010, p. 21–23): RPL can offer a viable and effective method to recognize learning, including in instances when documentary evidence of previous learning is weak, such as in the case of migrants, and more so, for refugees. In this regard, extensive experience in Canada (see Riffell, 2006) and some Nordic countries (see NOKUT, 2016) provide important insights that could be used within IGAD. The potential of RPL is to provide an opportunity “for people to acquire qualification or credits for a qualification or exemptions (of all or part of the curriculum, or even exemption of academic pre-requisites to enter a formal study programme) without going through a formal education or training programme and/or to ease their employment pathways with their skills recognized” (ILO, 2017e, p. 18).

For certificates and qualifications to work as a currency, they need to be recognized and trusted by employers – or by educational providers if recognition is for entry into a study programme. The current argument around RPL is correct in emphasizing employer involvement in the assessment process. But it often does not appreciate that employer recognition of and trust in certificates at the point of hiring is the most vulnerable point in the process (that is, for all types of recognition systems that go beyond publicly regulated professions). A certificate is intended to certify to an employer that the holder possesses skills and knowledge that will enable them to fulfil a particular work role in the workplace. This simplifies the employer's
job, as certification predicts the tasks and functions a certificate owner can undertake on the job and at what level, and serves as an abstract representation of the basket of values possessed by a worker. Given that the employer only accepts the veracity of the certificate on the basis of trust in the system, this collective trust will have to be built up assiduously, most importantly through social dialogue and the active involvement of professional bodies, organizations of employers and workers, and other relevant stakeholders in the process.

2.4.10 The relevance of recognition methodologies to skills mobility in IGAD

This section has attempted to provide a synopsis of the different forms of recognition available in the international context, from long-established approaches, to more modern ones, to approaches that are only starting to gain traction in the international context. We are of the view that by looking at this broad spectrum, IGAD has an opportunity to leapfrog other countries and regions. A good example of emerging research in this area is recent work on recognition of refugee learning efforts in Lebanon (see Trizmiel, 2016).

The ILO is piloting some interesting approaches in Turkey and in Jordan, wherein short training courses in construction sector trades are being offered for Syrian refugees (and others) with prior skills in the sector, and also offering a skills assessment that provides access to a work permit. According to the ILO (2015e), the demand for this training and RPL is great, given the clear benefits. A further exploration of these practices is proposed to inform work in IGAD.

Given that some African countries, including Kenya, have developed and adopted a national qualifications framework, and that two of the African regional economic communities – SADC and ECOWAS (the latter only for higher education qualifications) – have invested in regional frameworks, African policy-makers are also discussing the idea of an African Continental Qualifications Framework (ACQF) as a reference frame to facilitate transposition of qualifications between countries. At an expert meeting in Debre Zeit, Ethiopia (26–28 April 2016), it was agreed to establish a technical working group on the issue. It was also agreed that the adoption of the ACQF does not mean that all AU Member States have to adopt a national qualifications framework (ILO and AUC, 2016). In a recent development, the African Union Commission (AUC), in collaboration with NEPAD, the European Training Foundation, and the German development agency GIZ, have put out a call for a situational analysis to be conducted as a precursor to the development of the ACQF.

A challenge for migrant learners, including refugees, is to acquire proof of their learning achievements during exile or migration. This is critical for any form of credential evaluation required to seek employment or continue with further studies. The influx of migrants into Europe has forced European credentialing agencies to strengthen their approaches to allow for the complexities involved and to develop new innovative approaches to both the recognition of skills and related matters, including: adapting migration policies to labour market needs, protecting migrant rights, investing in immigrant integration, and monitoring the economic impact of immigration (OECD, 2018). These changes are aimed at ensuring that migrants’ skills can contribute to receiving countries’ economies. In this context, credential evaluation agencies have a critical and central role to play. The Norwegian credential agency, NOKUT, is a good example that can provide insights into the same processes in IGAD, as it
has recent experience working in the area of skills recognition of refugees and is also very open to collaborating and sharing these experiences with IGAD. Many of the refugees who apply for NOKUT’s recognition are unable to document their qualifications, and as a result, procedures have been adapted to accommodate people “without verifiable documentation” (NOKUT, 2016, p. i). A pilot project to test a new methodology for evaluation of refugees’ qualifications based on the idea of a “Qualifications Passport” is currently underway in Norway, and is very similar to RPL approaches that have been followed in the Canadian context for many years (Riffell, 2006).

The development of a migration governance architecture for IGAD is also important. In this regard, the AUC has been engaged in critical migration issues on many levels. At the 24th Ordinary Session of the AU Heads of States and Governments Assembly in January 2015, the AUC/ILO/IOM/UNECA Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration Regional Programme in Africa, known as the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP), was adopted:

The objectives and actions in the JLMP are designed to meet the challenges of migration and labour mobility on the continent by strengthening the capacity of Member States and RECs [regional economic communities] to, among other things, achieve a greater development, adoption and implementation of harmonized systems of free movement and coherent national migration policies of the workforce in the RECs. They also aim to extend social security to migrants to access compatible portability systems, and resolve “shortages” of skills (AU, 2017, p. 3).

The JLMP includes regional sectoral skill needs assessments that could provide possible insights into migration and recognition-relevant sectors. In turn, this could inform policy-making on the IGAD level.

As noted above, the 1981 Arusha Convention – a regional convention on higher education – was revised and updated in 2014, and is now referred to as the Addis Convention. The revisions brought the Convention into line with the “1997 Lisbon Convention, specifically recognizing new forms of quality assurance introduced through qualifications frameworks, and thereby opening the door to close transcontinental cooperation in the field of higher education” (ILO and AUC, 2016, p. 29). These Conventions focus on higher education qualifications but are increasingly contributing to learning on all levels, as they form the foundation for credential evaluation practices and can also inform the development of a regional qualifications framework. The intention is to implement the Addis Convention through national implementation structures, such as: the Convention Committee, the African Network of National Implementation Structures, and bilateral and regional bodies (ILO and AUC, 2016; also see ILO, 2015a). The potential role of the Addis Convention in promoting skills recognition across IGAD countries is important to recognize.

More details on particular trade recognition agreements – and more specifically how these agreements relate to skills – are limited in IGAD. From the literature we could not find examples of the development of professional standards nor of the specific use of occupational and educational classification systems in IGAD. Nor did field interviews uncover further information of relevance. This is not to say that none exist, but further and more detailed mapping will be required to ascertain the extent thereof. MRAs for specific priority occupational fields, following the example of ASEAN, and defining procedures and mechanisms for mutual recognition could be a useful instrument to facilitate portability of skills within IGAD.
RPL is an option for the IGAD region, but is highly dependent on the acceptance of the outcomes of these processes by employers (ILO, 2017f). RPL is of increasing interest to policymakers in many African countries (ILO and AUC, 2016), but as noted by the ILO (2017b), this acceptance is mostly sector-specific. A further limitation is the lack of understanding of the RPL systems available and their benefits in less developed contexts. An important lesson learnt for RPL systems is that the certificate obtained should have more value than simply signalling skills – the certificate can potentially give access to work permits or access to financing or professional licenses, and hence social protection schemes.

In the case of migrant workers, there is greater vulnerability for a number of reasons:

1. some of the skills and knowledge that migrants have may not be recognized in the host country – for example, due to barriers in transferability of qualifications;
2. work experience acquired abroad may be discounted, while limitations in language skills may hamper the full use of other skills;
3. discrimination may also prevent jobseekers with a migrant background from obtaining appropriate employment;
4. migrant workers may not be well-informed about the labour market services available to them, including RPL; and
5. limited language proficiencies (OECD, 2015; ILO, 2017b).

The AUC has taken the explicit position that RPL be considered for migrants. It advises specifically that “information could be made available to potential migrants on how to obtain recognition of diplomas and certificates in the country of destination by public and private employment agencies, migration information centres, where they exist ... and, whenever possible, trade unions.” (ILO and AUC, 2016).

### 2.4.11 Regional comparison with SADC and ECOWAS

Two regions that offer useful comparisons to IGAD are the SADC and ECOWAS. These are both African regional economic communities that have made progress with their recognition systems in recent years.

In the case of the SADC, there exists an SADC Treaty (1992) and a Facilitation Protocol (2005) that aims to “progressively [eliminate] obstacles to intra-regional movement, allowing regional citizens visa-free entry for lawful purposes and visits of up to three months“ (Facilitation Protocol 2005, as cited in Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2016, p. 24). The SADC, in collaboration with the ILO, also oversees a SADC Decent Work Programme (2013 to 2019) (Crush et al., 2017). An SADC Labour Migration Policy (SADC, 2013) has also been developed. Ratification of the Facilitation Protocol has been limited to only six Member States, and has been overtaken by the SADC Regional Labour Migration Action Plan 2013–2015, through which a commitment has been expressed to harmonize labour data collection systems, immigration policies, and legislation and to address regional migrants’ health vulnerabilities (African Centre for Migration & Society, 2015). Various bilateral agreements are in place, many of which are strongly focused on the recruitment of migrants to South African mining and agricultural sectors:
Vast differences in levels of development and employment opportunities across the region have led to extremely uneven migration flows. All countries both send and receive migrants but the balance between the two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destination before 2000 but has since become the region’s single largest exporter of migrants. South Africa is the major destination (Crush et al. 2017, p. 1).

Crush et al. (2017) further note that the movement of migrants out of the SADC is so extensive that more than half of the migrants are in Europe, East and Central Africa, North America, and Oceania. This trend has “considerable implications for migration and development policies which align with global and African advocacy of the role of Diasporas in African development” (Crush et al., 2017, p. 19). This is where the SADC Decent Work Programme can also play an important role to benefit workers in the region.

The main barriers for the facilitation of labour migration in the SADC include:

- recognizing the relevance of short-term migration and the movement of persons in the context of trade of services, stressing the need for more information on the movement of highly skilled workers and on the “trade value” of such moves;
- relaxing entry requirements for service providers; and
- recognizing qualifications, including establishing the state of available skills regionally in critical sectors as well as the standardization of skills recognition across the SADC (Crush et al., 2017; also see Bamu, 2014; Hartzenberg and Kalenga, 2015).

In the SADC region, progress has been made towards the establishment of a SADC Qualifications Framework (SADCQF) since the initial developments in the 1990s overseen by the SADC Secretariat. In 2011, SADC Ministers of Education approved the SADCQF (SADC, 2011), with several SADC Member States at various stages of referencing their NQFs to the regional framework (CEDEFOP et al., 2015; 2017b). The main purposes of the SADCQF include the following (SADC, 2011, p. 14):

- To provide a mechanism for comparability and recognition of qualifications in SADC;
- To facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications in all Member States;
- To recognize qualifications wherever possible;
- To promote credit transfer within and among Member States and even beyond;
- To create SADC regional standards where appropriate.

While the idea of a regional qualification framework for the SADC has been well supported over many years, implementation has been very slow, with limited capacity in the SADC Secretariat to drive the process. A launch took place in 2017 in South Africa, and there is an anticipation that more traction will be possible as various pilot projects are being considered. Linked to this process is a regional initiative to develop professional standards for teachers in the SADC region. The process is still at an early stage but has potential for establishing a regional licensing mechanism that other professions could emulate, and that could also be helpful for IGAD in the longer term (see UNESCO and SADC, 2018; Taylor and Keevy, 2018).

Since inception, the ECOWAS region has encouraged Member States to mutually exempt regional citizens from visitors’ visa and residence permit requirements and to allow them to work or engage in commercial activities in host Member States. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (1997) provides the legislative
framework, based on a three-phased implementation schedule (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2016; ILO, 2015c):

- the right of entry and abolition of visas (Phase I, from 1980 to 1985);
- the right of residence (Phase II, from 1985 to 1990); and
- the right of establishment (Phase III, from 1990 to 1995).

Phase I (ratified in 1980) gave citizens of Member States of ECOWAS a 90-day, visa-free right of entry, provided they possessed valid travel documents and international health certificates. Phase II (enforced in 1986) gave regional citizens the freedom to reside and work in other Member States. The Protocol was revised in 1992, with the aim of further enabling freedom of movement. ECOWAS has more recently abolished the 90-day visa option, but it has also not been able to ratify Phase III. However, there is a “standardized regional Travel Certificate and a uniform passport” (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2016, p. 22) in ECOWAS that simplifies “cross-border movement creating a clear legal framework and lowering costs, ultimately increasing regional migration” (Adepoju, 2007, as cited in Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2016, p. 22). According to the ILO (2015b), the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment provides a good basis for free movement and labour and the recognition of skills in ECOWAS, but similar to the SADC instruments, progress on implementation remains slow and uneven. The ECOWAS Labour and Employment Policy (developed with support from the ILO) was adopted in 2009 and is another important instrument in the region, but implementation has also been slow.

An ECOWAS Convention on the Recognition and Equivalence of Degrees, Diplomas, Certificates and other Qualifications in Member States (General Convention A/C.I/1/03) was adopted in 2003, with the specific focus to increase mobility of students, teachers, and other skilled workers (ILO, 2015c). In line with the Addis Convention of 2014, the ECOWAS Convention focuses on the equivalence of degrees and certificates. In 2011, following a feasibility study, ECOWAS agreed on the need for a system of recognition for all diplomas awarded within ECOWAS to facilitate student mobility and the exchange of teachers and researchers (ILO, 2015c). Similarly, a mutual qualification recognition and harmonized curriculum to encourage mobility of health professionals is being considered.

A feasibility study on the establishment of a regional and national qualifications framework was conducted in 2012. According to the ILO (2015c), ECOWAS has been seeking funding for sensitization and capacity building to take these processes forward. Like the SADC, the ECOWAS region has also been considering the feasibility of regional certification standards for teachers (UNESCO, 2016). Just as South Africa plays a key role in terms of migration in the SADC, Nigeria has a very strong influence in ECOWAS. Migration to Nigeria has been mainly to the construction and services sectors and has involved several waves of recruitment – as well as waves of expelling migrants, despite the development of protocols on free movement of nationals in the region (GCIM, 2005).

From this brief review, it is evident that both the SADC and ECOWAS provide important insights for skills recognition in IGAD, and we will return to these in the final chapter.
Chapter 3. Country reviews

3.1 Introduction

The task at the core of this research involves exploring the fit between the needs of refugee and migrant men and women of working age for access to recognition of their skills and access to skills development opportunities, and the opportunities currently available. In relation to the scope of government responsibility for provision of these services to its own citizenry, the volume of demand or requirements generated by migrants and refugees is ultimately very small. This is an important point to have in mind, since the implication is that however effective systems to support migrants and refugees may be, these will inevitably have to be developed from or be dependent on existing government systems established for skilling and recognition purposes or for the purpose of improving labour market functioning.

The features of a vocational education and training environment that are fundamental to the aims of generating access to TVET qualifications and creating structures through skills recognition can be achieved by creating a viable information management environment for the governance of a migrant workforce and for fostering the skills of that workforce. As the discussion of the country case studies will show, however, this must involve government to be sustainable. Currently the balance of functions and responsibilities and relatively distant partnerships between government institutions (both nationally and bilaterally) and international aid development agencies may not be adequate to the challenge at hand.

From a bigger picture perspective, this study directly introduces important broader debates that cannot realistically be addressed within the confines of the project. One of the most important of these relates to the relationship between migration and development. Much more has been written about the impacts and contributions of migration in developed and developing country environments. However, the emergence of much more intense migration movements into Europe has attracted attention from policy-makers there who are now paying attention to the drivers of migration in countries of origin; these drivers are assumed to include a paucity of local economic opportunities (Fratzke and Salant, 2018, p. 2).

In another dimension, this study is also drawn into exploring the dynamics of migration between least developed countries within a region, which is showing signs of growth, but also of social economic, and climatic trauma, which has had a scattering effect on human settlements and economic activities. This brings to the table a stronger awareness of South-to-South migration, which is emerging as an important theme within the scope of global movement.

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*For a prime example, see the research associated with the ILO and OECD project “Assessing the economic contribution of labour migration in developing countries as countries of destination (ECLM)”. The project assesses the economic importance of labour immigration in a significant number of developing countries where immigrants represent a large share of the workforce in key economic sectors. More information is available at: [https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_344706/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_344706/lang--en/index.htm).*
These matters are materially relevant to this project. We recognize that at least one central assumption is implicit in the structure of this assignment: that education – particularly technical and vocational education – attainment and/or recognition in a migrant population would improve migrants' chances of obtaining meaningful employment that would support their personal wellbeing, and enable them to contribute to the economic development of both the receiving country and their countries of origin. In other words, the possession of technical and vocational education qualifications would contribute to desired growth and development. Indeed, the European Commission's 2015 European Agenda on Migration seems grounded on the idea that “if development assistance can improve livelihood prospects in countries of migrant origin, outward migration will decrease” (Fratzke and Salant, 2018, p. 3). However, there is plenty of evidence in the literature that skills on their own will not necessarily generate desired change, and that other modifications in the environment must be brought about. Therefore, we acknowledge that this project will be able to speak more convincingly to how the implementation of qualifications and recognition systems, linked to personal biographic data supported by usable data platforms, could contribute to growth and development. The impacts of such systems would have to be the subject of a separate enquiry.

It is also important to note at the outset that the size of the informal economy varies only marginally throughout the IGAD region. Informal employment is estimated to comprise more than 90 per cent of total employment (excluding agriculture) in all but two countries in the region. In the Sudan and South Sudan, it is estimated to reach only 50—74 per cent of total employment (ILO, 2018a).

Lastly, it is important to note that it is not the mandate of this research to test the impact of the TVET approaches to migrant skills development; it is more realistically tasked to explore or to scope the environment for indications of existing or nascent institutional practices, structures, information, and evidence that something has been done.

The first country report focuses on Ethiopia, which provided the richest source of data and opportunity for review and analysis. The other country reports – Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, the Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia – are presented in the same manner but in a more condensed format. Each country report is structured as follows:

1. Context – a brief overview of the geographical and political factors that have a direct influence on the country’s ability to provide skills development opportunities, not only to its own citizens, but also migrants and refugees.
2. Skills development – the range of skills development institutions and qualifications available, and also how these are organized
3. Distribution of migrants and refugees – data permitting, this section provides an overview of the geographical location of migrants and refugees, and in a few instances, the known skills distributions
4. Labour market demand – the demand in the country for specific skills, which in turn, allows for a matching of those from migrants and refugees.
5. Skills recognition of refugees and migrants – the systems and processes in place to recognize skills of non-citizens.
6. Overarching observations – a few key observations that are specific to the country. The country reports are followed by Chapter 4, wherein a review of cross-cutting findings and recommendations are presented.
3.2 Ethiopia country report

3.2.1 Context in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has a population of just over 100 million people and encompasses a significant landmass in the order of 1,000,000 square kilometres. A decade of higher economic growth has brought poverty reduction in urban and rural areas, with the share of the population living below the national poverty line decreasing from 30 per cent in 2011 to 24 per cent in 2016. Agriculture remains the most dominant sector, employing about 80 per cent of the population and generating about 90 per cent of the country’s exports, which contribute to practically half (47 per cent) of national income (World Bank, 2019a; UNESCO, 2015a).

Rapid economic growth was a feature of the Ethiopian economy for well over a decade – from 2004/05 to 2013/14 – during which real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 10.5 per cent per annum (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2013). Nonetheless, emerging economic shifts towards more value-added activities are long-term, slow-moving, and uneven, and growth in the formal and informal sectors varies. Some areas, predominantly agricultural, low-productivity areas, have remained relatively unchanged, barring population outmigration. Simultaneously in the Ethiopian context micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are seen as important catalysts for inclusive employment, growth, and transformation. In 2011 the Ethiopian Government revised the 1997 Micro and Small Enterprise Development Strategy to emphasize the importance of TVET institutions to function as extensions of industry and expanded their role in job creation. Data from a recently published study show that in 2016/17 temporary workers constitute the bulk of workers in Ethiopian MSEs (77 per cent), and 87 per cent of MSE workers’ education backgrounds are high school graduate level or below. Though it should be noted that overall share of permanent workers has been growing among MSEs (Gebreeyesus, et al., 2018, pp. 11–15, 61–62). This implies a sustained need to increase access to TVET institutions, while also supporting MSEs.

It has been argued that public investment in strategic infrastructure, together with shifts in the agriculture sector and rising capital investment will continue to impact positively on the GDP growth trajectory. Foundations were set under the country’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), spanning the period from 2005/06 to 2009/10, and the first and second Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP), covering 2010/11–2015/16 and 2016/17–2019/20 respectively. These plans aimed at Ethiopia achieving middle-income status by the mid-2020. From a policy implementation perspective, medium-term strategic Education Sector Development Programmes (ESDPs), of which the term of ESDP V has recently been completed, are important, as they express how the Government strategized to bring economic and education development processes into alignment. These efforts have laid the basis for the current Ethiopian Education Development Roadmap (2018–30) (Teferra et al., 2018).

The economic development process has been characterized by a deep structural shift in the emphasis of activity away from traditional and primary sectors towards secondary and tertiary sectors. More specifically, this has meant the steady weakening of agriculture, with concomitant increases in services and good prospects for quickening in industries such as construction and manufacturing. In line with the manufacturing strategy, the industrial
sector is set to expand by 20 per cent on average, creating more jobs (World Bank, 2019a). A strategic outcome of this structural shift among sectors is to reduce relative demand in the national labour market for low-skill jobs – such as those found in agriculture – and to increase demand for semi-skilled and high-skilled workers in the secondary and tertiary economic sectors. Jobs that are created in the services sector will be relatively more knowledge-intensive and offer higher wages, so the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers in Ethiopia will grow. In the medium to long run, this trend in the labour market is expected to have positive implications for poverty reduction and income distribution.

It also brings pressure to bear on TVET to respond through the quality, skills, and qualifications mix of its programmes and graduates. Of central importance, therefore, is the question of whether current and future configurations of TVET and related vocational education programmes will fulfil the prospective demands of the economy. Equally important for this study is how the evolution of the Ethiopian TVET system can provide the base from which migrants and refugees can gain access to technical and vocational skills or means of skills recognition. In spite of valiant resource allocations to TVET, the number of young people enrolling in formal or informal TVET classes remains only a proportion of those eligible. It is argued that:

For Ethiopia to ensure that all young people have appropriate skills for decent work and that they possess the life skills necessary, the transition rate from secondary to TVET and teacher training must improve (UNESCO, 2015b, p. 2).

Indications are that further expansion of TVET in Ethiopia will open up more opportunities needed to equip its citizens to take on productive employment and to support inclusive economic growth and development.

Since the task of this research is to scope the potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility within member countries and across the IGAD region, it would be remiss to investigate this pressing issue without recognizing and acknowledging upfront that to the extent to which a host government supports and allocates resources to foreign refugees or migrants, it needs to achieve a balance between its mandate to serve the education needs of its citizens, while at the same time fulfilling its fraternal and humanitarian obligation to foreign nationals.

### 3.2.2 Skills development in Ethiopia

At five-year intervals, the Government instituted a series of the aforementioned ESDPs. Driven by these ESDPs, the Government also resourced a relatively expansive TVET development programme to establish TVET institutes. The Ethiopian Education Development Roadmap (2018–30) (Ministry of Education, 2018, p. 67) observed that large numbers of TVET institutions were built over 15 years from 2000 to 2015, and that over that period the number of public TVET institutions increased from 16 to 334, while enrolment rose from about 3,400 to roughly 273,600.

This increase in the number and range of available skills in the Ethiopian labour market has been positively received. Yet questions have been asked about the appropriateness of the skills and quality standards according to which TVET graduates are prepared. An explanation for these concerns could be that the recent phase of expansion erred too far towards a
supply-driven approach that was characterized by insufficient attention to, recognition of, and responsiveness to demand signals from industry (Krishnan and Shaorshadze, 2013). However, the Education Development Roadmap refers to relatively poor participation of industry and argues that: “In absence of meaningful industry participation, it is impossible for TVET delivery to relevant training.” (Ministry of Education, 2018, p. 72)

An indication of the distribution of student enrolment by sector and level in public and private TVET institutions is given in the table 6 below, which reveals that 81.6 per cent of learners were accommodated in public institutes, while a small but significant proportion – 18.4 per cent – attended private institutes.

Table 6. Number of students in public and private TVET institutes in Ethiopia in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of study</th>
<th>Public institutes</th>
<th>Private institutes</th>
<th>Public + private institutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levels 1+2</td>
<td>Levels 3+4</td>
<td>Level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8,083</td>
<td>4,554</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>43,088</td>
<td>11,051</td>
<td>2,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>80,716</td>
<td>54,578</td>
<td>1,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>4,214</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>6,244</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total/ Level</strong></td>
<td>141,372</td>
<td>75,607</td>
<td>4,503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

– = nil

Source: Seid, Taffesse, and Ali, 2016

An important feature of enrolment is the distribution of students according to the sector of their study choice. By far the highest enrolment across public and private sectors was in utilities, which accounted for just over 60 per cent of enrolment. The provision of utilities (water, electricity, and gas) is an essential service that plays a vital role in economic and social development. Quality utilities are a prerequisite for effective poverty eradication. Optimally, the sectors chosen by the majority of students for study might be expected to coincide roughly with the current and future expectations of where sectoral growth in the national economy is set to take place. But in Ethiopia, allocation of students to fields of study is influenced by government through a quota system, which is seen as best placed to make these allocations. In terms of the levels of study opportunities in TVET, it is clear that the Education Development Roadmap aims to open up higher skills paths in the reform agenda by establishing a “national curriculum and training materials development center for TVET semi-skilled and skilled personnel and middle level professional trainings”. (Ministry of Education, 2018, p. 83)

Public demand for vocational education and training in Ethiopia is substantial. Government TVET institutes therefore offer a range of programmes beyond the conventional formal
daytime programmes. In addition to the day programmes, the government TVET institutions provide evening programmes aimed at currently employed workers (both public and private); these are referred to as extension programmes and tuition fees are highly subsidized – about 25–35 Ethiopian birr per month (close to US$1). A third stream of provision consists of short-term training programmes of between two weeks and three months duration provided by “extension services” offered in the TVET institutes. There are no admission requirements at this level, including for learners without a secondary education (Krishnan and Shaorshadze, 2013). These extension programmes offer another option for refugees and migrants, who might be able to afford these lower fees against a limited household income.

The relative popularity of private TVET programmes relates to how private students perceive the relevance of a qualification and its composite skills for their employment and career chances. Clearly, a much higher proportion of all private students enrol for health and medical programmes than is provided for in the public TVET allocation of study opportunities (table 6). This reflects fast growth of private provision in the health sector.

A national exam determines access to higher education and TVET opportunities. Grades 10 and 12 take a centrally-organized examination, conducted by the National Education Assessment and Examination Agency. Failure rates in these tests are reportedly very high, revealing that access to government-sponsored chances is competitive. Students who succeed in passing the exam in Grade 10 are routed to preparatory school (equivalent to Grades 11 and 12) and then on to university. Hence, upon completion of Grade 10, students are streamed either to TVET or preparatory secondary education. Those who do not go on to preparatory school are expected to pursue TVET or to find work in industry (Krishnan and Shaorshadze, 2013). Clearly, the national examination system privileges academic education and contributes towards forming youth attitudes to TVET.

Private and NGO TVET training institutions are obliged to be certified by the Government. Students that cannot go to the government TVET institutions can choose a private institution. In theory, even the students eligible to attend the government TVET institutions could choose to go to the private institutions instead. However, the numbers of private students relative to public enrolments remain much lower. This is mainly because government TVET is free of charge, while the private institutions charge tuition fees. The Ministry of Education has observed that some private, for-profit institutions cater to students with lower educational outcomes and are of lower quality. Meanwhile, the NGO-run (private non-profit) TVET institutes generally have a reputation for higher quality, and their fees and financial arrangements vary (Krishnan and Shaorshadze, 2013). Perhaps the option could be explored where development funders would be prepared to fund refugees or migrants to attend private institutions. Allocation of public funding to public TVET training at higher education levels is restricted. This suggests that the Ethiopian Government sees TVET generating mainly low- to middle-level technical and vocational skills.

Although the TVET institutes model was expanded substantially, the presence of an apparent mismatch between TVET graduate skills and the skill sets required by employers was cause for concern. In response, the Federal TVET Agency moved swiftly to find an institutional intervention that would help to resolve the dilemma. This took the form of cooperative
training programmes intended to increase the numbers of private enterprises participating in the training process. According to the Ethiopian model of cooperative training, theory is taught mainly through classroom instruction in the TVET institutes; whereas practical skills are acquired through exposure to enterprises and their workshops in the form of an apprenticeship scheme. The Federal TVET Agency is implementing cooperative education based on a ratio of 30 per cent instruction in the Institutes to 70 per cent practical, industry-based training to be provided in workplaces (Ethiopian News Agency, 2016). Since the presence of apprentices is costly, as they need supervision and time to operate equipment, achieving buy-in from employers is an ongoing campaign.

Restricted/costly information flow between employers and jobseekers can lead to longer spells of job search and unemployment for new college graduates. Understanding how the labour market functions, particularly the job search process, is crucial to addressing this issue. In Ethiopia, the majority of employers advertise job openings in newspapers and/or on small boards installed on the busiest street corners and in the squares of cities in which the employers are located. It is less likely for these types of advertisements to reach a large number of new college graduates spread throughout the country. Considering the Ethiopian skilled labour market is not well organized, it is worth exploring the role information plays in unemployment duration among new college graduates. Emerging online platforms for vacancies, such as ethiopiajobs10, are an encouraging development and should be supported. Better flow of information may improve functioning of the labour market by increasing both the intensity of the job search and the quality of the job match. In this regard, job fairs may be one mechanism to nurture and exploit.

In the government system, the number of TVET occupations offered is determined by the number of occupations developed and disseminated; this figure stood at 379 occupations in 2012. Of these, skills training is provided in 197 occupations. There is a great disparity between the regional states in terms of occupational education and training offered. The number of occupations provided among the regional states varies from eight occupations in Benishangul Gumuz (the lowest) to 153 occupations in Oromia (the highest). These numbers include the training areas provided by both government institutions and private/non-government institutions in each regional state (Edukans Foundation, 2012).

The new Ethiopian 2008 TVET strategy envisaged preparation of curriculum materials at a local, institutional level rather than centrally. The rationale was that a decentralized model would improve responsiveness to local challenges and conditions and meet specific local labour market requirements. In line with this thinking, the Federal TVET Agency, with relevant stakeholders, prepared sets of occupational standards that formed templates for the preparation of curricular materials. Thus, each training institution became accountable for developing curricular materials based on the centralized occupational standards. In practice, this responsibility still remained with regional TVET agencies because of the low professional teaching and knowledge capacity of trainers, who lack capability or competence to develop the required curricula. To complicate matters further, the Ministry of Education in the meantime made frequent updates to or replaced existing occupational standards. Although a curriculum is a dynamic document, the level of changes required repeated reworking of curriculum material and created uncertainty among trainers and students. It also raised the cost of curriculum materials, as more curriculum developer time would

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be needed to adapt materials such as textbooks to regional conditions, and these would have to be printed on a regional basis (Edukans Foundation, 2012). The 2008 Ethiopian TVET strategy envisaged that effective integration of the formal, non-formal, and informal systems of TVET acquisition was subject to a strong and well-defined partnership between government and non-government sectors throughout the training delivery and assessment system (Ministry of Education, 2008a). The 2008 TVET Strategy also stipulated the creation of an Ethiopian National TVET Qualifications Framework of five levels (Ministry of Education, 2008b).

### 3.2.3 Distribution of refugees and migrants in Ethiopia

The distribution of refugees and migrants in Ethiopia and their relative ability to move around within that country directly affects their ability to source technical and vocational training chances and recognition opportunities. Refugees and migrants are located in unique patterns across the landscape, and since the distribution and density of the refugee and migrant populations in Ethiopia vary considerably, it is assumed that knowing their location relative to existing fixed facilities is a prerequisite for planning. Variations in training provisioning and a contested legal environment wherein migrants and refugees are treated separately are important to note as inhibiting factors.

As of August 2017, there were 852,721 refugees in Ethiopia consisting of the following groups by country of origin:
- South Sudan – 45.5 per cent;
- Somalia – 29.6 per cent;
- Eritrea – 19 per cent;
- the Sudan – 5 per cent;
- Yemen – 0.19 per cent (n=1,669); and
- other nationalities – 0.69 % (n=5,875).

To put these numbers in perspective against new arrivals: from January to August 2017, a total of 72,890 new refugees had arrived in the country, of whom more than 44,000 were from South Sudan, 17,000 from Eritrea, and more than 6,400 from Somalia (DRC and RMMS, 2017).

While camp-based assistance is the corner-stone of the Ethiopian refugee policy, the Government of Ethiopia introduced an Out of Camp Policy in the summer of 2010 that allows Eritrean refugees to live and study outside the camp if they qualify against the eligibility criteria and prove that they can sustain themselves independently. As the Ethiopian authorities seem to concede Eritrean refugees’ freedom of access to the cities, it would need to be explored whether these concessions would extend towards work opportunities. There are five localities, mainly contiguous with Ethiopian borders with other countries, where the major distributions of refugees are located. Then there is another concentration of migrants who have moved to the capital city. The highest single concentration of refugees is in the Gambella region on the western border. About 43 per cent of the total refugee population in Ethiopia is hosted in Gambella (mostly South Sudanese), and 25 per cent (mostly Somalis) is hosted in Melkadida refugee camps (figure 2).
As can be seen in the following figure, the Gambella region has a very low number of TVET institutions. Therefore, assuming that this area will continue to be a host region, it will be important to undertake a mapping of the indigenous population, the refugee and migrant population, and the TVET institutions. This may be the basis for further planning of new institutions, based on predictions of the lifespan of the existing camps. The skill levels of immigrants and refugees in these areas may be researched, especially if they choose to remain sedentary.

**Figure 2.** Refugees and asylum-seekers in Ethiopia as of 30 Sept. 2017

In addition to refugee and intra-IGAD migrant who enter Ethiopia, this study also encompasses Ethiopians who migrate to non-IGAD destination countries – including those who later come back to Ethiopia as migrant returnees. This includes all Ethiopian nationals who leave Ethiopia for a non-IGAD destination country, whether they take a direct or an indirect route to their desired country of destination. This category of migrants is large and diverse, and includes regular migrants who, as part of the diaspora, may reside permanently or on a contract basis in a country where they are residing (the Middle East is a popular destination), have the means and gainful employment to enjoy a quality lifestyle, and remit money through formal channels to their family in Ethiopia.
The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

The concern here is more particularly for urban or rural Ethiopians who, as individuals or as members of affected households, have limited access to income, are probably unemployed, may be dependent on family members for their subsistence, and have a restricted view of their own future and ability to fend for themselves. Ethiopians who find themselves in this situation may perceive migration as an option to better their lives. However, migration as it is experienced in the IGAD region is, for most migrants, a high-risk endeavour, and many efforts to migrate end in repatriation or voluntary return to their country of citizenship. Many migrants who have not succeeded in achieving their goals through migration and who only accumulated limited funds while abroad, return to dependence on family or the State upon their homecoming. At risk of suffering this scenario are numbers of young people, including students and graduates of the Ethiopian education system. Regular/formal migration routes exist but cater to a very small segment of the population, and are mostly confined to more skilled individuals.

The combination of high population growth and expanded access to TVET and tertiary education – university enrolment rose from 10,000 in 1990 to 360,000 in 2015 (Golubski, 2016) – means that higher numbers of young people with increasing qualification levels are entering the Ethiopian labour market. Unfortunately, although it is in a growth phase, the economy cannot generate jobs at the same rate. There are also indications, as mentioned elsewhere, that there is a degree of mismatch between TVET institution graduate skills and skills required by employers.

Another internationally common form of migration that highlights the plight of returnees and their reintegration into the economy in Ethiopia is the movement of young females into a number of countries, largely as domestic workers and especially in the Arab Gulf. For example, a large number of young Ethiopian women have been seeking work opportunities in households in Saudi Arabia. Unemployment combined with the need to earn income was cited as a common driver of this form of migration. As irregular migrants, these young women are open to abuse and exploitation, and a situation that was tacitly tolerated over some years by the authorities has since came into the spotlight, leading to a crackdown by the authorities that resulted in the return of large numbers of Ethiopians – more than 163,000 in 2016 – and registration of some 50,000 others in Saudi Arabia (RMSS, 2017). The ILO has assisted about 22,000 such Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia through one of its development cooperation projects funded by the EU, 8,000 of whom have benefitted from basic training.

An interview conducted by the research team with a young female Ethiopian returnee migrant from Saudi Arabia gave cause to think in more depth about how young people formulate their ideas about migrating – either as a temporary strategy or as a permanent goal – as compared with staying in their home country. She had formerly been living in a rural area and was undergoing retraining and formalizing her experience as a nanny to prepare for the local job market. In the case of this young woman, being without work and desiring a break from the “boredom” of her life, her discovery of an option to work through migration presented an attractive idea, initially as an escape. This was much less complicated than planning how she might move to a large town in Ethiopia where she expected that she might find some form of low-paid work. Then she heard from acquaintances in the village who had family members in Saudi Arabia that a nanny or household helper could earn Saudi riyal with high purchasing power that converted into a tidy sum in Ethiopian birr. On the other end of the migration scale, a university lecturer interviewed for the study observed that his son, although he has family, friends, and everything to meet his material needs in the
cosmopolitan capital city of Ethiopia, had by the age of 17 decided that his only ambition was to make a life in the United States. It became clear from both interviews that social media such as Facebook and Twitter play a role in how young people formulate their views on and convictions about life in general, but also about migrating.

3.2.4 Labour market demand in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s attempts to implement an export-led industrialization strategy – starting with a focus on ending poverty (PASDEP) and gradually moving towards structural transformation (GTPs) – have mainly focused on large public infrastructure projects in the country, such as the development of industrial parks, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or the 656-km Addis Ababa–Djibouti electric railway (AfDB, 2018). This has generated employment growth mainly in construction and related services, including finance, but also – to a lesser extent – in manufacturing and mining. The second phase of the most recent GTP, which began in late 2015, will change the focus from infrastructure development projects to the diversification of the manufacturing sector, meaning that these patterns could shift towards higher employment growth in manufacturing (Seid, Taffesse, and Ali, 2016).

With a population of about 100 million, Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Africa. The country has a 2.6 per cent average population growth rate. Ethiopia’s population is also very young. According to projections made on the basis of the 2007 census, the population aged between 0–29 was estimated to have reached about 73 per cent of the total population in 2016. The youth labour force participation rate was 74.9 per cent in 2013. In the same year, the national labour force participation rate (ages 15–64) constituted about 81.2 per cent of the population (ILO, 2018f; ILOSTAT, 2019).

Despite the economic progress achieved in the last decade, providing productive employment opportunities for the country’s youth continues to be a big challenge. The average national unemployment rate is 4.5 per cent. There is, however, a difference between urban and rural areas. While rural unemployment was estimated to be around 2 per cent in 2018, urban unemployment in the same year was estimated at 6.5 per cent (ILO, 2018f; ILOSTAT, 2019).

Variations have been observed in recent years in the share of the economically active population at the national level, as well as in labour market trends and characteristics at national and regional levels. Accordingly, at the national level, the agricultural sector covers 72.7 per cent of employment, while the service, manufacturing, and construction sectors cover 20.4 per cent, 4.5 per cent, and 1.9 per cent, respectively (Oqubay, 2018, p. 4).

The newly introduced Micro and Small Enterprise Strategy (Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, 2012) underlines itself as one of the main instruments for fostering urban economic development and creation of jobs. This strategy, which advocates coordinated action between TVET and MSEs, is intended to try to broaden employment opportunities in urban centres by encouraging and supporting self-employment through labour-intensive workshops and businesses that require low amounts of start-up capital. However, as the TVET sector reports of many regional states indicate, there have been obstacles in implementing the strategy, with the major difficulty being the absence of coordination between TVET and MSEs – a matter that requires further investigation to resolve (Edukans Foundation, 2012). Lack of coordination between enterprises and TVET centres is clearly at the base
of perceived skills shortages among enterprises, resulting in supply-driven TVET provision that produces graduates with low levels of employability. Kassa Alemu, Deputy Head of the Amhara State TVET and Enterprises Development Bureau added that the challenges for small- and medium-sized enterprises development are also about mindset: “The challenges observed are the attitude of trainees towards creating [their] own business. Most of them have a bent to be hired in governmental organizations” (Teshome, 2016).

Self-employment, though a seemingly open prospect, is in reality daunting for Ethiopians, 80 per cent of whom are rural residents. Lack of access to land, limited seed money, and a generally low level of community purchasing power contribute to this situation. One NGO interviewed for this study argued with conviction that Ethiopians’ commitment was not directed towards developing “sustainable livelihoods” or, for that matter, even “self-employment”\textsuperscript{11}, but looked beyond these goals towards “decent work”. This standpoint reflects that there are different levels at which development agencies aim to implement their education and training programmes. The programmes offered by development agencies at each level have diverse requirements in terms of implementation and operating costs, inputs and supporting investments, the skills levels of beneficiaries, their commitment to complete programmes, and the opportunity costs of studying.

Two powerful constraints on the kinds of choices that refugees and migrants can make about their opportunities to work are observed. First, refugees are partially or wholly restricted from conducting their lives outside of the designated camps as regulated by the Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation (2004) and the Out of Camp Policy (implemented since 2010). This means, at the very least, that a refugee has no choice but to be resident in a camp, and as a result, would not easily be able to identify and secure a job in the formal sector without great inconvenience and transgression of the camp/government regulations. Second, refugees – apart from those with special dispensation – are not granted access to work permits. They therefore experience difficulty in finding such jobs, and require collusion on the part of employers to shield knowledge of their employment from the authorities. The recent Ethiopian Jobs Compact, through which the Ethiopian Government has committed to granting work permits to 30,000 refugees (EIB, 2016), is important to note in this regard.

For their survival, refugees typically rely on three sources of support:
1. supply of resources necessary for daily life by international aid and development organizations;
2. financial support from family, either in their country of origin or further afield in the diaspora; and
3. income that derives from employment within the informal sector (Sorenson, 2004).

The informal economy can be understood as consisting of an unregulated, untaxed, and unprotected diversity of economic activities involving employers, jobs, and workers that are not regulated nor protected by the State.\textsuperscript{12} Of importance is that it includes waged employment in jobs that offer limited or no social protection or benefits. Since the informal economy represents a work destination for migrants and refugees, the scale and shape of the economy and its hospitality to migrants and refugees is very relevant.

\textsuperscript{11} The informal sector can include workers who are self-employed, or who work for self-employed people.

\textsuperscript{12} Gross national product and GDP figures of a country do not include data on the informal economy. Estimates of the size of the informal economy can be given as a proportion of GDP per capita or growth of GDP per capita.
3.2.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Ethiopia

A migrant with a qualification and/or experience and skills, whether having moved voluntarily or involuntarily, would benefit greatly from the opportunity to find employment fitting to their qualification, experience, and skills in any host country in IGAD. Therefore, the presence of a framework under which those qualifications, experience, and skills can be recognized is a vital significance to their employment prospects. Ethiopia has the Ethiopian TVET Qualifications Framework, which was developed in order to:

- In order to define the value of qualifications, ensure that different qualifications are comparable, and facilitate horizontal and vertical mobility within the TVET system...
- Occupational assessment and certification will be accessible to all candidates who feel competent that they meet the requirements of the respective occupational standard, irrespective of how and where they were trained or learned (Ministry of Education, 2008a, pp. 27–28).

The extent of RPL-related opportunities available to migrants and refugees in Ethiopia depends on the general state of RPL systems in a country. Therefore, to understand the actual and potential RPL resources available to migrants and refugees, an overview of general national progress would be the place to start. This is based on the assumption that it is unlikely that in any IGAD Member State a large-scale RPL infrastructure would be purposely developed solely for migrant beneficiaries. The most likely scenario would be for national authorities to explore how RPL facilities designed to facilitate access to work for citizens could offer a framework for inducting migrants and refugees into the local labour market, with adjustments if need be. Accordingly, this section gives a sketch of the emergence of the Ethiopian national system that reveals that there are systems and facilities that could also support RPL for migrants and refugees.

The 2008 National TVET Strategy foresaw the implementation of occupational competence assessments open to all candidates who feel competent (Tibebu, 2016). Since 2008 the Ministry of Education has pursued an outcomes-based approach with occupational standards detailing the competencies needed to be considered qualified for a certain field. Occupational assessment is done in accredited public or private centres as part of a national network of Occupational Competency Assessment and Certification Centers (OCACCs), also known as Centers of Competencies. The TVET Center of Competencies Test is administered to TVET graduates and other interested candidates by every regional state and city government TVET Agency through its OCACC. TVET graduates must pass this test, which has knowledge and practical components; as only when the test is successfully passed will they be certified and employed as such, or continue on to higher education.

The assessment testing has proved to be useful to TVET system management, as it serves as a quality assurance measure applicable to individuals but also to the institutions. The aim is to boost occupational competency, which can pave the way to having a trained, competent, and productive workforce across all sectors (Gebrezgabiher, 2016). Some thought needs to be given to how assessments that find foreigners “not competent” can be dealt with. While the assessment service is considered inclusive, in that “both citizens with or without formal educational background can take part as long as the latter have a skill and experience on [sic] a particular field or profession” (Geremew, 2013), efforts will have to made to ensure the assessment process is experienced as non-discriminatory and developmental, by giving candidates multiple opportunities and choices of pathways. RPL-based assessment will be important to feed into a process tailored for foreign refugees and migrants.
Since the inception of assessments (currently only implemented for key competencies), relatively high numbers of graduates have been found "not competent", although overall levels of competence have increased (Krishnan and Shaorshadze, 2013). It appears that currently not all graduates come forward to be assessed. Buy-in is still a challenge to advancing the system. However, as the market adjusts and employers begin to prefer TVET trainees/graduates who have successfully completed the mandated assessments, there should be a higher tendency for learners to opt for competence evaluations.

The Ethiopian Government is keen for partner organizations and industry to tighten the competency–industry nexus through changing poor perceptions of competency assessment. The National TVET Strategy argues strongly that for certificates and qualifications to work as a currency in the labour market, they need to be recognized and trusted by employers. Therefore, according to the Government, "It is … vital that experts from the enterprises are essential members of the groups of assessors. As far as possible, relevant business or employers' associations will be integrated into the management of assessment" (Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 28).

The statement above is correct in emphasizing employer involvement in the assessment process, although employer recognition of, and trust in, certificates at the point of hiring is the most essential point in the process. In the case of refugees and migrants, it is likely that the ways to assure credibility of National Occupational Qualification Certificates issued to refugees and migrants (amongst others) will be important. Nevertheless, the above system seems to lend itself as an institutional base created by government through which RPL-types assessment can be offered to migrant and refugee workers.

The Ethiopian TVET policy document (Ministry of Education, 2008a) emphasizes the importance of accessibility of assessment services. At the time of writing, no reference to additional facilities within high density refugee and migrant areas was reported. The tendency has been for more testing centres to be accessible in cities.

Our review of the implementation of assessment centres helped to identify some of the teething challenges that the system encountered during rollout over the past few years. These include challenges that any new assessment system may encounter, such as securing the trust of the immediate clients – i.e., jobseekers and employers – both of whom have to trust that the quality of the assessment process will contribute to a win–win situation where gainful employment and improved productivity are registered on either side of the employer–worker relationship. In the case of TVET graduates, authorities encountered resistance from graduates, who questioned the fairness and quality of the system and the efficiency of implementation. First, there were problems of trust: among students it was rumoured that the assessment centres were “nothing but only a means to collecting large amount of money” (Tibebe, 2016). Clearly, graduates experienced a lack of trust and concerns regarding how to respond to being judged not competent.

A core concern from students was that there was a disconnect between the competencies they learned during their training and competencies that were tested. More specifically the complaint was that the techniques and skills they learn in training centres and the questions they face in the assessment examinations do not match or are not related, which led many to failure (Tibebe, 2016). Some practitioners argued that this was due to a lack of practical training provided to the students. Clearly the quality and amount of teaching and practical
training, as well as the calibration of assessments played a role. What this experience indicates is areas and issues that will need to be addressed in systems designed to handle refugees and migrants from different education backgrounds, different language backgrounds, and localized ways of working in communities of practice.

Despite these initial problems concerning employer and jobseeker trust, awareness of TVET assessment among citizens in Ethiopia is on the rise and higher numbers of TVET graduates have accepted the value of the system. Consequently, demand for access to assessment services has emerged as a key challenge, with increasing numbers of learners placing pressures on assessment centres, affecting the quality of assessment. For example, quality challenges experienced in assessment centres in Eastern Hararghe Oromya included:

- Shortage and inappropriateness of machines, equipment, tools, and consumable assessment materials;
- lack of consistency in administering competence assessments;
- assessors who were less qualified in relation to the occupational standards;
- assessors who did not provide adequate support to candidates; and
- some assessment items lacked clarity (Geremew, 2013).

Where demand for assessment in certain occupational fields is lower, because those who register to take the assessment are fewer in number, test centres tended to delay assessment for days or weeks (Baraki, Negash, and Asfaw, 2016). These might present further challenges for providing similar services to refugees and migrants, who may come forward for assessment in unpredictable numbers due to changes in migration conditions. The following general challenges emerged through this learning process:

- Strengthening the human and material resource capacity of TVET institutions to encompass more authentic and quality assessment approaches in learning and teaching.
- Enhancing the awareness of all stakeholders on the nature and importance of external assessment through (for instance) awareness creation campaigns.
- Increasing the number and widening the geographic distribution of Centers of Competencies and assessment/test centers to increase access and reduce queues for assessment.
- Enhancing the competence and competitiveness of TVET trainers and assessors.
- Facilitating the revision of some of the units of competence and the assessment tools (instruments) in light of workplace requirements.
- Introducing some control mechanisms that ensure fairness/ethics on the side of assessors.
- Enhancing the engagement of productive sectors (public and private) in and towards external assessment (Baraki, Negash, and Asfaw, 2016).

### 3.2.6 Overarching observations: Ethiopia

Within the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, regions and woreda (districts) have strong autonomy and also associated responsibilities. Decentralization reforms in the education sector ensure that, subject to central approval, personnel are locally appointed and supervised. Similarly, service providers come under the control of local government structures and constituents (UNESCO, 2015a). Given that the distribution of refugees and migrants has much higher concentrations in particular states and regions, it is recommended...
that implementation of programmes relating to skilling of refugees and migrants should, at least initially, concentrate on these states and regions.

It is clear that the Ethiopian Government is faced with overwhelming demands for social and economic services to its citizens, which weigh heavily on available financial resources. Therefore, it will be important for the foreseeable future for the Government to lobby and work towards higher levels of cooperation and funding support from international governments and aid agencies. More also needs to be done to understand how development programmes and interventions shape the working lives of migrants. A key question concerns where these efforts should be concentrated. Further, the non-government (bilateral and multilateral) organizations supporting the TVET programmes are few in number. In this regard, the federal and regional TVET agencies need to carry out intensive advocacy work and win support.

3.3 The Sudan country report

3.3.1 Context in the Sudan

The Sudan previously shared a border with nine countries, though this was reduced to seven following the 2011 formation of South Sudan. Not that this alteration has stymied serial migration into and out of the Sudan. On the contrary, continued instability in South Sudan and the southern parts of the Sudan itself has contributed to a steady flow of temporary migrants, most of which are irregular. Human smuggling from neighbouring countries, mostly from Ethiopia and Eritrea, flows through the Sudan via the capital Khartoum, where temporary work can be found, and then into the northern regions of the Sudan in transit to Libya and then Italy and other parts of Europe.

An interesting historical feature of the region is that people identify more with their tribes than with countries. The borders in the region, perhaps less so in areas bordering Kenya and Egypt, are extremely porous and many tribes continue to exist across the manmade borders, with relative ease of cross-border travel. Referred to as “non-static borders” by a government employee during an interview, this stands out as one of the main reasons why the Sudan has become a transit country for many migrants heading to northern countries. As a result, free movement is taken for granted and the systems and policies to regulate such movement are either ignored or such movements are simply tolerated.

With a population just under 41.5 million and the third largest country landmass in Africa, the Sudan is extremely sparsely populated. The largest ethnic group in the Sudan are Sudanese Arabs, most of whom are Muslim and speak Sudanese Arabic. However, the Sudan is ethnically and linguistically diverse, with at least 70 spoken languages. According to key informants, the country has an amazingly open and tolerant culture towards migrants and refugees. Most foreigners are treated with kindness and are virtually equal to Sudanese citizens on many levels. There are some exceptions, however. According to more than one informant, as a direct result of a government-to-government arrangement, the refugee status of Eritreans is not recognized by the Sudan. Another example is in the public vocational colleges, where the spaces are so limited that only Sudanese students are admitted.
Chapter 3. Country reviews

Among the working age population (15+), 57 per cent of Sudanese are in the labour force, and the remaining 43 per cent of the population is not economically active. Unemployment among women is significantly higher, up to three times that of males. Unemployment is also relatively higher for high-skilled individuals. The educational profile of the unemployed indicates one out of four have a university/tertiary education. Twenty-six per cent of the unemployed persons in the Sudan are in Khartoum, and 44 per cent of them have university/tertiary education. The main source of household livelihoods as reported is the primary sector: crop farming and animal husbandry (45 per cent), wages and salaries (36 per cent), and own business (20 per cent). A smaller portion of households depend on pensions (1 per cent), remittances (3 per cent), and humanitarian aid (1 per cent) (Ministry of Human Resources Development and Labour and ILO, 2013).

As an under-resourced country impeded by an extended period of harsh international sanctions that were only lifted in 2017, the Sudan's economy is extremely fragile. Agriculture, notably cotton and livestock, provide employment to the majority of Sudanese.

Key industries that function in the Sudan's include: oil, although this has reduced significantly since the secession of South Sudan; agriculture; textiles; food; and mining, specifically gold mining. Some agricultural areas are leased to other countries that use the land, but the products are transported directly back to the leasing countries. It is not clear if there is much benefit to citizens beyond the contribution to the government fiscus.

As might be expected, there is a very large informal economy in the Sudan, with a labour force that is characterized by seasonal migration, around 85 per cent of workers engaged in vulnerable employment and 60 per cent of the labour force engaged in subsistence agriculture:

> These local migrants are by default low-skilled workers and their limited skills are related to rural activities, such as agriculture and pastoralism (e.g. cattle rearing, crop production, food making, trade and similar work that are commonly found in rural communities). When moving to urban areas, they tend to establish “subsistence enterprises”, home-based informal operations that can be carried out by one individual without further support (ILO, 2012, as cited in Ibrahim et al., 2014a, p. 67).

There is also a strong tradition of children following the profession of their parents. Overall, the country is hampered by skill shortages.

### 3.3.2 Skills development in the Sudan

The skills system in the Sudan comprises 98 technical secondary schools, 21 technical colleges, and 12 vocational training centres (VTCs). In comparison, there are more than 3,000 secondary schools in the country. Oversight of the system is in the hands of a number of agencies/ministries, making coordination difficult. The State Ministry of Education oversees four types of technical schools: industrial, agricultural, commercial, and services. The National Council for Technical and Technological Education oversees the technical colleges. The Federal Ministry of Education is responsible for the curriculum, teachers, training, final examination, and certification; while the State Ministry of Education is responsible for administrative and financial matters (UNDP and ILO, 2014).

Employers seem to be largely unregulated, according to government informants interviewed, and under no compulsion to spend money on training, be it for citizens or migrants.
Constraints facing the TVET system in the Sudan include not only the lack of funds for TVET, but also the management and utilization of the funds that are available. It is also noted that qualifications do not respond to the needs of the labour market, leading to a lack of employability amongst TVET graduates (UNDP and ILO, 2014).

The Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeships (SCVTA) oversees the VTCs. Nine of the VTCs are in Khartoum, of which five belong to the Federal Ministry of Labour and four to the State of Khartoum. The remaining VTCs belong to the states of Kassala, Kordofan North, and the White Nile (Ibrahim et al., 2014, p. 17). Additional VTCs are managed by other ministries, but information on these is limited. Overall, the absence of VTCs in the other states is a concern.

The provision of technical education through the VTCs is more general in nature – combining theory with practical training – and is primarily targeted at those young people who have successfully completed eight years of basic formal education, which is typically completed around the age of 15. VTCs provide an apprenticeship programme in 19 trades, but the demand for places in the VTCs far exceeds the available capacity. Though early development of vocational training was supported by West Germany in the 1960s, VTCs follow a model of two years of centre-based training, followed by one year of on-the-job training with an employer. Khartoum State VTCs have, however, moved away from this three-year apprenticeship programme to shorter-term, fully centre-based vocational training programmes of six to nine months. Short courses, skills upgrading, and trade tests are also carried out by VTCs (Ibrahim et al., 2014b, p. 17). From interviews and research team visits to two VTCs in Khartoum, it was evident that the capacity of the centres is far below what is required for the country, a view previously expressed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and ILO (2014b, p. 8):

> The process of human capital formation in Sudan is alarmingly low by regional and international standards, and provision of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) plays a marginal role compared to general and academic education.

Very few foreign students (migrants/refugees) are admitted, and the level of training is quite basic (Ibrahim et al., 2014b). The legal and policy framework governing access to training for migrants is not well defined and would require further verification.

Strong support for the construction of the public VTCs has come from international development partners, including the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the EU, with technical assistance from United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Based on the research team visits to VTCs, support from China is also evident: While equipment is largely outdated, in some cases, more advanced equipment in the centres is not used, simply due to user manuals not being translated from Chinese. The first completed VTC in Khartoum has been converted to house the Khartoum State Vocational Training Authority (Ibrahim et al., 2014b).

A limited number of private TVET providers operate, mostly in Khartoum State, with varying degrees of quality that range from better to worse than the state VTCs. Importantly, the fees are much higher in the private centres than in the public VTCs. In the conflict states of the Sudan, such as Darfur and the Blue Nile, skills development provisioning is less consistent, as might be expected. Local and international NGOs play a role there, as do international development agencies.
There is a move towards the establishment of a qualifications system led by the SCVTA. The development of a National Qualification Framework for the Sudan was kicked off at a workshop held in Khartoum in September 2018, as part of the Strengthening TVET System in Sudan project funded by UNESCO's Capacity in Education Programme (UNESCO, 2018b). There was agreement at the workshop on building an NQF that would include the following elements that are particularly relevant to this study:

- industry and education standards;
- promoting life-long learning by integrating policies and tools that allow transfer, progression, and mobility;
- promoting access to learning across formal and non-formal education;
- discussing how to benchmark the quality of people's qualifications in the Sudan with those of qualifications from abroad; and
- agreeing to standardize terminologies and standards for qualifications across all education providers, in the Sudan (UNESCO, 2018b).

The SCVTA oversees the trade testing system across seven grades, each linked to a specific post level (Department of Labour, n.d.). The trade testing system is articulated with the other parts of the education system, but actual flow and articulation is not evident. According to a key informant at the SCVTA, the thinking does provide a strong basis for the development of an NQF.

Skills development is recognized as a means to support small enterprises, but tends to focus only on informal apprenticeships that are not supported by government and which are, by-and-large, not recognized in the formal system. A detailed analysis of the informal apprenticeships conducted in 2014 provides an important view into their potential for employment creation and skills development, including for migrants and refugees, and recommends:

Informal apprenticeship should not be viewed as exploitation of young people so long as training and skills are imparted in exchange of labour provided. It should be perceived as the training system of the informal economy that stems from the family and traditions of social networks and that it has potentials to develop. The distinction between formal and informal does not mean effective and ineffective. Hence the importance of building on the strengths of informal apprenticeship and eliminating their short comings (Ibrahim et al., 2014b, p. 61–62).

Despite several attempts, very limited interaction with the private sector was possible during the field visit.

### 3.3.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Sudan

From the most recent Fifth Population and Housing Census conducted in 2008, it was found that 13.6 per cent of the population in the Sudan are migrants, with counts taken ranging from 700,000 in 1973, to 1.3 million in 1983, to 3.4 million in 1993 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008). According to UNDESA (2017), the Sudan is hosting 735,821 migrants, 40 per cent of whom are from South Sudan, followed by Eritrea (25.6 per cent), Chad (12 per cent), and Ethiopia (10 per cent). The Central Bureau of Statistics has stated that the root causes for migration into the Sudan are poverty, instability, and high population (in neighbouring Ethiopia). Despite significant inward migration, the net migration rate in the Sudan has been...

Remittances are an important income stream, estimated at US$1.12 billion, or 1 per cent of GDP. UN data confirms these estimates and further suggests that inward migration to the Sudan is mostly linked to oil and foreign direct investment inflows, ranged from 1.3 million in 1990 to 854,000 in 2000 and a further to 753,000 in 2010, accounting for 1.7 per cent of the country’s total population (UN, 2009, in UNDP and ILO, 2014, p. 12).

Recent data from the UNHCR (2017c) indicates that 192,404 new refugees arrived from South Sudan in 2017 alone and an estimated 795,353 refugees in country overall, compared to the Sudanese Government’s official estimate of 1.3 million. Biometric registrations, managed by the IOM in partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP), are providing more reliable data going forward, including the establishment of mobile registration teams. The recommendation to use national identification numbers to track migrants was also noted during the interviews for this study and seems to be widely supported.

The people of the Sudan are extremely open to foreigners, in many cases to their own detriment – according to many of the key informant interviews the local population is forced to compete for jobs and benefits on an equal footing with migrants. Migrant workers generally seem to face similar obstacles to finding work as citizens do, and they tend to compete on an equal, if not advantageous, footing. While a work permit system exists, its effective implementation and enforcement could not be confirmed. Interviewees suggested that migrants are therefore able to secure employment without qualifying for such permits. This unprotected labour market has a negative impact on both citizens and migrants:

The challenge is not just about acquiring adequate skills to adapt to the predominantly urban setting, but also about accessing social security schemes for those who work in an unprotected labour market, especially for (internal) migrants who lost the informal social security system provided by their families in rural areas. (UNDP and ILO, 2014, p. 68).

While the salaries of citizens are highly regulated – and are also very low for government employees, according to key informants – migrants are paid on a more competitive basis, albeit in more informal roles, such as domestic workers and other low-skilled positions. One interviewee remarked that, in some instances, a foreigner in such a position could be paid more than a Sudanese health professional. These anomalies require further investigation and verification with officials.

It was noted during the interviews that government officials expressed a somewhat laissez-faire approach to the management of irregular migrants in particular. Limited resources and the lack of foreign aid were blamed for the weak controls, and it seems this will remain the situation for the immediate future, with no specific interventions noted to address the matter. A local human rights activist raised several concerns about this situation and the extent to which it allows for the exploitation of vulnerable people. While some interviewees did raise concerns such as, “We need to protect our boundaries,” and “Migrants have a negative effect on the Sudan as poverty is already high,” the country seems to be largely unable to address the matter.

13 Also see http://sudan.opendataforafrica.org/ and https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ for data on the Sudan.
The key informants stated that South Sudan is the third-largest contributor to the refugee population, and this was triangulated with the data presented earlier in this section. Due to the historical links between the countries this is deemed quite normal and is directly linked to periods of instability in the south. Virtually no mention was made of refugees from other IGAD countries outside of Ethiopia.

A significant number of highly skilled Sudanese are reported to be working abroad:

> It is estimated that more than one million Sudanese are working abroad, many of them among the Sudan’s most highly qualified personnel. The loss of their skills and of their contribution to society is among the major factors hampering development and is not adequately compensated for by remittances (Ibrahim et al., 2014, p. 12).

Semi-skilled and unskilled migration to the Middle East, and in particular to Saudi Arabia, is also widely acknowledged but largely unconfirmed. Data on inward and outward migration is very sparse, although not entirely absent. Relevant findings from the 2011 Labour Force Survey (Ministry of Human Resources Development and Labour and ILO, 2013) provide important insights into the distribution of migrants and refugees. About 174,000 Sudanese migrants returned and rejoined their families in the period from 2006 to 2011, and this figure represents only 1 per cent of the estimated 17 million people aged 15 and above in the Sudan during the survey period. The reasons for their return were: education (22 per cent); seeking a job (15 per cent); termination of work in previous place (8 per cent); finished studies (5 per cent); health care (5 per cent); or other (34 per cent). An estimated 43,000 returning migrants came from outside Africa, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Qatar.

On the other hand, about 135,000 Sudanese left the Sudan from 2006–2011, and the majority went abroad. The reasons for departure were: seeking a job (54 per cent); joining work (25 per cent); joining family (7 per cent); education (6 per cent); or other (7 per cent). Their labour force status before departure was: working (50 per cent); unemployed (39 per cent); or not in labour force (9 per cent). Their destinations were: Saudi Arabia (66,000); South Sudan (12,000); United Arab Emirates (11,000); Libya (9,000); Jordan (7,000); Qatar (6,000); India (4,000); Lebanon (4,000); or other European countries (3,000) (Ministry of Human Resources Development and Labour and ILO, 2013).

Internal migration is a significant factor in the Sudan, and is mostly towards Khartoum State:

> According to the 2008 census, civil war, drought, desertification, lack of education and social services, and other push factors, such as lack of employment opportunities, have contributed to the migration to Khartoum state. The analysis shows that, after Khartoum, the Eastern and Central regions have been the most attractive destination areas for migrants, resulting in net losses of population due to internal migration in the states of North Kordofan, South Kordofan, and West Darfur (UNDP and ILO, 2014, p. 24).

The proposed establishment by the Ministry of Interior of a Regional Operational Centre in support of the Khartoum Process14 and the AU–Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling15 was noted. The establishment of the Centre is supported by

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14 The EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, or “Khartoum Process”, is a platform for political cooperation among the countries along the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe.

15 The AU–Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling is a forum for participating countries from the Horn of Africa region to debate issues, exchange information, share experiences and deliberate on the status and counter measure approaches to human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa region.
the European Commission and aims to “support the collection, exchange and analysis of information, support joint investigations and enhance the coherence of national and regional legal frameworks” (European Commission, 2016). The Ministry was also reported to record data on refugees but several attempts from the local ILO office to obtain the data were unsuccessful.

3.3.4 Labour market demand in the Sudan

Labour market demand in the Sudan remains largely driven by agriculture and extractive industries. Oil revenues had made up much of the Sudan's GDP, however, they contribute little to employment generation. Declining oil revenues because of low export prices, ageing oil fields, and reduced inflows of oil transit fees from South Sudan upon secession have added to these challenges since 2008 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2017). The Government's second Five-Year National Development Plan (2012–16), therefore aimed to diversify the economy away from oil to agriculture and other sectors. Moreover, the establishment of cross-border trade corridors, through infrastructural programmes improving the Sudan's seaports, may constitute solid groundwork for implementing the bilateral agreements that the Sudan signed with Chad, Egypt, and Ethiopia in 2016 to boost trade and regional cooperation (AfDB, 2018). Nevertheless, the employment gains in mining from diversifying and trading in mineral exports may be limited.

3.3.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in the Sudan

As indicated, the Sudanese Government has a very open approach to migrants. While officials interviewed made comments such as, “[Migrants have] no added value to Sudan,” they were unable to provide any concrete examples of official interventions to address the situation. Sudanese legislation and policy relevant to migration include:

- **Criminal Procedures Act, 1991** – Provides for matters related to the detention of irregular migrants and punishments for facilitating irregular migration.
- **Passports and Immigration Act, 1994** – Regulates admission, stay, and the deportation of foreign nationals.
- **Combating of Human Trafficking Act, 2014** – Criminalizes human trafficking.
- **Asylum Regulation Act, 2014** – Provides for matters related to refugees, including their rights and duties in the Sudan. (MGSoG, 2017, p. 11)

As expected, migrants and refugees come to the Sudan with very limited, if any, documentary proof of their skills and training. A letter from an employer in the Sudan is often the only prerequisite for a foreigner to be legally employed. A work permit system is in place in theory, but no evidence of actual implementation was noted. Migrants in the Sudan are mostly unskilled or low-skilled, and tend to work as domestic workers (Ethiopians are preferred according to key informants) and as builders and plasterers (Egyptians are preferred according to key informants). A system is in place for high-skilled, professional migrants, but these seem to constitute a very small percentage of the workforce in the Sudan.
Opportunities exist to offer training to more than 400,000 refugees located in camps, but the capacity within the skills system – including in the technical secondary schools, technical colleges, and VTCs – is not able to cater for the local population, less so for the indigent population, and certainly even less so for refugees. Cost-effective solutions for skills training in similar contexts in other parts of the world would be worth considering. International development agencies can play an important role in this regard.

3.3.6 Overarching observations: The Sudan

As mentioned, the Sudan’s borders are exceptionally open and as a result, irregular migration is prevalent, with smugglers operational in many areas of the country within full view of authorities. There is a lacuna of policies or regulations to govern the movement into and out of the Sudan, especially for the purposes of work. The existence of several bilateral labour agreements on migration was reported, but evidence could not be provided of the details. Ethiopia is the exception, with several interviewees reporting very specific arrangements, though not a formal bilateral labour agreement.

Overall, it is noted that the capacity of TVET is very low in the Sudan. In this regard, the UNDP and ILO (2014a; 2014b) have made strong recommendations for a reform of the skills development system in the country. Based on the evidence presented here and first-hand experience acquired during our field visit to Khartoum State, this recommendation is supported. The practical implementation of such a reform process, including coordination of the diverse set of federal, state, and private role-players, will not be easy. Political stability is without a doubt an important prerequisite, as are improved systems to manage the movement of people.

Key informants also expressed strong views for “more coordination needed across international development agencies”, both in the Sudan and across IGAD. Several development agencies including the ILO, UNESCO, GIZ, KOICA, JICA, the EU, the Saudi Development Fund, and China all contribute meaningfully, but coordination is not evident. A new initiative, currently being led by the UNESCO Office in the Sudan working with the ILO Office, seems to be very relevant, as it attempts to provide greater levels of coordination and planning across federal and state bodies. The current lack of coordination appears to be one of the main weaknesses in the Sudan and limits the country’s ability to benefit from funding and expertise on a more sustainable basis. A careful consideration of the capacities of ministries responsible for migration and/or skills development in the Sudan will have to be part of any attempt to improve coordination.

3.4 Djibouti country report

3.4.1 Context in Djibouti

Apart from salt mining and largely untapped geothermal energy resources, Djibouti has limited natural resources and restricted industrial development. The national economy is based on financial, telecommunication, and trade-related services that contribute around
80 per cent of GDP, which is in keeping with Djibouti’s goal of establishing itself as a regional business, financial, and trade centre. The country’s relatively more open banking and finance regulations and free-trade zone status are attractive to businesses from countries in the region. Important developments in infrastructure, notably the container port adjoining the Gulf of Aden and the modernized rail link to Addis Ababa, position the country as an important logistics and related services provider. However, political and economic instability in the region and a tiny domestic market, together with high labour and energy input costs, have held back foreign investment. Being a small economy and high importer, the country experiences high foreign debt and budget deficits. The country also has extensive and longstanding unemployment, estimated to be between 60 to 80 per cent among citizens, which is intensified by large numbers of irregular migrants entering Djibouti. Urbanization of the population is estimated to be 78 per cent. Currently, the Djibouti economy is dominated by the tertiary/services sector, employing more than 70 per cent of the working population. It should be noted that the Government is the country’s largest employer (Economic Commission for Africa, 2017; Republic of Djibouti, 2015).

A new rail link between Addis Ababa and Djibouti has been constructed. Over the years, the traffic between the two cities by road has grown immensely, as Djibouti’s port provides Ethiopia – a landlocked country – with access to the sea and accommodates more than 90 per cent of Ethiopia’s trade, which in turn represents more than 70 per cent of the Djibouti port’s business activity. The new standard heavy rail line with a much shorter transport time than the road became commercially active in 2018 and should substantially expand and reduce costs of international trade for Ethiopia. The international port of Djibouti is designated as a free-trade zone. It has highly developed container and refrigeration facilities as well as also capabilities for storage of oil and gas products and trans-shipment of goods into the region. New container terminals, refurbished docking berths, and a new nearby port, Doral, with deep-water container facilities have increased competitiveness of the port in the Red Sea Gulf of Aden (Economic Commission for Africa, 2017; Republic of Djibouti, 2015).

The expansion of the tourism sector is viewed to offer prospects within a broader intention to fashion Djibouti not only as an entry point, but also as a tourist and recreational destination. This includes exploiting underwater reef diving opportunities. This type of economic expansion would typically require relevant vocational programmes related to the hospitality industry. In addition, there are fisheries and, as mentioned, mining resources, including salt and gold deposits. Clearly there are efforts currently under way in Djibouti towards economic diversification. However, the missing element is job creation and some space for encouraging entrepreneurship. Essentially, government economic policy needs to prioritize employment generating activities (Economic Commission for Africa, 2017).

Because of Djibouti’s harsh landscape and limited areas of arable land, agriculture is not a viable economic sector and is largely practiced at subsistence level only. In rural areas, nomadic pastoralism is a way of life. Sheep and goats are raised for milk, meat, and skins; while camels are used for transport caravans. Very low proportions of these populations possess or have access to institutions offering post-school skills training. These nomadic populations are dependent on the products of their animals as their primary source of livelihood.
3.4.2 Skills development in Djibouti

The Government traditionally has sought to overcome constraints such as high and rising informal economic activity; the small size of African enterprises; weak inter-firm linkages; the low level of competitiveness; and the lack of innovation capabilities by launching parastatals (government-owned enterprises) in specifically targeted industries (see UNCTAD, 2012). Examples include the mineral water bottling plant at Tadjoura and a dairy plant outside Djibouti city. The Government has also attempted to exploit significant geothermal activity in the hopes of making the country energy self-sufficient. However, the parastatal sector has been plagued by inefficiency and the need for significant budget subsidies. Since the mid-1980s, the Government has worked toward the privatization of these companies in an attempt to increase profits and productivity. In 1996, these efforts were further expanded as part of a structural-adjustment programme sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank (Republic of Djibouti, 2015).

The demand for access to TVET training among refugees or migrants can only be considered relative to current provision to citizens as well as the existing kinds of pressure for delivery of specific skills to meet the needs of industry or the demand of the youth population. Therefore, in countries like Djibouti where TVET systems have experienced limited growth or where growth has not maintained pace with demand, there will be pressure to balance the needs of citizens with the need to accommodate refugees or migrants.

A second key issue is the placement of these institutions, not only in relation to local citizens, but also in relation to camps and settlements where refugees and migrants are concentrated. The distribution of education facilities in a country is a complex matter, which oftentimes involves privileging some groups, most notably urban dwellers. There are also other political considerations that may also impact the distribution of TVET facilities. In Djibouti there are five administrative regions and one city region, Djibouti Ville. The five administrative regions do not possess a single post-school technical and vocational institution among them; whereas the city has two public Lycée Industriel et Commercial (LIC) institutions.

A third issue is the policy and legislation that govern migration and refugees in general, and their access to training in particular. It is evident that Ministry of Labour officials are mindful of the numbers of migrants in the country. Diverse forms of migration impact on the economic and social life of Djibouti, which will be addressed in more detail below. Suffice it to say that while Djibouti is generally treated as a transition point in migration further afield, there are significant proportions of migrating people located in Djibouti who desire and would benefit from job opportunities, ranging from residents in camps to others who live homeless on the streets or occupy makeshift shelters on the beach.

In the Ministry of National Education and Professional Training (MENFOP) there is a Technical Education and Vocational Training Department. There are three types of institution within its mandate:

**Technical high schools**

There are seven technical high schools in Djibouti with two in the capital and one in each of the regions outside of the capital. Unfortunately, the equipment available in the schools is obsolete. Six high schools offer technical education, while one high school is devoted to
hotel industry trades. In 2016, 1,865 students were registered in technical high schools. This provides limited access to TVET education opportunities in comparison to the ordinary high school enrolment of 16,387 in 2015–16. (MENFOP-DP, 2016).

**Lycées Industriels et Commerciaux**

There are two lycées that provide for technical training under professional qualifications. In 2015–16, 323 students registered for the [baccalauréat technique](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baccalaur%C3%A9at_technique) (technical baccalauréat) in the LIC Djibouti and the [Lycée Technique](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyc%C3%A9e_technique) Gabode. These are the only two institutions where the post-school technical baccalauréate is offered, and both are located in the capital city. (MENFOP-DP, 2016).

**Les Centres de Formations**

Four vocational training centres have evolved in Djibouti to accommodate for adult, school-leaver, and second-chance student needs. The centres are all unique and address needs that are specific to each centre. In 2013 there were 510 learners in these vocational training centres (MENFOP, 2017).

The Government’s National Service Assets programme involved recruitment and training of about 4,100 young people between 2004 and 2014 in a military framework partnered by the vocational schools and training centres. It is reported that 85 per cent of those who attended the course have a job (Republic of Djibouti, 2015). It is not clear whether this programme is still operating. There is also the Al Rahma Development Complex Technical High School; this complex includes a modern hospital and is funded through Kuwait Government aid. The University of Djibouti, established in 2006, had a student body of over 7,000 by 2015 with faculties of Law, Economics, and Management; Science; Humanities, Languages, and Social Sciences; Medicine; and Engineering.

There are some observations that need to be made about the various institutions that offer technical and vocational training in Djibouti. First, the enrolment numbers as stated are insufficient to meet the demand for opportunities to acquire skills, especially demand from young people given that the youth unemployment rate is about 60 per cent. Second, the existing system appears to have been developed on a piecemeal basis, with limited continuity visible between the different institutional levels. Third, as a result, it is unlikely that coherent programmes allowing for progression are provided for across the institutions. This can frustrate the development of more high-level technical skills. Furthermore, it seems that the University’s [Instituts Universitaire de Technologies Industrielles](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instituts_universitaires_d%27eti) should be designing and implementing programmes for higher level technical skilling in collaboration with enterprises in the transport and logistics sectors, rather than seemingly developing intermediate level programmes that the lycées or adult education colleges would be best positioned to take up.

**3.4.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Djibouti**

Djibouti has a population of about 950,000 in relation to the estimated 27,000 refugees in the country. Nearly 80 per cent of Djiboutians live in urban areas, while approximately 13 per cent of the Djiboutian population consider themselves migrant (UN, 2019; Kireyev, 2017). An outstanding feature of migration trends in and out of Djibouti is that in spite of highly limited...
employment opportunities in the country, with unemployment over 50 per cent, very few Djiboutian citizens choose to leave in comparison with other countries in IGAD, which have massive numbers in their diasporas.

Migration is experienced in the pastoralist areas of Dikhil and Ali-Sabieh regions, which border countries affected by famine as a consequence of chronic drought over a decade. Along the borders with Somalia and Ethiopia there is ongoing movement of population and livestock when nomadic populations from neighbouring countries seek pastures for their livestock in Djibouti’s northern Dikhil, Tadjourah, Ali-Sabieh, and Arta regions (UNICEF, 2017a).

Djibouti is a place of immigration and transit. The country continues to experience in-migration that is both short-term and long-term (EUTF, 2017) but does seem to be declining overall. The IOM estimates the crude net migration rates\textsuperscript{16} as follows: 35.5 during 1985–90; –4.76 during 1995–00; –4.96 during 2005–10; and –3.69 during 2010–15 (UNDESA, Population Division and UNICEF, 2014). In August 2017, the situation was reported by the UNHCR (DRC and RMMS, 2017) as follows: There were 27,601 refugees and asylum-seekers in Djibouti as of August 2017, most of whom settled in Ali Addeh. Their origin was as follows: Somalia (13,306), Ethiopia (8,654), Yemen (4,434), and Eritrea (1,149), with a small proportion from countries other than the above. Many Somalis have been resident, while the number of refugees increased in 2017 following unrest in the neighbouring Oromia region (UNICEF, 2017a). Many people in transit in either direction through Djibouti will not declare themselves as refugees, as they wish to avoid being identified by UNHCR or Djibouti’s Office National d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (National Office for Assistance to Refugees and Victims of Disaster) because they do not wish their onward journey to be disrupted by internment in a camp.

### 3.4.4 Labour market demand in Djibouti

Djibouti government officials in the Ministry of Labour refer to the demographic challenges of youths and of migrants as important challenges for the country. In both population groups, access to skills and employment opportunities is acknowledged as being important for social cohesion and social inclusion. The country’s five-year plan for 2015 to 2019 directly acknowledges young people as a major social and economic concern, providing sufficient justification to develop an up-to-date national human resources development plan. Government acknowledges that domestic, bilateral, and multilateral plans for concrete interventions related to the labour market must be prioritized to deal with the fast-changing demographic pressure of unemployment on the labour market.

Disappointingly, between 1991 and 2016, the employment to population ratio in Djibouti for all persons aged 15 and older only grew marginally, from 43.6 per cent to 49.0 per cent (World Bank, 2016a). Even more disconcerting is that in the youth population – ages 15 to 24 – the employment to population ratio declined from 41.4 per cent to 37.6 per cent over the same period. Within this scenario, the female share of the labour force was only 34.9 per cent (World Bank, 2016a). Clearly, overall unemployment and, even more so, youth unemployment are very high. From the perspective of the Ministry of Labour, job creation, improvements to matching skills with jobs, and bringing jobseekers into interaction with employers are three fundamental imperatives. This reflects a requirement for government

\textsuperscript{16} Crude net migration rate is the ratio of net migration during the year to the average population in that year, expressed per 1,000 inhabitants.
departments to improve coordination – especially between public and private constituencies. Another theme relates to ways of sourcing and managing labour market information to facilitate skills-job matches that are mutually beneficial to the parties involved, in terms of generating sustainable work and productive industrial processes.

To tackle these challenges the Government, in 2014, launched the Djibouti Vision 2035 strategy, set to be implemented in successive five-year plans. The first of these, the “Strategy of Accelerated Growth and Promotion of Employment” (SCAPE) focuses on large-scale investments in port infrastructure development and railway construction, which are expected to boost employment, especially in trade-related services (AfDB, 2018). Given that the tertiary sector already employs over 70 per cent of Djibouti’s active population (AfDB, 2016), there are a number of initiatives underway that target the gradual diversification of other sectors. Among these are mining and hydrocarbons – although due to high labour productivity in mining, employment gains are traditionally limited – as well as geothermal energy, tourism, and the primary sector (Republic of Djibouti, 2015; Oxford Business Group, 2016). For example, the Government is cooperating with Chinese firms in the launching of a large industrial and commercial customs-free zone, in exploiting natural resources (fish, salt, and energy), and in developing tourism (AfDB Group, 2017).

As reported above, Somali, Ethiopian, and Yemeni people form the largest proportions of migrants in Djibouti. The general issue of labour market access and skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Djibouti will be discussed below with some reference to Yemeni migrants by way of illustration. A striking feature of the gender/age make up of refugee migrant groups from Yemen into the Horn of Africa is that the largest proportion are children (comprising 38 per cent or more), while the balance between men and women differs at different destinations (UNHCR, 2016a). From an education and work needs perspective, it is obvious that children – perhaps up to about age 15 – would need to access formal schooling. Regarding the demand for TVET, related training for refugees would have to be assessed in relation to the number of adults among the refugees in a particular location. However, demand from adult refugees for access to some form of technical or vocational training would need to take into account the prior education, work experience, and willingness of refugees, as taking up training or seeking recognition for qualifications they already possess may not necessarily be part of their future plans.

A cultural indicator that is relatively prominent in predominantly Muslim countries in the Horn of Africa is the tendency for substantially fewer females than males to pursue education. For example, a greater proportion of Yemeni men above 18 years (36 per cent of Yemeni refugees in Djibouti) and a much lower proportion of Yemeni women (25 per cent of Yemeni refugees) would be candidates for any kind of formal work requiring middle-level technical and vocational skills. This implies that specific attention would need to be given to understanding cultural mindsets and the household and social conditions and responsibilities of women in these circumstances in order to shift embedded conceptions of women’s roles and to create openings and opportunities that might be taken up by refugee women thus affected.

After an extended drought caused a severe famine that impacted the lives of more than 10 million people in peripheral arid and semi-arid regions, the IGAD Heads of State mandated the authority to undertake the initiative “Ending Drought Emergencies in the Horn of Africa”. This is particularly important for Djibouti, where the focus has shifted from
emergency responses to long-term interventions designed to enhance drought resilience in target communities and among refugees in arid and semi-arid areas, as reflected by the emergence of the Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative. Three areas that will have technical and vocational skills needs as spin-offs from such programmes would be:

- Re-skilling or cross-skilling former nomads who need to convert from a nomadic to a sedentary occupation (e.g., from large livestock (cattle) to small animal (poultry) farming);
- New training programmes (agricultural extension-type programmes) on resilience to make forms of animal agriculture more viable through better techniques and technologies;
- Multiple opportunities on various infrastructure projects to conserve water that must be distributed across affected areas (the policy is oriented towards generating partnerships and sharing responsibilities for facilities such as water storage with communities with irrigation benefits).

### 3.4.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Djibouti

A joint plan of action between the Government of Djibouti and the UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNESCO, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Al Rahma Association was formulated to support access to educational services for Yemeni refugee children, and an emergency education assessment was conducted. A number of refugee children benefited from a six-week programme based on basic literacy and recreational activities. A further number of older refugee children – who had missed school – were given a four-week programme of catch-up classes. Finally, eight teachers were recruited for the programme, indicating that the donors were determined to have actual teachers rather than volunteers. This raises the important question as to how to meet parents’ and adults’ skills needs. In Djibouti, the needs of adults do not seem to have been formally addressed. The resort of adults prepared to work would be to find employment in the informal economy.

This account is directly relevant to central questions concerning access of refugees and migrants to the labour market, and thereby to employment opportunities so that they can live and work in the cities or fashion sustainable livelihoods in rural environments. Since the majority of Yemeni refugees and migrants have minimal or no financial resources at their disposal, they would unlikely be in a position to come up with the cash resources needed to undertake a job search. The Government of Djibouti, supported by local and international humanitarian actors, has also facilitated the return of Djiboutian citizens and has provided access to territory for stranded migrants.

Djibouti does receive quite substantial humanitarian assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council, a political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries with humanitarian motives and also interests in securing ties in the IGAD region. For example, Saudi Arabia, through the King Salman Centre for Relief and Humanitarian Work, has been assisting through the provision and rehabilitation of emergency shelters and collective centres; distribution of essential relief items; and the establishment of two clinics in the Obock camp in Djibouti (UNHCR, 2016a). Western development agencies providing support include the UNHCR, the IOM, and more recently, the Norwegian Refugee Council.

In December 2017, Djibouti announced new refugee laws that provide for improving the lives of refugees. The laws give assurances that the Djibouti Government will “streamline
refugee status determination procedures”, and undertake to open up “more opportunities for [refugees’] socio-economic integration”. Though the intentions of the Djibouti Government are positive, the real challenge lies in the labour market, where formal sector job opportunities are relatively scarce. Before the new laws were announced, refugees could only take recourse to the informal economy for jobs such as domestic worker, fishing, restaurant staff, or unskilled labourers (UNHCR, 2017b).

In August 2017, Djibouti undertook to provide education to all refugee children by including them into the national system. This again highlights the commitment of Djibouti to supporting refugee rights, yet at the same time this commitment is in tension with the need to raise the general quality of education in the country. It should be noted that improvements in the quality of Djibouti’s school education system would be welcomed. At this early stage, it is highly unlikely that refugees will find easy entry into formal sector jobs and will thus have to resort to the informal economy.

In 2014, the Djibouti Ministry of Higher Education gazetted the conditions and procedures for granting equivalence/recognition of higher education diplomas. This action could only have ensued from a determination of a need within the system to consider the relationships between qualifications and the comparability of qualifications. This is a key action that provides a basis for developing a system that describes, categorizes, recognizes, validates, and specifies the interrelationships of qualifications. This pronouncement provides evidence for recognition by the Ministry of the need for a system to generate a coherent understanding of qualifications emerging from the nascent higher education systems, and perhaps to generate a means to compare this system and its constituent qualifications with another system. What this higher education initiative does not seem to take into account is how to incorporate qualifications from other sectors of the system, such as TVET.

**3.4.6 Overarching observations: Djibouti**

An important factor to note is that the Djibouti Government has adopted an open-door policy to refugees and migrants. As an example, when the Yemen refugee crisis broke during the first months of 2015, the Government at first sought to restrict refugee movement by obliging refugees to register and remain confined in the newly established refugee camp of Markazi, about four kilometres from the port city of Obock, which is about 235 kilometres distant from Djibouti City. However, the hot, semi-arid local climate of Obock, with average monthly temperatures of 38.6°C (101.5°F) or higher from May to July, caused many refugees to vacate the camp. The ability of the Government to enforce confinement to the camp was diminished, while further refugee influx continued. Under these pressures, the Government authorized registration of Yemenis in Obock and in Djibouti City in November 2016, which offered Yemeni refugees’ relative freedom to pursue their lives outside of Markazi. As a result, in 2017, there were Yemeni refugees living in Markazi, in Obock, and in Djibouti city, with movement between these sites not only due to weather extremes but also because the cost of living in Djibouti city is much higher than in the peripheral regions. Many Yemeni refugees who cannot sustain their positions in Djibouti city are forced to return to the Markazi Camp. At least in the camp, refugees would have free access to basic shelter, food, and health services that they would otherwise have to raise income to afford. Recently, Djibouti has adopted a policy permitting Yemenis to reside in urban areas (UNHCR, 2016a).
Under these circumstances, the open-door policy needs to be interrogated further to establish to what extent it has facilitated Yemeni living standards or whether this policy would require additional interventions to achieve desirable effects. However, the main gap is the limited assistance (material and medical) for the most vulnerable refugees in urban locations (UNHCR, 2016a).

This research did not find evidence of a developed or functioning public employment services infrastructure in Djibouti. Efforts towards this goal will benefit from increased interactions between relevant government ministries and agencies and private sector employers, of which there was limited evidence. However, moves towards constructing the elements that would eventually comprise a public employment service are being implemented. The emphasis of these initiatives tends towards addressing youth unemployment. Within some government institutions there are indications of rising interest in devising ways in which information can be applied to solving skills matching and problems, both from the jobseeker and the employer side. Further, the National Agency for Employment, Training, and Professional Integration has launched initiatives to generate services that can enhance capabilities of young people to find work and improve their employability.

3.5 Uganda country report

3.5.1 Context in Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa. It is bordered on the east by Kenya, on the north by South Sudan, on the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the south-west by Rwanda, and on the south by Tanzania. The southern part of the country includes a substantial portion of Lake Victoria, which is also shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda has an estimated population of about 34.6 million people, 51 per cent of which is female. At 3.2 per cent, Uganda has one of the highest population growth rates in the region (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Uganda's population has grown rapidly in recent years from 24.2 million in 2002 to 34.6 million in 2014. Its fertility rate remains one of the highest in the world at 5.8 births per woman in 2014. Urban population has grown considerably, but a large proportion of the population still resides in rural areas. In 2014, the urbanization rate stood at 21.4 per cent. This is below the urbanization rate (32.8 per cent) for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Uganda has the world’s youngest population – with 78 per cent below the age of 30 (Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi, 2018).

Uganda has had a long-term Comprehensive National Development Planning Framework since 2007 that provides for the development of a 30-year vision. To date, the country has already developed Uganda Vision 2040 and the first and second National Development Plans (National Planning Authority, 2015). Uganda Vision 2040 is a long-term, segmented plan that provides the overall guiding framework on sustainable development and socioeconomic transformation for Uganda. The vision is to transform Uganda from a largely subsistence-level agrarian economy to a modern and prosperous country by 2040. This involves transitioning from a predominantly low-income to a competitive upper-middle-income country. Uganda's economic outlook has been favourable over the past two decades. From 1999 to 2000, there were major reforms that resulted in a continued average growth rate of 6.3 per cent.
Between 2010 and 2015, the growth rate averaged 5.4 per cent, with the highest recorded at 9.7 per cent in 2011. GDP growth increased slightly to 5.3 per cent in 2016 from 5 per cent in 2015 with the rebound of private sector activity after the end of elections (National Planning Authority, 2015).

Economic growth can only be sustained if productivity is high; and higher productivity can only be achieved if the economic strategy enables a continued supply of skilled workers. Thus, the National Development Plan II continues to put emphasis on inclusive growth and employment. The “Skilling Uganda” programme focuses on the realization of economic growth through skills acquisition and development. The Ministry of Education and Sport’s Skilling Uganda strategic plan (2012) spells out the transformative agenda of changing the mindset about technical, vocational, and business/entrepreneurial skills as the drivers of economic growth. The Ugandan Government recognizes that productivity potential can be unlocked through business, technical, and vocational education and training (BTVET). The Skilling Uganda BTVET Strategic Plan 2012/3–2021/2 confirms the role of human capital in economic growth (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2012).

It should also be noted that while Uganda has a vocational qualifications framework – the UVQF – it does not technically have an NQF. Uganda refers to the Ethiopian and Kenyan qualification frameworks as examples, indicating that there could be mutual benefit and cooperation towards regional skills recognition. However, the EAC currently lacks the financial and technical capacity to implement this process, and must therefore rely on Member States to align their national policies.

3.5.2 Skills development in Uganda

The Skilling Uganda strategy indicates a paradigm shift for skills development in Uganda. At the forefront of this is the transformation of the BTVET system from being an educational sub-sector into a comprehensive system of skills development for employment, productivity, and growth. (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2012, p. 14). The new BTVET system focuses on skills needs for all. The paradigm shift is about moving from educational certificates to skills and competencies that are relevant for the labour market and changing the concept of TVET being for lower achievers to that of providing skills development for all. Also, it involves taking away the rigidity of the system and making it flexible and workplace-orientated, as well as encouraging larger stakeholder participation through public–private-partnerships.

Uganda has private provision, public, and non-formal BTVET programmes, with the Directorate of Industrial Training (DIT) as the umbrella quality assurance body. The projected learner intake in this sub-sector is expected to increase from 206,223 to 448,468 by 2020 (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2012, p. 110). Plans are underway to refurbish existing public BTVET institutions and to increase access to BTVET. Despite this, BTVET institutions are reportedly still using old technology, and curriculum revisions have been proposed but not implemented.

The DIT, as a quality assurance and qualification standards-setting directorate under the Ministry of Education and Sports, is tasked with the responsibility of developing occupational qualifications standards and training modules, and with compiling and distributing assessment and training packages that are occupation-based within the Ugandan Vocational
Qualifications Framework (UVQF). The UVQF promotes the skills development programmes in the BTVET sub-sector through flexible training/learning modules packaged in the form of assessment training packages. The DIT started issuing UVQF qualification certificates and transcripts in 2009 and therefore phased out the issuance of trade test certificates. The qualifications which the DIT awards include:

- **Modular transcript** – The modular transcript is a partial qualification after undertaking a modular assessment in a given occupation. Modular assessments are flexible and build up to a qualification. For each module, a learner has to demonstrate certain competencies during assessment. This allows for easy access into training, and refugees and inward migrants benefit from this arrangement through partnership training from local TVET institutions and other agencies that operate in refugee communities at the borders or in local communities.

- **Worker’s PAS** – The Worker’s Practically Acquired Skills (PAS) is a partial qualification received after undertaking modular assessment in a given occupation, most especially for individuals undertaking apprenticeships as skilled artisans in the *jua kali* (Ugandan informal sector) in the Katwe and Kisenyi areas of Kampala. Migrants who work in the informal sector are reportedly finding it easy to acquire this form of assessment/certification because it is based on practical skills. It is further stated that this form of certification is what locals use when seeking employment from migrants.

The Federation of Ugandan Employers, which is a stakeholder representing industry, has also embraced the paradigm shift towards competency-based education and has particularly supported the involvement of industry in developing the skills development curriculum. The Federation has indicated that it is working with government to ensure that skills and qualifications are relevant to the employers’ needs and economic growth.

Further, in 2012 Uganda implemented a training levy system through which employees’ training needs would be catered for (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2012, p. 97). It is assumed that migrant workers may benefit from the skills levy. The researcher could not discern any benefit that accrues to TVET institutions through the skills levy. One would assume that the skills levy should be an equalizer in terms of allowing all employees, irrespective of whether they are nationals or migrants, to access the levy. This fact was not established during the study.

### 3.5.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Uganda

Uganda is a major destination for refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing conflict or instability in neighbouring countries, including South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, and Rwanda. The power struggle and conflict between the Government and opposition forces in South Sudan in December 2013 led to massive displacement of South Sudanese nationals into neighbouring countries, with the largest number fleeing to Uganda. According to the UNHCR, there was a total population of concern of more than 1.4 million in Uganda as of March 2018, with approximately two-thirds originating from South Sudan (UNHCR, 2018b).

World Bank data on emigrants and outflow of Ugandan nationals indicates that there were an estimated 406,193 Ugandans in the diaspora in 2016 (table 7).
Table 7. Uganda's diaspora disaggregated by country, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>120,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>106,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>64,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>30,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>19,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>18,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>12,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>406,193</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Uganda's generous policy towards refugees has been hailed as “one of the most progressive in the world” (DRC and RMMS, 2016, p. 6), with positive social and economic aspects. Good relationships and peaceful co-existence between host communities and refugees have been reported in all refugee settlements, with more than 78 per cent of refugees in rural settlements being engaged in productive agricultural activities and only 1 per cent depending entirely on humanitarian assistance (DRC and RMMS, 2016).

Uganda reportedly has the largest population of refugees from the IGAD region and most of them come from South Sudan (1 million), with others coming from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and some from Eritrea (UNHCR, 2018b). Ugandan Government figures for refugee numbers are smaller than those found in some other sources, but still showcase a sizeable refugee population (see tables 8–10 for Ugandan Government figures on refugees) Because of this high influx of refugees, the Ugandan Government, through relevant ministries (Education and Sports; Internal Affairs; Gender, Labour and Social Development), is working with a number of international agencies to attend to refugee welfare, which includes health, education, the provision of skills, etc.

Refugees are given identity cards, but the Government does not have adequate capacity to capture the movement of the refugees once the cards are issued. However, there is a refugee management system that uses biometrics. Future plans are that the same system will be used to capture data on labour mobility, employment, income, etc. Refugees are allowed to move to urban areas, and in some cases, would become internal migrants once integrated with the local population. The refugees’ status would then evolve to that of economic migrants (World Bank, 2016a).
Educational needs of the refugees are attended to in the host communities through integration. Often, schools are built and vocational training is introduced through capacity-building programmes run by NGOs. An example is the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) programme designed by the UN country team and the Government of Uganda. The programme operates within a resilience framework and is designed to develop self-reliance among refugee and host communities in Uganda.

An official from the Office of the Prime Minister shed light on the waiving of work permits for refugees; although Uganda has a generous policy towards refugees, refugees and foreigners are not allowed to work in the public service if they do not hold the prerequisite qualifications.

Table 8. Refugees in Uganda by country of origin, as of the end of June 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>No. of refugees</th>
<th>Per cent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>229,176</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>207,541</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>39,608</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>36,758</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>17,367</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>547,063</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Government, Office of the Prime Minister, Refugee Information Management System (RIMS), June 2016

Table 9. Refugees in Uganda by age group, as of the end of June 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–4 years</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–11 years</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–17 years</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–59 years</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Government, Office of the Prime Minister, Refugee Information Management System (RIMS), June 2016

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17 Personal communication from official in the Office of the Prime Minister, 14 Dec. 2017.
Table 10. Refugees in Uganda by gender, as of the end of June 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Government, Office of the Prime Minister, Refugee Information Management System (RIMS), June 2016

Most internal migration takes place from rural areas to the cities. An interviewee from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives noted that rural-to-urban migration is happening at a large scale because youths do not see the agricultural sector as a supplier of employment opportunities. Efforts are underway by the Government and development agencies (such as Voluntary Service Overseas and the Association of Volunteers in International Service Foundation and many others) to respond to the Skilling Uganda agenda by introducing innovative training to make agriculture attractive as a source of employment and entrepreneurship. It is hoped that training programmes on modern agriculture and entrepreneurship will encourage youths to remain in the rural areas and enable them to earn their living in a rural setting.

In Uganda, migration and the environment are also intrinsically linked. Environmental degradation and climatic disasters can cause migration; while human mobility, in turn, has a significant impact on surrounding ecosystems. Common natural disasters in Uganda that lead to displacement are landslides and floods, while the semi-arid climate of the Karamoja region has led to frequent migration of its population, particularly pastoralists.

The IOM indicated that it works with migrants in slums and trains them in entrepreneurship skills to give them access to livelihoods. Informal training is provided by service providers under the DIT, which also enables certification, testing, and the ability to access funds/loans. The IOM has also built a training institute where it trains immigration officers to make experiences at borders friendly so as to ease population mobility. To this end, the number of border posts is also being increased. A number of international agencies are implementing livelihood programmes at border posts in partnership with the ministries of Gender, Labour and Social Development; Internal Affairs; and Education and Sports. The IOM is further working to reintegrate returnees into communities in Uganda through targeted programmes. Some of the returnees are from the Gulf States, where most young people choose to seek employment; however, it needs to be borne in mind that some returnees are IDPs who left their places of origin due to climate conditions or conflict (aftermath of war) and terrorist attacks (IOM, 2015b, p. 2).

Most Ugandans migrate to neighbouring countries, in particular Kenya and South Sudan, and other African countries; while significant numbers have also been recorded in Europe and North America. Labour migration, especially to the Middle East, is facilitated by private recruitment agencies operating in Uganda. Many Ugandan men have been recruited to work as private security guards in countries such as Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The size of the Ugandan diaspora could be much higher, with some sources indicating it can be as high as 3 million.
In terms of the externalization of its labour force, Uganda has seen an increase in low- and semi-skilled migrants to the Arab world. Those considered to have low skills include domestic workers, security guards, drivers and construction workers. There are recruitment firms registered with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development that conduct pre-departure training under the direction of the ministry. Pre-departure training involves preparing the migrant on matters of culture, language, and laws of the receiving country. In some instances, core job-specific training (e.g., domestic cleaning) may be included. It needs to be noted that through a DIT process migrants may select to subject themselves to assessment in order to obtain a Worker’s Pass.

As Uganda is part of the EAC, free movement of labour is adopted in principle; however, interview respondents from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and National Council for Higher Education reported that there seems to be mistrust amongst parties – all referred to the Republic of Tanzania in particular. A National Diaspora Policy is still to be approved (reportedly), and a Working Abroad Policy is in progress, according to the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. There is also a lengthy process involved in obtaining a passport.

Challenges concerning low-skilled workers in the Middle East, including evidence of human rights violations perpetrated on migrants, has led to the signing of bilateral agreements with Gulf States. However, these are generally not implementable, as migrants travel out of the country voluntarily and are only identified when there are problems. In addition, Uganda does not have diplomatic missions in all countries in the Middle East. The desire is for IGAD and EAC countries to enter into cooperation agreements so that countries with diplomatic missions in the Middles East can offer protection to all IGAD/EAC migrants in the destination countries.

3.5.4 Labour market demand in Uganda

Uganda is part of the EAC common market where there is free movement of persons, which has an impact on the nature of cross-border trade with other countries. Traders need to seek clearance from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, and under the Trade Licensing Act (1969), the Minister has the power to restrict non-national trade as well as the locality of trade. IGAD, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC, and SADC countries are working towards the Continental Trade Agreement to remove barriers and allow free trade across borders for regional Member States.

Uganda’s labour market is dominated by a high rate of labour force participation, which comprises a large informal sector, high levels of self-employment, and non-standard forms of employment, as well as pervasive under-employment. Only about half of working age people participate in the labour force, with the remainder either involved in subsistence agriculture or inactive. Of the labour market participants, about 90 per cent are in employment while the remainder is recorded as unemployed. Unemployment has consistently been higher for women than men and for those under the age of 30. About 47 per cent of those in employment are waged workers, while 44 per cent are self-employed, and the remainder counted as contributory family workers. The majority (62.6 per cent) of waged workers are male, and 58.6 per cent of contributing family workers are female. The vast majority (90 per cent) of waged workers are located in the private sector. Just 9 per cent of those in formal
paid employment are employed by the public sector. Of the 37.4 per cent of waged workers that are female, only 27.9 per cent are employed in the public sector (Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi, 2018). Uganda’s informal economy accounts for 60 per cent of GDP and nearly 50 per cent of available jobs. There are strong formalized organizations such as the Kampala City Traders Association, which represent the interests of informal businesses in Uganda. The informal economy is a significant source of livelihoods in towns such as Jinja, where there are open markets and fishing.

Concentration of populations in growing cities contributes to urban problems of poverty and unemployment, which are shared by migrants. The EU, the IOM, and other partners are engaged in the Strengthening Social Cohesion and Stability in Slum Populations project. At the heart of this work is the enhancement of employment opportunities as a vehicle towards social harmonization. Although migrants in slums are the direct beneficiaries, locals also benefit from the training this project offers.18

3.5.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Uganda

According to the World Bank (2016b), Uganda has an open policy regarding migration. The country is very accommodating and migrants to Uganda can integrate freely and even buy land for residential and cultivation/agricultural production activities. In 2000, Uganda had 529,000 migrants including 236,000 refugees. The Norwegian Refugee Council (2017) estimates that 489,000 South Sudanese refugees fled to Uganda in 2016 alone, not counting refugees from other countries, which is more than the “362,000 people [that] crossed the Mediterranean into Europe in the same period”.

According to the IOM, Uganda has ratified a range of international instruments pertaining to migration, and since the mid-1980s has passed a variety of acts and regulations affecting immigrants. Ugandan legislation dealing with aspects of migration include:

- Aliens (Registration and Control Act), 1985
- Adoption of Children Rules, 1997
- Children Act, 1997 (Chap. 59)
- The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons, 2004
- Employment (Recruitment of Ugandan Migrant Workers Abroad) Regulations, 2005
- The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act, 2000
- The Recruitment of Ugandan Migrant Workers Abroad Resolution, 2005
- Refugees Act, 2006
- Equal Opportunities Act, 2007
- Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2009
- Refugee Regulations, 2010

According to the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012, the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is mandated with overseeing the entry into and stay of non-nationals in the country; the registration of Ugandan nationals

18 Key informant interview with IOM official, Kampala, 14 December 2017.
and resident aliens; and the issuance of passports and travel documents. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its Diaspora Department, manages relationships with the diaspora. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development oversees all issues related to labour externalization. An Immigration Control Official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicated in an interview that the Ministry does not systematically collect data on migrants’ skills. However, working in partnership with the UNDP, plans are at an advanced stage to develop a database of migrants and their skills profiles. This information is critical to assisting the country to manage the outward migration of young workers; the departure of highly skilled professionals (so called “brain drain”); and the inflow of migrants.

In an interview with the study team, the Head of the National Council for Higher Education stated that many migrants come to Uganda seeking education. This may also be the result of Uganda’s “no-visa policy” for EAC citizens, and is evident from the number of Kenyans, Rwandans, and South Sudanese who have enrolled in local universities. Uganda, through the National Council for Higher Education, plays a significant role in the East African University Council, which, among other things, seeks to bring about harmonization in tertiary education qualifications. The East African Qualifications Framework for Higher Education, includes guidelines on credit transfer and benchmarking, has been developed and is a step towards the realization of the free movement of personnel as enshrined in the EAC Common Market Protocol. This step will equally benefit the IGAD Member States, and lessons learned from this regional process will be applied to neighbouring IGAD states who are not members of the EAC.

### 3.5.6 Overarching observations: Uganda

International agencies such as the UNHCR, UNIDO, the IOM, GIZ, Voluntary Service Overseas, and the Association of the Volunteers in International Service Foundation as well as local NGOs are also working in the skills development space to support the Skilling Uganda programme. They work with marginalized populations and youths as well as migrants and refugees. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives are working together to provide skills for IDPs, migrants, and the marginalized populations in agriculture, oil and gas, and other key areas. There are a number of youth projects that are supported financially by the Enterprise Uganda Foundation under the stewardship of the Ministry of Finance.¹⁹

In addition, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MOGLSD) is responsible for initiatives aimed to empower Ugandan citizens, such as the Uganda Women Entrepreneurship Programme, which aims to improve women’s access to financial services and equip them with the skills for enterprise growth, value addition, and marketing. The MOGLSD’s remit also includes that Youth Livelihood Programme of Uganda, which is underpinned by a youth empowerment strategy. These strategies are informed by an awareness of the need to address intensification of international and internal labour migration Committed to exploiting the value of TVET in leveraging skills for the labour market, the Ministry of Education and Sport tabled the Skilling Uganda: BTVET Strategic Plan 2012/3–2021/2 with the core aims of making BTVET relevant to productivity development

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¹⁹ Key informant interview with Senior Economist and Assistant Commissioner, Ministry of Finance, Kampala, 13 December 2017.
and economic growth; increasing the quality of skills provision; and increasing equitable access to skills development.

An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Uganda is very active in the implementation of the Khartoum Process. The Director indicted that progress has been made in relation to:

▶ Establishing a continuous dialogue for enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility;
▶ Identifying and implementing concrete projects to address trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants – the Government is working with several international agencies on projects to address this; and
▶ Giving a new impetus to the regional collaboration between countries of origin, transit, and destination regarding the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe – the Ugandan Government, through inter-ministerial task teams, is very active in this area.  

3.6 Kenya country report

3.6.1 Context in Kenya

Kenya is a major communications and logistics hub with an important Indian Ocean port and has strategic land borders with Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. It is second, after Ethiopia, in terms of the size of economy, with a population of about 48.5 million (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). After faltering in 2008, economic growth resumed, reaching 5.8 per cent in 2016 to place Kenya as one of the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Kenya’s young population, strong private sector, skilled workforce, improved infrastructure, new constitution, and its pivotal role in East Africa, gives it the potential to be one of Africa’s successful economies (World Bank, 2016a). Addressing poverty, inequality, governance, and the skills gap (between market requirements and the education curriculum) will be major goals, as well as tackling problems of climate change, low investment, and low productivity. Only when these have been addressed can sustained growth rates transform lives of ordinary Kenyan citizens (World Bank, 2016a). According to Henrik Schmidtke, a GIZ interview respondent who manages a skills development project focusing on migrants and refugees, current statistics show that 52 per cent of Kenyans are youths, and that youth unemployment had risen to 22 per cent in 2017, which is significantly higher than in neighbouring East African countries (Uganda, 4 per cent, and Tanzania, 5 per cent). Unemployment and under-employment in Kenya have led to a culture whereby Kenya is continually exporting labour to other parts of the world (World Bank, 2017a); this assertion was reiterated by interview respondents from the Youth Enterprise Development Fund to confirm that migration in search of decent jobs and better remuneration is an ongoing phenomenon.

According to Oucho (2012), Kenya is one of the African countries experiencing growth, especially in infrastructure and technology. With the discovery of oil and gas in the Turkana

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20 Personal communication from Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2017.
21 Interview conducted in Nairobi, 1 December 2017.
coastal area, there is a high level of infrastructure development that is taking place and that should augur well for employment. However, there is a reported mismatch between skills that are produced and the demands of employers because the curricula and skills development training are not responsive and relevant to the current labour demands. An interview respondent\textsuperscript{22} from the IOM who is working on a youth development project indicated that because Kenya lacks skills in the oil and gas industries, migrants are working in this area, but new curricula are being developed to train Kenyan youth in this new field.

3.6.2 Skills development in Kenya

The Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority (TVETA) is a state corporation established under the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act of 2013. The TVET Qualifications Framework operates as a standalone qualification framework, and precedes the Kenya National Qualifications Framework (KNQF) established in 2014. TVETA responsibilities include setting standards for TVET training, accreditation of institutions, and assessment and certification of students. The TVETA oversees the newly introduced competency-based education in the TVET sub-system.

According to key information interviews with the Director–General of TVETA and the Accreditation Manager, the 2012 Education Reform paved the way for the development of an RPL policy that is to be implemented by the TVET regulator. As a result, the TVET Accreditation Directorate of TVETA is expected to, inter alia, equate certificates and undertake recognition of prior learning, and to make use of the RPL guidelines in their determination of learner progression. However, it was mentioned that there are many issues that must be resolved in order for the RPL policy to be implemented. One such issue was the fact that the new education reform has categorized basic education into four phases of 3-3-3-3 (12 years of schooling), while TVET is categorized into 2-6 levels. Some of the TVET levels overlap with basic schooling, and this makes it difficult to determine the RPL process for a learner. The KNQF will need to resolve this matter. According to the Director–General, a revised RPL policy has been developed and was promulgated when the KNQF Regulations, 2018, were adopted.

The National Industrial Training Authority (NITA) is a state corporation established under the Industrial Training (Amendment) Act of 2011. The Authority has five industrial training centres spread across the country. It also has established in each county an office where learners can reach and access information about trade testing. NITA focuses on skills training and offers training based on competencies that the learner demonstrates in an occupation or part thereof. Skills and competencies are cumulative and recognized towards a particular occupation/trade, with competency standards having been developed for five trades in partnership with industries. NITA has an open policy whereby anyone can walk into a trade centre; go through a preparation process; and then sit for a trade test that will lead to certification. As part of its ongoing strategic focus on youth development, NITA has been involved in a multi-agencies World Bank project aimed at equipping vulnerable, marginalized youths and refugees with the opportunity to do a trade test and earn competency-based certification to acquire a decent job.

\textsuperscript{22} Key informant interview with Senior Regional Specialist, Nairobi, 26 November 2017.
The NITA RPL tools and certification system accommodates migrants and refugees, such that there is a continuous inflow from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tanzania who are afforded a walk-in trade test opportunity. NITA work very closely with industries in terms of curriculum development, work attachment, and ongoing skills forecasting. Part of its operation funding comes through levies from industries.

There seems to be an overlap of responsibilities between NITA and the TVETA even though the former claims to be working very closely with industry in assessment, curriculum development, skills matching, and forecasting; whereas TVETA on the other hand, claims credits for expansion of technical and vocational education in the country.

The Kenya Technical Teachers College is an institution that produces teachers for the TVET sector. Elements of RPL are discerned from their training approach because of the life-long learning and continuous skilling of teachers to be able to teach technical and vocational subjects using the latest technologies.

TVET programmes in Kenya are offered across five institutional types:

- 61 Institutes of Technology;
- 60 Technical Training Institutes;
- Youth Polytechnics and Village Polytechnics, which are vocational training centres catering mostly to primary school leavers; and
- National Polytechnics.

Programmes are also offered by other institutions across government ministries, as well as by over 1,000 private institutions (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2015a). Other role-players in the skills sector include international agencies, the Federation of Kenyan Employers, and the Federation of Trade Unions. NITA plays a role in skilling the informal sector through an apprenticeship model. There are walk-in trade centres in the counties where individuals can be assessed for a particular modularized skill/trade. Refugees and migrants make use of this opportunity too.

### 3.6.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Kenya

According to the Federation of Kenyan Employers, there are processes to implement integration of East African territories that would allow for free labour movement within the region. However, at the moment, the regularization of migrant workers (i.e., securing a work permit) is the responsibility of the employer in Kenya. Often this happens with skilled migrants who are expected to have a work permit and are subjected to vetting.

Kenya is a regional hub for irregular migration as a destination, origin and transit country towards South Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa, West Africa, Europe, and North America. As of January 2018, the refugee population was approximately 488,415 people most of whom came from Somalia (58 per cent), South Sudan (23 per cent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7 per cent), and Ethiopia (5 per cent). There are two main refugee camps, Dadaab in Garissa County and Kakuma in Turkana County, while 65,000 refugees were residing in Nairobi by late 2017.
Chapter 3. Country reviews

Internal displacement has occurred over time due to political violence following elections but occurs currently on a smaller scale. Data is lacking on numbers of people affected by climate change and environmental degradation, but pastoralists are having to move further and for longer periods from their traditional grazing areas.

With regard to migration of Kenyan citizens, government is concerned about the skilled emigration rate estimated at 35 per cent accounting for loss of skilled personnel in key sectors. Simultaneously, youth unemployment is understood to be a key driver or rural-urban migration and of youth emigration (IOM, 2018).

Admittedly, the country has witnessed a brain drain in the fields of medicine, engineering, and education. This has been the case due to the better opportunities presented by countries abroad to the specialist professionals in the above-stated fields. Developed countries have been on the forefront in enticing specialists to migrate to their countries for employment. Kenya also has experienced an outward migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to the Gulf States; mostly young people going to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in search of better employment opportunities. The Kenya National Employment Authority (NEA) established a website (https://kenyamigrantworker.org/) specifically to support and inform Kenyan citizens who seek work opportunities in the Gulf States.

The Government has a diaspora policy and a labour migration policy that are in the final stage of development, and these are sorely needed given that a large percentage of Kenya’s population has emigrated to take up work opportunities abroad. Interview respondents from the Ministry of Labour and the IOM indicated that the migration policy is still in draft form and will be finalized in the near future.

According to the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics, most outward migration occurs within the East Africa regions and IGAD Member States, and there is a small amount of outward migration to the Gulf region. Most migration is as a result of a search for employment. It is assumed that the outflow of migrants is a consequence of the economy not generating enough jobs. The reduced migration pattern within the country is due to devolution – a political reform introduced to decentralize government services and develop the regions, counties, and sub-counties.

3.6.4 Labour market demand in Kenya

Kenya is the most diversified and industrialized country in the region, although many of its exports such as tea and coffee, require little processing and therefore employment in manufacturing has so far remained limited. Under Kenya’s Vision 2030, the Government aims to increase employment growth in manufacturing by 10 per cent annually to become a middle-income country by 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2007). To assist with this, the Government has established three Special Economic Zones that will help boost industrial manufacturing by allowing for lower tax levels and fewer regulatory hurdles (Deloitte, 2016). Moreover, the country will likely remain the main regional hub for information and communication technology, as well as financial and transportation services. Another key driver of Kenya’s growth has been the construction sector, which grew on the back of a number of large-scale public works projects and increased private investment, especially in real estate, which contributes the largest factor impacting service sector growth in 2018 (AfDB, 2018).
As mentioned, the growth or decline of the informal economy\textsuperscript{23} is linked to the growth or decrease of the formal economy. Although Kenya is picking up speed in industrialization and infrastructure development, it has a large informal economy and sprawling small enterprises in the cities and towns. The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Cooperatives plays a role in supporting the informal economy. Several projects are reportedly underway to support youth entrepreneurship and marginalized individuals.

There is also an informal apprenticeship system that plays a key role in supporting small enterprises and skills development. This system provides a major pathway for initial vocational training, providing young people with an opportunity to become employable and enter the job market. The informal apprenticeship system that currently exists needs to be improved in order to be recognized as a training system, so as to get the maximum benefit possible in terms of skills enhancement and to achieve more of its potential.

### 3.6.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Kenya

The Kenyan Government has an open approach to migrants and is pro-active in trying to put legislation in place to allow for free movement of persons. According to the Department of Labour\textsuperscript{24}, the Government does not discriminate against migrants, and they have access to the same benefits as locals. Through NITA, migrants are also able to acquire relevant credit for qualifications towards a particular skill/apprentice/occupation. Through NITA, migrants can submit themselves to an assessment at trade test centres to evaluate their competencies in a particular skill. This system is applicable to Kenyan nationals as well.

Through the TVETA structures, migrants are able to access skills training in the TVET colleges – whether private, faith–based or government institutions.

### 3.6.6 Overarching observations: Kenya

As in most of IGAD countries, it is evident that there are many ministries in Kenya dealing with migration, but there is a slow pace in information sharing among them. Regional cooperation is visible though, and provides important lessons for IGAD. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics data on migration is produced periodically and can be used to inform planning.

In a move to strengthen the coordination of migration-related services and interventions, the Kenyan Government instituted a National Coordinating Mechanism under the Ministry of the Interior’s Department of Immigration.

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\textsuperscript{23} The informal economy in Kenya is known as \textit{Jua Kali}.

\textsuperscript{24} Key informant interview with official from the Ministry of Labour, Nairobi, 29 November 2017.
3.7 Somalia country report

3.7.1 Context in Somalia

Somalia comprises the regional administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hir-Shabelle, Koonfur Galbeed, Jubaland and Benadir. According to the Population Estimation Survey for Somalia, the population of Somalia was estimated to be 12.3 million in 2014 (UNFPA, 2014). The population is growing at a rate of 2.8 per cent a year. The ratio of males to females is 1: 1.02. The fertility rate is at 6.4 births per woman (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019a). Around 42 per cent live in urban areas, 2 per cent are nomadic and 23 per cent live in rural areas. The remaining 23 per cent are internally displaced persons (IDPs) and might be considered as part of the urban population (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). According to the Somalia High Frequency Survey, the average size of the household is estimated to be 5.3 persons, while households below the poverty line have a larger average family size of 7.2 persons, compared to households above the poverty line, with 4.8 persons. IDP households are larger in size than the average urban and rural households (World Bank, 2016b).

Approximately 69 per cent of Somalia’s population lives below the poverty line. Poverty in Somalia is more pronounced in the IDP camps, where it is estimated to be 88 per cent, followed by rural areas with 75 per cent and urban areas with areas 67 per cent. At the regional level, two specific regions of Somalia – Somaliland, located in the north-west, and Puntland, located in the north-east – experience more stability with regard to socio-economic conditions. Stability in these two areas may have contributed to some reduction in overall poverty levels. On the contrary, the southern part of Somalia is comparatively poorer and suffers from unstable economic and security conditions (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

GDP growth is too low to provide enough jobs for the expanding labour force, particularly among young people. Currently, the national poverty line is US$1.90. Between 2013 and 2017, real GDP grew by an average of 2.5 per cent per annum, while the population grew by 2.9 per cent a year. The result was a contraction of per capita GDP of 0.3 per cent a year (IMF, 2018).

Somalia has an “internal displacement crisis” (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 12). In addition to the protracted displacement of approximately 1.1 million people, a further 1.5 million people have become internally displaced in Somalia since 2017. This brings current estimates of the IDP population to more than 2.6 million (UN, 2018a). IDPs represent 9 per cent of the population, spread between rural and urban areas (UNFPA, 2014).

Somalia’s demographic profile shows a pronounced youth bulge. From the Population Estimation Survey for Somalia (UNFPA, 2014) and the High Frequency Survey (World Bank, 2016b) results, Somalia has a very young population, with approximately 50 per cent below the age of 15 years. Just over 75 per cent of Somalis are below the age of 29 years. The median age of the population is 16 years (World Bank, 2016b).

The great challenge facing Somalia is that a high proportion of young people have little or no access to productive resources and very limited employment opportunities; consequently,
the young tend to be more often unemployed. Although improving, there is still little in the way of educational opportunities and skills training for the labour market, weak political participation, and a legacy of past violence. Many young Somalis are trapped in an environment of violence, fear, unemployment and poverty (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

Agriculture accounts for 65 per cent of GDP. Livestock contributes about 40 per cent to GDP and accounts for more than 50 per cent of export earnings. The main exports are fish, meat, bananas, sorghum, and corn. Dependence on livestock and agriculture as the major source of export earnings reflects the narrow economic base (AfDB Group, 2018b).

With the advantage of being close to the Arabian Peninsula, Somali traders have increasingly begun to challenge Australia’s traditional dominance over the Arab Gulf livestock and meat market by offering quality animals at low prices. In response, Gulf Arab States have started to make strategic investments in the country. Saudi Arabia is building a livestock export infrastructure, and the United Arab Emirates is importing livestock from Somalia.

The modest industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, accounts for 10 per cent of Somalia’s GDP. The primary drivers of growth in recent years are construction, telecommunications, and financial services. GDP growth in 2018 and 2019 is expected to be driven by a recovery in agriculture and private sector investment. Inflation, which has been contained by dollarization and the sharp decline in oil prices, is predicted to remain around 2.7 per cent in 2018–2019 (IMF, 2018).

Somalia's fiscal position is improving, as reflected in national income figures (table 12).

Table 11. Somalia national income figures, 2015–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National income metric</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP (millions US$)</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>6,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP, annual percentage change</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP (US$)</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF, 2018a

Somalia's GDP per capita is low, but this does not provide a full picture of the country’s economic health. There is a considerable volume of remittances sustaining domestic consumption, spurring investment, and stabilizing the current account deficit. Remittances were estimated to make up 24 per cent of GDP in 2015. They are an essential source of income for 20 per cent of Somali households.

The reliance on remittances amplifies the lack of productive employment in Somalia. Recipients receive on average US$233 per capita yearly, an amount that represents about 37 per cent of their household expenditure (World Bank, 2018a). Households are dependent on cash transfers, and the World Bank found that these households become poorer when transfers decrease.
3.7.2 Skills development in Somalia

The demise of the Somali State in 1991 led to the breakdown of the public education and training system. In the current Government, technical education falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education (MOECHE), while vocational training is the mandate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA).

Currently, the MOECHE is managing public primary and secondary schools throughout the country. Several progressive interventions are being implemented to enhance the status of the teaching profession. These include the payment of basic salaries by the State; a reward system to encourage teacher productivity; the development of an online teacher training platform; and the construction of two teacher training colleges. Furthermore, the MOECHE is developing a pilot project for establishing five professional secondary schools to ensure that schooling is responsive to the needs of the labour market and increase employability of students.\(^{25}\) The Government is aiming to construct seven TVET centres in strategic locations, with full board and a carrying capacity of at least 1,000 students.

While most tertiary institutions are private, there are public universities such as the Somalian National University, which started operating in 2013 with campuses in several locations. There is a burgeoning private education sector, from schooling to tertiary education, which stepped in to fill the vacuum during the period of internal strife and instability. Private universities are locally owned or set up in partnership between local and foreign education institutions, and are profit driven. There are several key policy and legal enactments steering education and training in Somalia as part of the national reconstruction effort. These include the following:

**National Development Plan (2017–2019):** The Somalia National Development Plan is the overarching framework guiding the political, economic, and social development of Somalia. The four overarching objectives of the National Development Plan are to:

- Quantitatively reduce abject poverty by reviving key economic sectors such as livestock, farming, fishing, ICT, finance, and banking;
- Repair vital infrastructure, starting with clean energy and water, economic beltways, ports, and airports;
- Qualitatively strengthen State capacity by reforming and streamlining the public administration sector;
- Sustain political inclusivity, accelerate security sector reform, and strengthen the rule of law across federal and state levels (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

Education, training, and skills development are integral to supporting the imperatives of the National Development Plan.

**Education Sector Analysis (2012–2016):** The Education Sector Analysis identified the current status of key educational indicators across several subsectors, and where possible, identified key trends in the sector over the past few years. Findings of the full sector analysis are the basis for the priorities, strategies, and activities outlined in the current Education Sector Strategic Plan covering the period of 2018–2020 with a three-year timeframe aligned to the recently endorsed Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, the first of its kind in 30 years.

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\(^{25}\) Information provided by MOECHE officials at a meeting in Mogadishu, 28 May 2019.
The Education Sector Analysis notes that most out-of-school children live in conflict-affected countries and countries deemed as “fragile”, with Somalia ranking among the highest on the list of such countries. In Somalia, children whose families are displaced by drought, conflict, and poverty are at high risk of losing their rights to education and being exposed to social and political risks that undermine positive “coping” strategies. At the same time, education facilities, personnel, and learners are at risk of being attacked or suffering violence and intimidation by various non-State and State actors.

**Education Sector Strategic Plan (2018–2020):** The MOECHE has led the development of the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) for the Government. The ESSP covers all education sub-sectors, from early childhood to higher education.

Key priorities in the ESSP include strengthening regulations; supporting access for marginalized and at-risk youth; expanding access and quality through infrastructure expansion and rehabilitation; and improving quality assurance systems, standards, and the governance structures of universities. Additionally, to increase the knowledge generation of universities, priorities include supporting university personnel to engage in research activities producing innovative knowledge that will contribute to the economic and social development of Somalia (MOECHE, 2017).

The ESSP is guided by the National Development Plan 2017–2019, the draft National Education Act, and other national and international policy instruments, such as the global targets for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related to education (SDG 4), gender (SDG 5), equity (SDG 10), and peace and security (SDG 16).

Key areas considered in the ESSP include:
- enrolment and access (for both formal and non-formal education);
- internal efficiencies of the education system;
- capacity building and training;
- education cost and financing;
- teacher qualifications, training, and distribution;
- learning outcomes and quality of education;
- governance and management of the education sector; and

**Draft National Education Act:** The Act provides for the principles, goals, and management of the education system in Somalia. Currently, it is at a second reading before Parliament before promulgation into law.

**National Education Policy:** The overall goal is to provide an equitable and inclusive education system that affords all learners access to free and compulsory basic education (K1–12) followed by the opportunity to continue with lifelong learning, thereby enhancing their personal development and contributing to Somali’s cultural development, socio-economic growth, and global competitiveness.

**Curriculum Framework:** A national, unified Curriculum Framework with syllabi for primary and secondary education has been developed. It will ensure standardized learning outcomes and the implementation of a standardized exam system. The Curriculum Framework seeks
to ensure that all children have access to quality education that will prepare them for a fulfilling and productive role at community, country, region, and global levels.

The lack of reliable data on children's learning outcomes presents a major challenge to assessing the effectiveness of education at primary school level. The curriculum seeks to address this gap through the introduction of early grade assessments and low-stakes assessments for monitoring learning outcomes. It also aims to strengthen and unify the examination system across Somalia.

From key informant interviews the research team learned that universities and TVET colleges are not accredited, and the quality of offered programmes is questionable. One interview respondent estimated that there are 159 known universities in Somalia, with about a 100 in Mogadishu alone. There are no figures regarding the school-to-work transition, but interview findings have revealed that there is a high rate of youth unemployment. There is also no regulatory framework governing education and training, which means that there are no barriers to and no quality assurance of private providers entering the training market.

Currently, Somalia does not have quality assurance and accreditation systems for universities and colleges. The sector is also supported by non-State actors such as international donor agencies, NGOs, donors, community education committees, CBOs, education umbrella groups, employers, and religious groups. The diversity of actors, each with their respective institutional mandates and incentives, has led to a lack of coordination, conglomeration, strategic intent, and collective focus.

Current estimates suggest that there are approximately 145,000 learners enrolled in post-secondary institutions (universities and TVET colleges), while around 94.4 per cent of youths between 14 and 24 years of age are not in education and training (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). In central southern Somalia, 96 per cent of youths are out of school; while 92 per cent and 91 per cent are out of school in Somaliland and Puntland respectively. Together, males and females enrolled in post-secondary institutions constitute only 4.8 per cent of the total youth population (table 13).

Table 12. Enrolment in universities against the demands of the youth bulge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of residence</th>
<th>No. of youths (14-24 years)</th>
<th>Enrolments</th>
<th>No. of out of school youths</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>663,494</td>
<td>8,843</td>
<td>9,226</td>
<td>18,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1,368,849</td>
<td>52,586</td>
<td>52,927</td>
<td>105,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP Camps</td>
<td>221,543</td>
<td>3,436</td>
<td>3,514</td>
<td>6,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomadic</td>
<td>748,535</td>
<td>6,185</td>
<td>8,591</td>
<td>14,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,002,421</td>
<td>71,050</td>
<td>74,259</td>
<td>145,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total pop.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Government of Somalis, 2017
Urban youths are more likely to attend TVET institutions than those in remote areas. More youths from the wealthiest quintile are enrolled in tertiary institutions, including universities and TVET institutions.

There are a myriad of education and training projects for migrants and IDPs being implemented in Somalia. The major projects are briefly summarized below.

**Enhanced Assistance Programme:** Under the UNHCR, when returnees arrive in Somalia, they are provided with an enhanced return package that consists of:
- an unconditional core relief item kit;
- an unconditional one-time reinstallation grant of US$200 per person;
- an unconditional monthly subsistence allowance amounting to US$200 per household for six months;
- an unconditional monthly grant for food rations for six months provided by the WFP;
- a conditional grant of up to US$1,000 for shelter per household; and
- conditional enrolment in self-reliance and livelihoods projects based on a set of targeting criteria and availability of resources (UNHCR, 2018c).

In addition, UNHCR provides school-going children with an education grant of up to US$25 per school-going child per month for one year to resume their education after return. Each school-going child is also provided with a school uniform and learning materials. In 2018, UNHCR supported 3,559 school-going children who resumed their education upon returning to Somalia (UNHCR, 2018c). Support to returnees and host communities is also provided through livelihoods training and improvement of public infrastructure. Livelihood activities also offer returnees an opportunity to rebuild their communities and rehabilitate or expand public facilities such as schools, hospitals, roads, or law enforcement premises. From the available data, it is evident that skills development training by the UNHCR is taking place, but it is reaching only a fraction of migrants.

**Rehabilitation of TVET in Somalia:** The EU and GIZ established this project with the objective of ensuring that the supply of Somali skilled labour with basic to higher qualifications is in a better position to satisfy labour market demand in selected regions of the country, namely Hargeisa, Garowe, Kismayo, and Mogadishu. This project is expected to run over five years. To achieve this, the project offers a combination of formal and non-formal labour market-oriented qualification programmes in high-demand sectors, according to the GIZ. Activities involve a TVET strategy, early thinking on a qualification framework, governance structures (Vocational Qualifications Authority and Skills Councils), staff training, financing mechanisms, study visits, and international events. To date, 3,500 Somali youth, 1,225 (35 per cent) of whom are women, have graduated a newly developed qualification module (EUTF, 2016).

**Joint Programme on Youth Employment Somalia (YES):** The project aims to capitalize on recent security, governance, and reconciliation achievements by expanding employment opportunities for young men and women in Somalia. The Economic Recovery Plan for Somalia states that youth unemployment is one of the greatest obstacles to the country’s economic recovery. The plan states that the aim of the Government is to provide youths with employment opportunities so as to avoid them joining militia groups.
The programme strategy is to contribute to sustainable employment creation while also providing immediate livelihood opportunities for young men and women through the implementation of three interlinked programme components:

- value chain development in high potential growth sectors (fisheries, renewable energy, and construction);
- demand-driven skills development; and
- labour-intensive urban and rural public infrastructure rehabilitation.

By the end of 2017, YES had created 12,560 short-term jobs through its cash-for-work component, which represents a significant achievement. This translates to $185 per job created, which is regarded as cost effective (Chirwali and Ali, 2018).

**Joint Initiative on Migrant Protection and Reintegration**: In Hargeisa, migrants who choose to return to Somaliland now have access to “Start Your Business” training through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa. The training had over 60 migrants who opted to return from Libya instead of continuing their journeys to Europe. The training runs over five days. Organized by the IOM and the UNHCR sub-office in Hargeisa, the training follows a format developed by the ILO and was delivered by local ILO-trained facilitators. The initial group of trainees were mainly young men in their 20s and 30s. Most of them returned to Somaliland. The support to returning migrants is a part of the broader €25 million EU-IOM Joint Initiative on Migrant Protection and Reintegration Initiative – active in 26 countries in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad region, and North Africa – that supports reintegration for returnees in their countries of origin. The initiative facilitates clean, safe, regular and responsible migration management through the development of rights-based and development-focused policies and processes on protection and sustainable reintegration.

**EU support**: The EU’s support to Somalia is rooted in the desire to rebuild the State, improve stability, and reduce poverty. It has been implemented using a comprehensive approach based on active diplomacy and support to the political process, security support, development assistance, and humanitarian aid. Since 2008, the EU has provided more than €1.2 billion to the country through various financial sources. A large part of EU development funding to Somalia is financed by the European Development Fund. The funding cycle of 2014–2020 amounts to €286 million and focuses on three sectors: (1) state building and peace building; (2) food security and resilience; and (3) education (EUTF, 2018).

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF) aims to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management, including addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement, and irregular migration. Amongst others, the EUTF focuses on economic development programmes that address skills gaps, improve employability through vocational training, and support job creation and self-employment opportunities with an emphasis on strengthening micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (EUTF, 2017).

In addition to the above, the EU has been engaged in TVET in Somalia since 2008 through a range of programmes related to infrastructure, livestock, fisheries, and other projects. Short trainings with direct links to labour market and value chain development are provided. For example, the EU supports the Sheikh Veterinary School in Somaliland as part of its support
to the livestock sector. The EU tries to ensure complementarity with other donors’ initiatives in TVET through formal coordination mechanisms, though coordination currently results in information exchange rather than actual burden sharing.

In another initiative, the EU, working jointly with the government of Puntland State, launched the third phase of the Puntland Education Sector Support Programme, worth €7.3 million. The initiative, called "Waxbarashadu Waa Iftiin" (Education is Light), is implemented by CARE and Save the Children in close coordination with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Puntland. It will enrol over 56,000 students over a three-year period and reflects full alignment with the education priorities set out in the Puntland Education Sector Strategic Plan (2017–2021) and Sustainable Development Goal No. 4. The new programme will consolidate and expand the achievements made under the two previous phases of EU support, which reached over 58,000 students and resulted in the construction of 17 new schools, 228 new classrooms, and 66 water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities. This new phase will add 16 schools, 84 classrooms, 23 WASH facilities, and four secondary school laboratories. Two hundred new teachers will be trained, while 300 youths will be equipped with marketable vocational skills. The programme also incorporates support measures for children with special needs, children from pastoralist communities, and girls (Puntland Government of Somalia, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2017).

Other projects with EU involvement include a German Development Bank Scoping Mission on TVET to provide evidence-based guidance to the EU Delegation to Somalia for streamlining support to TVET and creating meaningful interventions that provide sustainable and equitable TVET of good quality with strong links to and a positive impact on employment and economic opportunities in Somalia (UNHCR, 2018a) and the Somali Education and Training System (SETS) Programme which is aimed at building support in the education and training system.

**Growth, Enterprise, Employment & Livelihoods (GEEL) Programme**: GEEL promotes inclusive economic growth in Somalia. Through GEEL, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) aims to accelerate Somalia's integration into the global economy by improving the country's competitiveness in export markets, reducing reliance on imports, increasing market linkages and business partnerships, and spurring new investments to create jobs. In regions recovering from years of conflict and natural disasters, USAID aims to boost production of high-quality fish, agriculture, and dairy products for domestic and international consumers. GEEL is leveraging the growing capacities of the Government at federal, regional, and local levels to build foundations for resilient economic growth. Activities are focused on value chains with high potential across all regions of Somalia and Somaliland, and include the integration of renewable energies across sectors for sustainable private sector growth (USAID, 2018).

**Somalia Resilience Programme**: The programme promotes “diversified livelihood and asset preservation strategies, improved disaster risk management and other coping mechanisms... improved ecosystem health, as well as improved community-level governance” (World Vision, n.d.).
Additional international donor projects for migrants and IDPs in Somalia include:

- **UNICEF’s Youth Employment Programme**, funded by the Government of Japan, which has enabled over 1,500 displaced, returnee, and host community youths to have access to quality and relevant vocation skills, helping to provide livelihood opportunities and contributing to peace and social cohesion in Somalia.

- **Somalia Stability Fund**, a multi-donor fund working towards a peaceful, secure, and stable Somalia. The fund offers Somali stakeholders a source of multi-year funding that responds to local needs and opportunities and provides sustained support to long-term, locally driven efforts to build stability in Somalia;

- **USAID’s Somali Youth Learners Initiative**, which aims to expand access to quality secondary and non-formal education for over 100,000 youth;

- **Somalia Infrastructure Fund**, one of the financing windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility of the New Deal COMPACT for Somalia; and

- **Third Country Training Program**, which is a scheme under which JICA provides participants from developing countries with a technical training programme in collaboration with a Southern partner.

**Key policy pronouncements for IDPs and refugees**

The following policy pronouncements affect IDPs and refugees:

**Tripartite Agreement** between the Government of Kenya, the Government of Somalia, and the UNHCR governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya was signed in 2013. The objective of the agreement is to provide a legal framework for the safe and dignified voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya and their reintegration into Somalia.

**Draft National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and IDPs**: The major objective of this policy is to ensure that all IDPs and refugee-returnees enjoy the full equality and obtain the same rights as all other citizens that the National Constitution, all other laws of Somalia, as well as international humanitarian and human rights’ laws gives them. They shall not be discriminated against in the exercise or enjoyment of any rights and the freedom on the lands they live as IDPs or refugee-returnees. The policy aims to protect persons of concern from forced displacement, provide them with protection and assistance during displacement, and finally find a durable solution to their displacement.

Under this policy, the Government of Somalia commits itself to:

- providing the needed services, protection, and humanitarian assistance to refugee-returnees and IDPs in the country;
- protecting its people from any kind of displacement including arbitrary displacement, development-induced displacement, and forced evictions;
- searching for durable solutions to displacement of persons and mitigating the causes;
- facilitating voluntary return, relocation, and reintegration of refugee returnees and IDPs;
- ensuring that refugee-returnees and IDPs have an equal opportunity to exercise and enjoy the same rights as other Somali citizens do; and
- disseminating the guiding principles of this policy to all concerned authorities as widely as possible.
Draft National Eviction Guidelines: The guidelines recognize the urgent need to protect vulnerable communities, particularly IDPs and refugee-returnees, from forcible evictions. It recognizes that the practice of forced evictions constitutes a gross violation of human rights and directly or indirectly contravenes the international instruments ratified by the Government. The guidelines further provide conditions and procedures for evictions and the appeal mechanisms that can be evoked by affected people.

Interim arrangements on land distribution for housing to eligible internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee-returnees: This document highlights the urgent need to find durable solutions for IDPs and refugee-returnees. The Government is committed to enacting an interim measure that provides for security of tenure and the housing needs of eligible IDPs and refugee compatriots.

3.7.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in Somalia

The dynamics of the population movement in Somalia can be best described as mixed migration flow (table 14). Somalia has experienced one of the world's largest displacement crises, with almost 1 million registered refugees in the Horn of Africa/Yemen region and about 2.6 million internally displaced persons. The migration situation in Somalia is evolving rapidly and is multifaceted.

Table 13. Size of populations of concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
<td>2,648,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>122,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers</td>
<td>16,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>16,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2018d

The Somali Government's Draft National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and IDPs includes three main reasons for displacement – conflict/insecurity, droughts, and floods – with the main reason being conflict over land or land disputes. The Draft National Eviction Guidelines prepared by the National Commission for Refugees and IDPs takes into consideration the protection of vulnerable communities, particularly IDPs and refugee-returnees from forcible evictions.

The UNHCR (2018d) registered 32,261 refugees and asylum-seekers in Somalia. They are mainly from Ethiopia (15,757 asylum-seekers and 3,858 refugees) and Yemen (54 asylum-seekers and 12,071 refugees). In addition, there are 521 persons from other countries, including Syria (210), Tanzania (103), and Eritrea (90). Somali refugees continue to return from countries of asylum. There are 122,000 Somalis who have voluntarily returned from Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti, Libya, Tunisia, and Eritrea since 2014. The port in Bossaso also attracts significant numbers of Ethiopians, many of whom are seeking to reach Saudi Arabia where they hope to find employment. There are also Somali youths crossing to Yemen as the first stage of a hazardous route to reach Europe (UN, 2018b). Educational levels of migrants are unavailable in Somalia, and do not lend themselves to definitive analysis.
Chapter 3. Country reviews

Between 2010 and 2018, 551,000 Somalis fled the country as refugees and asylum-seekers. Major refugee movements are to Kenya and Ethiopia, which serve as a destination or transit point to other countries (UNHCR, 2018a). Somali migrants continue to attempt to migrate for both economic and security reasons. Migration is, however, not only the result of unexpected circumstances. Somalia is also an agrarian society with seasonal, including cross-border, migration at the core of the Somali way of life.

However, the changing geo-political dynamics in the region are resulting in a reverse flow towards Somalia, with the majority of those currently entering being Somali returnees who have returned to Mogadishu and other urban centres for business and other reasons. Somalis are returning home from voluntary migration episodes, spontaneously or assisted, while others are returning from forced migration episodes to neighbouring countries as refugees. Host countries are calling on the Government of Somalia, its regional authorities, and the international community to act. More than 65,000 Somali nationals have been forcibly returned from Saudi Arabia, and 30,000 Somalis have returned as a result of fleeing the Yemen crisis (UN, 2018b). The Kenyan Government is also under pressure to respond to the challenging domestic security situation and wishes to close the Dadaab refugee camp. European countries are also increasingly looking at the readmission of failed asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants. This migration flow to Somalia is placing an additional burden on a country already facing a significant IDP caseload and which does not meet all the conditions for an organized and voluntary return. There previously was a tripartite agreement between the Government of Somalia, the Government of Kenya, and the UNHCR regarding the repatriation of Somali refugees, but because of geo-political dynamics, this agreement has become invalid.

About 80 per cent of IDPs are from and within the southern part of Somalia, and the vast majority of returnees also originate from this region. This is severely testing Somalia's absorption capacity and adding to the complicated security situation in the country and the region, and this is likely to lead to an increased irregular migration flow to the north, towards Europe, and to the south, towards South Africa. The central and southern regions of Somalia have been particularly affected by internal displacement. About 75 per cent of Somali IDPs originate from Lower Shabelle, Bay, Mudug, and Bakool and have moved to Baidoa, Kismayo, and Mogadishu (UN, 2018b).

A finding of an IDP profiling survey in Mogadishu is that 62 per cent of all IDPs are under the age of 18 and have limited education, as less than a third had attended formal primary school. Sixty-nine per cent above the age of five cannot read or write, and the overall literacy rates for males and females is 73.1 per cent and 50.6 per cent, respectively. About 36.3 per cent of males and 29.7 per cent of females had completed secondary school education, while an estimated 20.8 per cent of males compared to only 9.5 per cent of females had completed university education. Data shows that vocational education is a rare option (Federal Government of Somalia, 2014). IDPs also experience struggles in accessing services such as water and health, and their access to employment is very constrained: most livelihoods accessible to IDPs are precarious and unsustainable. Among youth, limited education, unemployment and poverty make them vulnerable to forced recruitment.

Somalia's efforts to reintegrate returning refugees and (re)integrate IDPs in line with the National Development Plan are implemented mainly through the Durable Solutions Initiative, which provides opportunities for partners to support the efforts of national and
local authorities that have already launched significant initiatives in key return areas, namely Kismayo, Baidoa, and Mogadishu. Several joint programmes are being implemented in Somalia, bringing together the respective strengths and capacities of participating agencies and organizations. These programmes are of variable length, ranging from one to five years, and include:

- the UN Joint Midnimo Programme (UN-Habitat and IOM), intended to enhance local leadership capacities to facilitate sustainable returns, recovery, social integration, and peaceful co-existence in Jubaland and South West states;
- the UN Joint Kenya–Somalia Refugees and Peacebuilding Cross-border Pilot Project supporting Somali refugee returnees in Baidoa; and
- the EUTF’s RE-INTEG Programme: Enhancing Somalia’s Responsiveness to the Management and Reintegration of Mixed Migration Flows.

Despite the encouraging programmes underway, projects addressing durable solutions are still too limited in number, scope, and scale to yield significant, broad-based impact. While most of these projects target specific geographic areas, further funding for the application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) would be required to replicate or scale-up projects in other locations. Most of these programmes are focused on life skills training, entrepreneurship, and enabling participants to integrate into Somali society.

The mixed migration flows in the region, including robust internal labour migration with Somalis moving from fragile regions to more stable ones such as Somaliland for work opportunities, form a critical aspect of migration governance for the Government of Somalia.

### 3.7.4 Labour market demand in Somalia

The ILO estimates Somalia’s employment-to-population ratio at 41 per cent. The labour force participation rate is estimated at 65.9 per cent and 37.6 per cent among males and females, respectively. Males aged 45–49 years and 35–39 years have the highest labour force participation rates at 86.6 per cent and 86.4 per cent, respectively. This is about twice the labour force participation rates for females in the same age cohorts. The disparity in the labour force participation rates between males and females is attributed to religious and cultural practices that limit women from actively engaging in the labour market (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

The urban population has the lowest labour force participation rate at 40.1 per cent, compared to 56.7 per cent for the rural areas. The labour force participation rate among the nomadic community is estimated at 68.7 per cent, compared to 44.9 per cent for IDPs (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). The relatively high labour force participation rate among the nomadic community is because the members of that community are mainly self-employed: their working life starts relatively early but does not often stop at old age. Those in the IDP camps experience restricted movements and limited labour market opportunities, hence the low labour force participation rates.
Somalia has weak frameworks for promotion of health and safety in workplaces; inadequate employment security, with employment mainly characterized by contract, casual, and temporary employment and outsourcing; a weak social protection system; limited social security coverage; gender gaps in access to employment and pay and benefits; and low trade union representation.

Contrary to many countries, the gender pattern of occupations does not seem to be highly segregated (table 15).

### Table 14. Occupations categories in Somalia by numbers of workers and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation category</th>
<th>No. of workers</th>
<th>Percentage of total workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers</td>
<td>54,672</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professionals, associate professionals and technicians in health, education and other sectors</td>
<td>162,814</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical support workers</td>
<td>7,559</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Service and sales workers</td>
<td>334,727</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agricultural, livestock, forestry, and fishery workers</td>
<td>1,489,596</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Craft and related trade workers</td>
<td>112,679</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Stationary and mobile plant and machine operators, and assemblers</td>
<td>112,036</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Elementary occupations (unskilled)</td>
<td>98,006</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,372,090</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A large part (62.8 per cent) of employed Somalis are agricultural, livestock, forestry, and fishery workers (67.8 per cent among women and 60.1 per cent among men). The second most common occupation group is that of service and sales workers, who account for 14.7 per cent of employed women and 13.8 per cent of employed men. The pattern that emerges from these numbers is the prevalence of low-skilled work. While the informal sector is a significant employer in Somalia, but jobs in the informal sector are precarious in nature and characterized by low pay, limited competitiveness, job insecurity, and other atypical forms of employment (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017).

The educational profile of the populations is reflected in labour force participation. Almost 73.2 per cent of Somalis have reached, at most, secondary level, and just 24.8 per cent have obtained a university degree (figure 3).
The formal private sector is not developed enough to integrate large numbers of highly educated people at tertiary levels, but stronger educational achievements up to secondary levels would yield more productive employment and therefore better opportunities to reduce working poverty. Key marketable skills are electrical installation, auto-mechanics, carpentry and joinery, masonry, plumbing, metal fabrication and welding, entrepreneurship, tailoring and tie dye, electronics and mobile repair, fishery, and cookery. Electrical installation is viewed as being one of the most marketable skills in the labour market as long as electricity service providers are increasing in the country and demanding skilled professionals (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019b).

The labour market and employment sector is closely connected to a number of key national laws, strategies and policy initiatives:
- draft Social Protection Policy;
- Labour Code;
- National Employment Policy;
- Foreign Investment Law;
- Human Capital Development Mechanism;
- Civil Service Law No.11;
- Statistics Law;
- National Education Policy;
- National Education Act;
- National Education Centre Strategy Plan
- draft National Policy on Refugees-returnees and IDPs.

The National Employment Policy (NEP) (MOLSA, 2019) represents a commitment to concerted action across the Government, in close collaboration with employers’ and workers’ organizations, civil society, financial institutions, and sector associations and organizations. The NEP builds on and calls for linkages with the wider institutional settings in Somalia, including an amended and updated Labour Code, the proposed Law on Civil service, Foreign Investment Law, Social Protection Policy, and Foreign Work Permits Law. The NEP provides for
action to be taken across the range of policy levers which are available to the Government for
the engendering of growth and employment. These levers include, among others, finance,
trade, public investment, and labour market regulations and services.

Somalia faces a host of employment challenges, many induced by a continuing (albeit much
diminished) insecurity across the country. For instance, the destruction of the education
system and the absence of a significant vocational and technical training system have
resulted in a substantial skills deficit among youths in Somalia.

A second important issue is the confusing, incomplete, and often contradictory data on the
state of the labour market, which makes definitive analysis extremely difficult (MOLSA, 2019).

However, Somalia cannot address all these issues at once, and trying to do so will risk not
achieving the highest priorities. Given the tight public budget and low revenues, the NEP
focuses on three key objectives. These are: (1) improving employment governance; (2) job
creation through promotion of micro, small, and medium enterprises; and (3) the promotion
of the employment-intensity of key economic sectors. A series of desired outcomes and
outputs are associated with each objective.

3.7.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in Somalia

The training system in Somalia is characterized by the absence at a national level of a
unified qualifications system, standards setting, programme and institutional accreditation,
institutional registration, recognition of prior learning (RPL), and assessment and certification
systems. This impacts adversely on the credibility of student awards, recognition of skills,
and the development of standardized competency outcomes.

Somaliland and Puntland piloted a TVET curriculum in line with the Vocational Qualification
Framework (VQF) of Somaliland, developed in 2011 with the support of the EU and implemented
by Save the Children. The VQF aims to align TVET programmes and qualifications with the
needs of the labour market and was established as safeguard against the institutionalization
of supply-driven training programmes that cannot provide graduates with competencies
and skills relevant to the needs of the labour market. The TVET curriculum comprises 10
modules, where each module has a syllabus, teacher’s guide, and trainee guide. The current
modules cover Levels 1, 2, and 3 of TVET qualifications in the VQF. Despite these positive
developments, the current VQF is limited to the three lowest levels of TVET qualifications and
covers only a few occupations.

A public education and training system does not exist in Somalia. Therefore, access to all
forms of formal learning is based on the fees-for-service principle. In essence, those that can
afford to pay tuition fees, whether migrant, returnee, refugee or citizen, gain the privilege
of access to universities and the limited availability of post-school TVET Colleges. So, the
issue is not whether migrants have access to formal learning, but whether they can afford to
pay fees and whether they can meet the education levels used as admission criteria. Donor
agencies tend to offer core skills training courses as a way to make migrants economically
active in the short-term. However, interviewees expressed concern about the proliferation of
these *ad hoc* training events, while urgently needed efforts to rebuild the public education
and training system are lacking.
There are also no mechanisms to assist migrants with validation and recognition of foreign qualifications. Many migrants enter the country with skills. There is a need to determine the skills profile of migrants and recognize their skills.

Nonetheless, the National Development Plan is committed to developing and implementing standard monitoring and evaluation tools that will be applied by all partners implementing TVET programming inside Somalia. Key activities will thus focus on developing a functioning monitoring and evaluation system which will be supported by experienced international experts who will work closely with government TVET personnel to create credible tools that are easily implemented.

3.7.6 Overarching observations: Somalia

The key challenges facing education and training in Somalia, drawing from the literature and discussions with interview respondents include, but are not limited to:

- **Unregulated environment**: Interview respondents indicated that there were virtually hundreds of universities and TVET colleges competing for students in an unregulated education and training environment. Planning related to a national qualifications framework, level descriptors, institutional and programme standards, an accreditation and performance monitoring mechanism, and systems and processes to regulate and quality assure education and training provision, as is done in most countries, is only at a nascent stage. Hence, students have little reliable information about the quality of education and training offered by private providers, with notable exceptions, and might be exposed to exploitation by unscrupulous training providers whose primary goal is profit.

- **Funding**: Skills development is heavily reliant on donor funding, which is often short-term, ad-hoc, and unpredictable. This affects long-term planning, management, and sustainability of provision. The current government budget to the education sector is 3 per cent and is largely insufficient to meet needs.

- **Capacity constraints**: The civil war led to skills flight from the public service. For instance, the institutional capacities in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs with regard to human resource management, administration, finance, data collection, operations, and monitoring and evaluation are weak. The education and training system lacks an overarching regulatory framework to steer, govern, manage, and implement delivery at all levels.

- **Teachers**: Qualified teachers are very limited in number, and there is a need for teacher training and continuous professional development programmes. In this respect, considerable progress is being made to address teacher shortages. Three new teacher training institutes will be built within 12 months. Ground-breaking ceremonies have taken place for two institutes and construction will start in July 2019. These teacher training institutes will be in Bardera, Baletweyne, and Mogadishu.

- **Curriculum**: There is no standardized TVET curriculum, assessment, and certification for post-secondary education and training.
Supply-driven: The education and training system is supply-driven since it is the training providers that decide on course offerings. Often, these are low-resourced, high profit-generating courses based on the preference of the training providers. There is hardly any alignment between the needs of the labour market (demand) and the education and training system (supply). Institutions are therefore churning out graduates who are not suitable for the job market. The last Labour Force Survey for Somalia was carried out in 2014. The ILO is expected to conduct a Labour Force Survey in 2019 with a sample of 18,000. This survey is expected to provide a clearer profile of the state of the labour market.

Training providers: NGOs or donor agencies helping migrants and IDPs tend to focus on integrating migrants into the local economy and community by providing them with basic skills to sustain themselves financially. Donors such as the UNHCR, UN-Habitat, ILO, Danish Refugee Council, GIZ, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children International, Mercy Corps, International Rescue Committee, UNICEF, FAO, and UNDP are very active in providing basic entrepreneurship training in the country.

The long-term stability and development outcomes of Somalia rest on the provision of good quality education and trainings that reinvigorate youths’ skills, resourcefulness, and employability. The EU has been at the forefront of restoring and developing formal education and TVET in Somalia, and this has had a profound effect of not only expanding access to education and training for children and youth, but also of strengthening the education and TVET system. Despite the progress registered over the years, the Somali TVET sector continues to face multiple challenges in the areas of quality, relevance, training of trainers, equity (in particular gender equality) and inclusion of marginalized groups, and limited entrepreneurship and employment prospects for youth.

The major challenge is that Somalia lacks a public post-school education and training system. Moreover, there are no public TVET colleges and Community Skills Development Centres that can play a critical role in incorporating migrants into the labour market and mainstream economy. Currently, 95 per cent of Somali youths under 25 years are not in education and training (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). Therefore, the chances of accommodating migrants in the post-school system are considerably smaller.

Strengthening the qualifications system in Somalia through standards setting, quality assurance mechanisms, possibly a qualifications framework, and monitoring and evaluation systems are on-going in Somalia. This is a priority in order to facilitate recognition of skills and RPL, and to give credibility to certification. As noted above, there are currently no mechanisms through which the skills and prior learning of migrants can be validated and recognized.

Much of the work and funding for returnees and refugees is supported by international donor agencies. The National Development Plan has articulated its policy of a progressive migratory regime, but this needs to be backed with concrete actions. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. Recently, growth is being driven by construction, telecommunications, and financial services. Somalia has an insufficient skills base in these sectors. A better understanding of related skills should be the first step for identifying job and upskilling opportunities for citizens and migrants alike.
Development of the TVET system: The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs need to prioritize development of the following:

- National TVET policy in alignment with the National Education Policy, National Employment Policy Act, and National Employment Policy;
- A unified TVET curriculum framework;
- Stronger partnerships with industry in the design of occupational and competency standards, in training delivery through work-based training, in professional development for teachers, and in quality assurance;
- A TVET Quality Assurance and Accreditation Framework and enhanced capacity to regulate private training provision.

3.8 South Sudan country report

3.8.1 Context in South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became Africa’s 55th country. Within two years, humanitarian and development gains and hopes were set back sharply by renewed conflict, which lasted from December 2013 to February 2015, when a peace agreement was signed, and thereafter from July 2016 to October 2018. The social, governance, economic, and developmental fabric of the country has since suffered the ill effects of ongoing hostilities and insecurity. Recently, on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, the Government, the opposition, and civil society ratified the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCISS). It is common cause that the most critical factor for the future is that all stakeholders and former combatants in the conflict remain committed to the new agreement and create sustainable peace in the country (World Bank, 2018b). The human costs of the conflict in terms of human life and suffering have been colossal. The ability of the social, economic, and governance structures in South Sudan to sustain the peace and feed the national population are threatened. UN estimates indicate that more than half the population (about 7 million people) has been severely food insecure since May 2018 (World Bank, 2019b, p. 10). Major contributors to this dire situation, in addition to the conflict, are climate variability, poverty, and associated disruption of food production systems. These circumstances are important drivers of internal displacement and asylum-seeking by South Sudanese citizens.

For the financial year 2018, a fiscal deficit of 3.1 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2019b, p. 14) was recorded as a result of declining government revenues and rising security-related spending related to the ongoing conflict. Between 2014 and 2017, GDP per capita dropped from US$1,111 to below US$200 (AfDB, 2018b). In terms of revenue, the economy is critically dependent on oil, which accounts for almost all export revenues, and contributed 70 per cent of GDP in 2017; followed by agriculture (10 per cent), manufacturing (7 per cent), and services (6.1 per cent) (AfDB, 2019, p. 177). Under pressure to raise revenues, the Government aimed to resume full oil production to some 350,000 barrels per day by mid-2019, after production in five key oil fields was shut down on resumption of hostilities in December 2013. South Sudan will pay US$4 per barrel on oil transit fees, a significant reduction from the US$9.1 per
barrel previously paid as the result of an agreement with Sudan signed in September 2012, when international oil prices were relatively higher (World Bank, 2019b, p. 9).

There are some expectations that South Sudan’s rural areas could play a role in diversifying economic activity to counteract dependence on importing agricultural commodities and to reduce poverty and food insecurity. Such an approach would also seem sensible if it could involve rural people, since the majority (80.7 per cent) of the South Sudanese population live in rural areas, while a corresponding 19.3 per cent live in the urban areas. However, from the perspective of expanding TVET, conditions under which the majority rural population live would present challenges. First, literacy levels of adults in the country were estimated to be at 31.98 per cent in 2015 (Koffi and Soares Da Gama, 2018). Low levels of exposure to basic education would limit the capacity of these people to access TVET opportunities as a way to improve their skills, be they urban or rural dwellers. Poor access to the foundations of schooling reinforces low-skill and low-productivity forms of employment as the most common opportunities in the rural agriculture sector.

Further, there is powerful evidence that low-skill and low-productivity work generates highly limited wages. A very large share of the active population is found in non-wage, low-productivity employment concentrated in the agriculture sector, meaning these people as a rule do not receive cash income. For example, in South Sudan’s rural areas in 2011, of all adults aged 15 to 64, 53.9 per cent were engaged in unpaid work (47.4 per cent as unpaid family workers and 5.5 per cent doing unpaid work for others); while 37.1 per cent worked on their own account for themselves. Only one-in-ten received wages, of whom 7.9 per cent were employees and 2.2 per cent were employers (Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati, 2011).

The widespread prevalence of these low-skill and low-wage conditions in rural areas does not favour successful outcomes for a TVET strategy based either on skilling local people or on an assumption that local markets are sufficiently developed in demand to be a source of employment for TVET graduates. First, the majority of local rural residents’ levels of schooling and skilling, whether formal or informal, would not be sufficient to permit them to access post-primary level TVET programmes. Second, as indicated, the wage income profile of rural communities remains restricted. A very small proportion of working adults in rural areas have access to wage income. Existing spending power would, in all likelihood, be insufficient to constitute a viable enough market for TVET graduates in traditional trades to make a living.

In terms of the R-ARCISS, the Transitional Government of National Unity launched South Sudan’s National Development Strategy (NDS) on 27 November 2018. The NDS is set to address fundamental matters related to restoring stability, such as: stabilizing the economy, including stabilizing prices of basic commodities such as food; enforcing the rule of law; restoring social services; rebuilding infrastructure; facilitating voluntary return of displaced South Sudanese; enacting reforms towards more effective governance systems; and introducing accountability, transparency, and good governance to counter ‘high levels of corruption and lack of transparency in the country’ (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2018, p. 25).

The NDS document identified heavy reliance on oil revenue volatility as a critical impediment to sustainable financing of South Sudanese economic development, making it essential to find ways of mobilizing non-oil revenue to finance the NDS. It is argued in the NDS that: “This
The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

will be done through implementing key reforms in public financial management and making investments to begin to diversify the economy” (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2018, p. 28). Clearly, these actions will represent initial steps towards expanding and diversifying domestic production and exports in the non-oil sectors. However, given the need to concentrate on fundamentals, it is too early for the current NDS to formulate a detailed industrial strategy that defines South Sudan’s intentions for future sectoral growth.

This stage of economic planning has implications for how TVET institutions position themselves in terms of the skills they offer. In the future, the Ministry of Finance and Planning needs to identify sector level strategies that can inform the direction of TVET curriculum planning. Currently, TVET institutions in South Sudan operate without reference to macro-economic or sectoral messaging regarding future vocational skills demand. Policy signalling of potential future TVET skills expansion will offer clarity going forward.

3.8.2 Skills development in South Sudan

The TVET sector in South Sudan has operated according to planning that is not yet grounded within a national technical and vocational sector plan informed by formal national economic and industrial policy. This situation has remained in place as long as the civil war has endured and has been a key factor militating against a clear policy focus and direction. It is important that any policy acknowledges the inescapable size and weight of the largely rural economy consisting of low-skills pastoralist, nomadic, and arable non-formal livelihoods that involve the majority of the South Sudanese population. Through these living patterns, rural South Sudanese ethnic communities produce the means of their subsistence and collectively mediate social being and meaning.

In South Sudan, the formal education ladder is an 8-4-4 system: that is, eight years of primary education, four years of secondary education, and four years of higher education. In terms of this structure, formal TVET study opportunities extend from post-primary/secondary level into higher education. TVET student enrolment in some levels and streams – for example, university level – is limited.

Between 2013 and 2016, the South Sudan education system grew in aggregate by 45 per cent, from fewer than 1 million students to more than 1.4 million students (table 16). The bulk of school enrolment was in primary schooling, amounting to 78 per cent of total education system enrolment, or 1.1 million primary students, in 2016. A large proportion of the primary-school-aged children are out of school. The net enrolment rate for primary schools was 50.4 per cent, while for secondary schools the rate was 3.5 per cent (Ministry of General Education and Instruction [MOGEI], 2017). Only 14 per cent of pupils completed the primary eighth grade (MOGEI, 2017). The quality of primary schools and their ability to retain enrolment needs to be improved, since conditions in the primary schools limit the number and quality of learners transitioning to secondary school or to TVET institutions.

General secondary schools and TVET secondary schools represent the only two formal government alternatives for post-primary school study. In 2016, the enrolment of secondary school and TVET combined (63,775 students) as a proportion of primary schooling stood at 5.8 per cent, which means that a very small group of primary school students enter post-primary schooling. Of this student cohort, only 8.1 per cent are enrolled in TVET secondary
schools. This can be interpreted to mean that TVET enrolment is simply too small in view of the large demographic weight of youths who are at the appropriate age to enrol, but for whom there are no places.

**Table 15. Number and percentage of students per institution type in South Sudan, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood Development and Education</td>
<td>102,092</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary schooling</td>
<td>1,098,292</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Education System (AES)</td>
<td>136,784</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schooling</td>
<td>58,597</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>5,178</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training Institutes</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education</td>
<td>6,333</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 2016</strong></td>
<td>1,407,669</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 2015</strong></td>
<td>1,192,381</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 2013</strong></td>
<td>967,225</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MOGEI, 2017*

The TVET secondary schools present one important route into TVET occupations. However, it is not clear what is contributing to low enrolment in these institutions. A review of formal education in 2016–17 argued that in terms of resourcing “[the] pre-primary, AES [Alternative Education System], and TVET sub-sectors are suffering from neglect despite their demonstrated contribution to readiness to study (pre-primary) and learning to work among children and youth.” (MOEGI and IIEP, 2017, p. 87). The data further reveals that the unit costs of TVET are relatively low compared to the general secondary stream costs (table 17). Given that TVET provision is generally more costly than general schooling, increased expenditure in these institutions would be desirable.

**Table 16. Public unit costs by level of education, 2013–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Total enrolment</th>
<th>Cost per student (SSP)</th>
<th>Unit cost as multiple of primary cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>28,849</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>7,003</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MOGEI and IIEP, 2017*

A related consideration is the social cost of TVET schooling, especially in a country where expenses transferred to households can be prohibitive for poorer households. It is clear that a much lower proportion of TVETs charge school fees, and their average fee is discounted in comparison to secondary schools (table 18). Whereas current enrolment is relatively low, these cost advantages would be expected to encourage increases in enrolment in future,
subject of course to availability of places. The Juba TVET school reported receiving much higher applications for enrolment than places available.

**Table 17.** Average annual fees paid by students per school type, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>% of schools charging fees</th>
<th>Average fee per student in 2015 (SSP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schooling</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>215.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>193.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= nil.

*Source: MOGEI, 2017*

As noted above, the issue of TVET fees is a factor affecting enrolment. A further factor affecting poor access of rural populations is the spatial location of TVET facilities. In South Sudan, TVET institutions were planned and built mainly in urban areas, which implies a relative lack of access opportunities in rural areas. The highest proportion of TVET institutions is clustered in the vicinity of Juba, the largest city in the country with a population estimated to be in the region of half a million.

It is also necessary to understand the contingent status of TVET institutions affected by conflict. At least one in three schools has been attacked by armed forces since the start of the conflict, according to UNICEF (Glinski, 2017). It seems that vocational training institutions and TVET schools have suffered similar adversity, although those located in urban areas are, on balance, less vulnerable to armed conflict conditions (MOGEI and IIEP, 2017). The ongoing civil war probably impacted more on rural TVET centres, which effectively reduced rural access leading to concentrated access in larger urban environments.

Outside of the formal programmes referred to above, the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MOGEI) instituted an Alternative Education System (AES), which refers to a range of different interventions devised to address the education needs of generations of children and over-age youths who have either not attended or are early leavers from primary schools – a massive demographic constituency that the formal education structures cannot accommodate. The AES aims to enhance life skills and support for beneficiaries to learn towards “a productive life” (MOEST, 2014). The key programmes include the Accelerated Learning Programme for individuals 12–18 years and older, which offers a route to secondary school, and the Community Girls’ Schools programme for young girls from 8–11 years old living in poverty. These two programmes account for about 97 per cent of AES enrolment. Other programmes include the Intensive English Language Course, Basic Adult Literacy Programme, and others. At this stage, as the AES expands, there is comparatively little in the way of vocational or livelihoods-based programmes, apart from the Pastoralist Education Programme running in 13 schools in 2016 (MOGEI, 2017), which is designed for children in pastoralist, nomadic communities and covers primary school curriculum and skills relevant to pastoralism.

There is also a system of mobile schools following South Sudan’s formal primary school curriculum to enable children to transition to a formal schooling mode. The curriculum is also
Chapter 3. Country reviews

tailored to the pastoralist mode of life and incorporates animal husbandry skills for children (e.g., improving the children’s knowledge of animal health care and pastoralist production systems) in addition to useful life skills (e.g., sanitation courses, value of environmental protection, and peace and conflict studies) (Forcier Consulting, 2016). By 2013, South Sudan had roughly 108 mobile schools with between 4,000 and 12,000 students; the Government aims to target 100,000 pastoralist children in mobile schools (Forcier Consulting, 2016, p. 29).

The example of the Pastoralist Education Program is important for this report because the programme originates in a fundamental need in the country for skills programmes that can support communities engaged in livelihoods systems. Skills play specific economic and social roles here, and the allocation of work responsibilities and exchange of resources are based on familial and clan structures and relationships instead of financial relationships facilitated by a cash economy and the labour market. Pastoralist, nomad, and traditional crop cultivating populations are found in most IGAD Member States. However, in South Sudan, these groups constitute dominant proportions of the country’s population and many may be engaged in subsistence farming.

Figure 4 on the following page is intended to provide a descriptive view of the institutional shape of TVET and related learning provided in the South Sudan system through formal and informal institutions. This analysis demonstrates the TVET footprint in relation to the formal primary and secondary education system and the AES on the one hand, and on the other hand, the comparatively large and variegated non-formal domain of vocational training offered by multiple providers.

Figure 4. Mapping the institutional environment and sources of demand for TVET
Three ministries have a stake in the formal TVET policy terrain in South Sudan:

- Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MOGEI – formerly the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology [MOEST]);
- Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resources Development (MOLPSHRD); and
- Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MOCYS).

For the MOCYS, TVET is addressed in the South Sudan Youth Development Policy. There has, however, been a quite lengthy hiatus in the finalization of TVET policy development between the MOGEI and MOLPSHRD. As a result, two separate plans have emerged from independent policy processes initiated by each ministry:

- South Sudan Vocational Training Policy (MOLPSHRD, 2008).

From the perspective of the MOLPSHRD, the country’s Labour Act specifies labour standards and some provisions of training, while the South Sudan Vocational Training Policy guides the Ministry’s approach to vocational training. The latter policy was developed in 2008, validated by the Cluster of Technical Committees of the Ministries in 2014, and passed at the Ministerial level; it is currently under consideration by the Council of Ministers (UNESCO, 2018c). For the MOGEI, two policy documents guide much of its work: the National Technical and Vocational Education and Training Strategy; and the General Education Policy (UNESCO, 2018c).

The MOGEI and MOLPSHRD policies differ from each other in their coverage of TVET provision. The distinction is articulated in the following comment, arguing that “Both documents are similar in policy direction, choices and strategies, differing only on the target learner groups. The MOEST [i.e., MOGEI] policy document focuses mainly on formal TVET, while that of the MOLPSHRD addresses the concerns of both formal and non-formal TVET” (UNESCO, 2014, p. 11). As a consequence, there is a view that provisioning is fragmented due to “different ministries’ involvement in TVET with unclear demarcations and lines of responsibility.” (UNESCO, 2018c, p. 7). This view is also reflected in an evaluation by UNIDO in 2014 (UNIDO, 2014).

Under the MOGEI, TVET is offered only at secondary level in dedicated TVET secondary schools and is not part of the majority of general education schools. Currently, there are only five TVET secondary schools (two technical, two commercial, and one agricultural) in operation. There is one technical and one commercial secondary school located in Juba, the capital, and the city of Wau has one technical, one commercial, and one agricultural secondary school (UNESCO, 2018c). Due to the conflict, infrastructure damage and community insecurity, other similar technical secondary schools are not in operation.

The MOLPSHRD follows a competency-based curriculum, with a balance of 70 per cent practical and 30 per cent theory, with the objective of better equipping trainees for the workforce. The emphasis in the Department of Vocational Training is on skills to access jobs and improve students’ employability (UNESCO, 2018c). A group of public vocational training centres (VTCs) are operated by the MOLPSHRD. The VTCs offer both non-formal short courses (three to six months) and longer in duration formal courses of up to two years. Most training activity involves the short programmes, for which there is an open admissions policy under which candidates who may not be functionally literate are accepted (UNESCO, 2018c). The MOLPSHRD also operates Multi-Service Training Centres in Juba, Malakal, and Wau.
Currently, those in Juba, the core institution of vocational training in Southern Sudan before the civil war, and in Wau are still operational and offer regular training in eight traditional trades. In 2013 it was reported that for the first time, the Juba Multi-Service Training Centre enrolled over 200 trainees in two-year courses in various fields, ranging from automotive to electricity, carpentry, joinery, and many others. A further 500 trainees were enrolled in the same programme at the Malakal and Wau centres (Joseph, 2013). However, these programmes were interrupted by military conflict. Vocational training offered by the MOLPSHRD at the state level is also not yet available in all states (UNESCO, 2018c).

A central component of oversight will need to be put in place involving quality assurance to ensure that assessment and examinations are conducted according to standards. It was observed, for example, that in the case of the VTCs there is a need to secure formal external and internal quality assurance mechanisms, such as nationally agreed standards, against which the practical skills proficiencies of trainees can be benchmarked and which would support equivalent standards among institutions.

The Minister of Youth, Culture and Sport, Nadia Arop Dudi, reported in August 2018 that a lack of funding was restricting the MOYCS's training activities: “We have three youth centres in Wau, Juba, Malakal which was built after 1972 and it was serving youths. However, due to lack of capacity and available resources currently those centres are not fully utilized by the youths. We need support from our development partners to make it fully functional” (UN-Habitat, 2018).

Examples of TVET and vocational training projects involving different departments include:

- The MOLPSHRD’s Multi-Service Training Centre collaborates with funders on targeted projects. For example, in 2018, the Multi-Service Training Centre was in negotiation with the World Bank for funding of a skills-based project aimed at “Economic Empowerment Training of Conflict-Affected Youth” (World Bank, 2018c).

- The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission piloted a short-term vocational training programme (three months) for about 290 ex-combatants to acquire basic occupational skills to facilitate their reintegration (UNESCO, 2014).

- Alongside a forestry intervention, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development provided rural and urban poor youths from vulnerable households with access to “livelihood opportunities through comprehensive skills development training comprised of technical, entrepreneurship and life skills”. It was expected that the project would benefit 3,500 households through skills development (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development, 2016, p. viii).

Recent reports (UNESCO, 2018c) indicate that a number of TVET institutions are not operational. TVET institutions located in rural areas and small towns have proven to be more vulnerable than urban facilities to incidents of armed conflict and have been experienced repurposing for military advantage, stripping of assets, and vandalism. In many cases, resources could not be mobilized to refurbish these facilities, or the local population, including teachers, were forced to evacuate the area indefinitely due to safety concerns.

Though TVET training in higher education is an important pathway for the development of TVET skills in South Sudan, it plays a limited role in this respect as there are few prospects for the technical qualifications path in public higher education. For example, at Juba University, students...
have limited opportunities, apart from an “Electronics and Instrumentation” programme within
the School of Applied and Industrial Sciences, which is more oriented to biology and chemistry
in industrial applications, and “Information Technology” in the School of Computer Science and
Information Technology. Admission into these two programmes was below 100 per year in 2011
and 2012 (University of Juba, 2015). The university does not track the annual numbers of TVET
secondary school graduates who register. When the MOGEI gets to expand TVET secondary
schools into agricultural, commercial, and technical fields, the chances of TVET secondary school
graduates finding pathways for career development will expand.

A substantial number of NGOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs) offer various vocational
training programmes in the country. The precise number of organizations and their
commitments of funds, personnel, programmes, period of operation, partnerships, donor
funding, and sustainability could not be compiled.

Table 18 provides an indicative picture of actors in the vocational and technical education
field.

**Table 18. Indicative list of stakeholders involved in vocational provisioning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor entities</th>
<th>Multilateral agencies</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>ACROSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>BBC Media Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Dorcas Aid International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin Church Aid</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Finn Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Aid</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Nile Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
<td>PLAN International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Vocational Skills Development Organization (VOSDO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Whitaker Peace Development Institute (WPDI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key government departments</th>
<th>Bilateral agencies</th>
<th>Faith-based organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Don Bosco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service and Human Resource Development (MOLPSHRD)</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MOGEI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MOCYS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNESCO, 2018, as cited in UNESCO, 2018c, p. 22*
There are several key characteristics of this NGO-, FBO-, and donor-supported sector of vocational training and TVET provision. First, the mode of provision is non-formal. Second, the main players in this sector have attained limited success in working with government departments and structures, though the working interactions are more likely to take place at the state level – where government institutions exist – rather than at the national level. Third, the NGO and FBO actors do not seem to have particularly effective working relationships among themselves. The sector lacks a common overarching understanding of, and agreement on: what the local needs for vocational and technical skills are; appropriate theoretical frameworks; relevant curriculum; effective intervention design; and challenges for sustainability. As a consequence, the tendency is for the various actors to work within their own programme logic.

The outcome of this environment is that “donor-funded activities are project-based and sometimes fragmented, are duplicated and have unclear accountability mechanisms, especially in regards to their sustainability” (UNESCO, 2018c, p. 25). However, there is a tension here: donors are motivated to shift towards a shorter-term focus because of the urgency of the immediate community needs on the ground for skills towards achieving durable livelihoods. Furthermore, this foreshortened time horizon in planning can be partly understood to arise from a loss of confidence within the donor community in the ability of the relevant government departments to sustain their focus on longer-term goals in the formal education domain. Therefore, the tendency is to work in the non-formal sector, which involves limited dependency on government partners. An initiative to bring the various actors together – the South Sudan Vocational Training Coordination Forum – was started by the MOGEI in 2011 and then pursued further by the MOLPSHRD. The forum provided space for partners to discuss and coordinate with each other, but activities lapsed. In late 2017, the Forum was revived but to date “no formal apex governmental body exists” (UNESCO, 2018c, p. 5).

This situation has implications for skills recognition systems. The tendency for uncoordinated interventions permits a multiplicity of knowledge and skill offerings by different role players. Examples of the dimensions according to which vocational training interventions can differ include: variation between curricula including fragmentation; background and quality of instructors; duration of programmes; prior education and skills background of participants; and support for creation or identification of opportunities for work. These conditions present challenges for recipients in how they might be able to leverage their vocational training to enter a formal learning programme or how they might access RPL to assess their skills. The possible contribution of RPL to supporting and facilitating student progress through programmes is of high interest.

3.8.3 Distribution of migrants and refugees in South Sudan

South Sudan’s land surface area is comparatively expansive, which contributes to an elongated border that is difficult to control. The length of South Sudan’s borders is 4,797 km. The border countries are (with length of boundary): Central African Republic (682 km), Democratic Republic of the Congo (628 km), Ethiopia (883 km), Kenya (232 km), the Sudan (1,937 km), and Uganda (435 km) ([Southsudan.net](https://Southsudan.net), 2019). The direction and scale of migration and presence of South Sudanese refugees in territories across the region is dramatic. As of December 2018, there were 2.68 million refugees estimated to be resident in the immediate neighbouring countries. The major host countries were Uganda and the
Sudan with 1.2 million (41.5 per cent) and 920,000 (34.3 per cent) refugees respectively (table 20). About three-quarters of refugees are hosted in these two countries, the former with English and the latter with Arabic as its lingua franca. South Sudan’s total population was estimated at 12.58 million in 2017, and the refugee population accommodated in six neighbouring States is equivalent to 20 per cent of the national population.

Table 19. Estimated numbers of South Sudan refugees in six neighbouring States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>2018 December</th>
<th>Host populations estimated 2018–2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>73,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>422,240</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>123,593</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>920,294</td>
<td>261,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,112,025</td>
<td>2,236,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,680,728</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available.

Source: UNHCR, 2018c

South Sudan is itself host to refugees from several countries in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (31,304 refugees). The single largest group of refugees hosted by South Sudan is from its northern neighbour, the Sudan. The 270,453 Sudanese refugees presently located in South Sudan constitute 92.5 per cent of all foreign refugees hosted by that country. In addition to these numbers, a further 2,019 asylum-seekers are resident in South Sudan, of whom 1,523 are from Eritrea (table 21). The large number of Sudanese refugees originates from conflicts in that country’s Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The refugees are hosted mainly in camps in Maban County, Upper Nile State and in northern Unity State, which share a border with the Sudan and are part of the north-east region of South Sudan. Other than Sudanese refugees in this area, it would seem that South Sudan is not a preferred destination for refugees from neighbouring countries. Therefore, except in the northern states of Upper Nile and Unity, it is likely that the distribution of Sudanese refugees involves large numbers moving into the southern regions of South Sudan. What this suggests is that foreigners living and working in the southern regions are more likely to be there as migrants and will have a numerically small presence.
Table 20. Refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries in South Sudan, by country of origin (2018/19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>No. of refugees/asylum-seekers</th>
<th>% of all refugees/asylum-seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>270,453</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Rep. of the Congo</td>
<td>15,652</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>292,428</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2019

Figure 5 below provides a two-dimensional picture of the various directions of population movement in the region between each country and South Sudan as well as within South Sudan. The arrows provide a nominal perspective of population movements which occur at any number of border crossing points. Further, the arrows show bi-directional movements. This is important since at any given time, different migrant individuals or groups could be moving in opposite directions across a border between any two countries. Also, a single migrant or migrant group may move back and forth across a border more than once, since migration can involve repetitive circulatory patterns of movement.

Figure 5. Map showing population movements: between South Sudan and the region and within the borders of South Sudan, late 2018

Note: Yellow boxes refer to numbers of South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries. Source: Compiled by authors
In addition to the movement of South Sudanese refugees into and out of neighboring States, the map above depicts very substantial numbers of citizens who are internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced to move because of armed conflict, competition for resources, or emergence of ethnic tensions. IDPs in South Sudan numbered more than 1.9 million people in late 2018. Nine in every ten IDPs live among host communities. Ten per cent live in settlements that comprise only IDPs. There are six long-standing Point of Concentration (POC) sites in the urban settlements of Bor, Bentiu, Juba, Malakal, and Wau. The POC sites formed at the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013, when people, believing they were under threat, sought protection by settling in close proximity to United Nations bases of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Though these sites were originally taken to be only a temporary resort, they became practically permanent. In other areas, out of security concerns, fear of ethnic tensions, and risk of violence, some IDPs choose to live together with other IDPs at smaller sites referred to as “collective centres”, which have less formal recognition than the POCs.

There is a lack of systematic information about the skills profile of returnees and by what activities they acquired such skills while in exile. The literature on refugees reports on training received in the various countries where South Sudanese are hosted. Consolidated reporting of refugee training experience across the host countries is not attempted, to our knowledge, as the various funders, donors, NGOs, and CBOs tend to provide information on their own work, with limited reference to the programmes of other actors. Even then, the tendency is to report on a project basis, so reporting on continuities in the training activities of individual training providers is hardly apparent. Reporting on training interventions refers to training of refugees shortly after arrival and then on an ad hoc basis during their sojourn. The literature does not touch on the options for training people who are soon expected to return. Training of returnees in their camps or settlements of origin may be useful before returnees – especially voluntary returnees – disperse on their own routes back to their homelands.

In order to generate an empirical base from which to assess the likelihood of refugee skills acquisition, it is necessary to assemble a cross-cutting impression of conditions in refugee camps and the extent to which the conditions mitigate against vocational skills or TVET exposure. Table 22 below was created to synthesize the general characteristics of living conditions recorded across several camps in different countries where South Sudanese refugees are accommodated.
Table 21. General conditions and education conditions experience by South Sudanese refugee communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education conditions</strong></td>
<td>▶ Persistently low education enrolment and attendance rates for refugee and host community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Primary and secondary aged children out of school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Prevalence of school drop-out and child labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Adult vocational training not specifically mentioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social circumstances of residents</strong></td>
<td>▶ High percentage is women and children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ High proportion of adults are women, many are heads of household.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Large numbers of unaccompanied and separated minors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Increasing disempowerment of men has caused them to be more exposed to emotional and psychological violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Child protection issues and sexual and gender-based violence risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host community conditions</strong></td>
<td>▶ Refugee-hosting communities in underdeveloped parts of the country with high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure, and limited basic services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Lack of documentation and birth registration are drivers of vulnerability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Attempts to promote self-reliance of refugees and hosting communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Environmental degradation linked to refugee sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp basic facilities</strong></td>
<td>▶ Limited access to sustainable energy for cooking, lighting, and power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Minimal access to basic services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Food shortages in some camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Tent accommodation is the most common form of shelter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host policies</strong></td>
<td>▶ Focus on integrating the refugee and host community socially and economically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Policy of integrating refugees into national services (i.e., education and health).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Freedom of movement and an out-of-camp policy in some countries, while encampment policy remains in effect in other countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table created from author observations of literature and information sourced in Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, and Murphy, 2008 (p. 8).

Notwithstanding these conditions, a proportion of returnees do arrive back in their homeland with skills acquired in exile. Factors that contribute to refugee up-skilling are:

▶ long duration of refugee stays in host countries;
▶ living outside of camps, which provides greater freedom to improve skills towards a livelihood; and
▶ some camps offer much better living and learning opportunities than others.

For example, in Uganda, refugees are able to access greater freedoms outside of camps. That returnees do go back home with skills is corroborated in the following observation:

"[T]he new skills that many returnees have brought back with them, ranging from building, welding, bicycle and other repair skills, food processing and baking, could have significant livelihood potential that could otherwise take years of investment in training and extension to bring about. This potential has not yet been realised. There is a serious lack of resources and capital to enable these skills to be put to use, and a lack of purchasing power to create a market in more remote rural areas (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, and Murphy, 2007, p. 8)."
The value of acquired skills and experience that returnees bring back is strongly emphasized in the quote above. It also foregrounds a challenge, which is to make sense of the different levels of skills and experience that returnees may bring with them. Most South Sudanese refugees leave their country with very low levels of schooling and adult literacy that must constrain their capability to pick up skills while in exile. Yet observers differ on the extent to which South Sudanese refugees return with improved skills as the two quotes below suggest:

Another major challenge for generating income for returnees was the lack of skills. Although returnees in exile had to some part acquired relevant schooling and trainings at their host location, these skills were not always transferrable or needed at the return location (Bohnet, 2016, p. 19).

[Returnees can bring skills and knowledge with them that help the local community and economy (Ashkenazi et al., 2006, p. 11).]

From the perspective of this research, a core challenge for the home country is how to identify returnees’ skills levels and integrate returnees socially and economically. This is not a straightforward process for government or development agencies inducting returnees. Equally, returnees adopt strategies to manage risk, security, and their resources through the return process. The motives and social embeddedness of returning refugees influence how they return. Returnees with skills and occupational experience, especially those with completed post-school study, form part of the combined resources of a refugee family, who will stay and work in exile or return home when deemed appropriate, as retaining household interests and presence in both exile and return locations is a common strategy. It is observed that “in many refugee situations mobility and ongoing and circular migration are key livelihood strategies” (Harild, Christensen, and Zetter, 2015, p. 13). Refugees with secure employment and good incomes may not necessarily return until their occupational wage levels or job availability improves in South Sudan. Voluntary return conditions alone will not necessarily encourage returns, unless circumstances are perceived to be favorable.

The IOM provided a well-documented empirical account of returnee movement between the Sudan and South Sudan following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 up until the writing of their 2009 report. The IOM calculated that both North–South and South–South return movements were almost 2 million over less than five years. This figure also took into account secondary displacement, estimated to involve more than 200,000 individuals and which refers to people not remaining in their original destination or place of return. Among the 2 million returnees were families who had been living in exile for up to 20 years, so this wave of returns brought back a historical accumulation of refugees (Ensor, 2013; IOM, 2009).

More than 116,000 IDPs were directly assisted via the combined United Nations–IOM/Government of National Unity/Government of South Sudan-assisted return programme. Their return was monitored, and assistance provided at points of arrival. This is in comparison to the total number of returnees, the majority of whom elected to return by themselves, and who “posed enormous challenges to the international community and authorities that try to locate them, and provide support” (IOM, 2009, p. 4). What is important to draw from this account of the earlier post-CPA return movement is, firstly, the very large numbers of returnees and, secondly, the considerably smaller proportion of the total number that could be supported by the multilateral team of organizations, including government.
In the meantime, during 2013, hostilities commenced again. Nevertheless, for the year 2014, UNHCR estimated 200,000 returnees, and that many thousands followed (UNHCR, 2015). In 2018, the Revitalized Peace Accord was signed. Assuming the latest peace process is sustained, with time, citizens may begin moving back to their own country. Numbers of IDPs in the POCs have declined slightly, by perhaps 10 per cent. This current period is referred to as a phase of “returnee uncertainty” inside and outside of South Sudan (Mednick, 2019). This raises the question of planning when, how, where, and which returnees moving into the region should benefit from envisaged implementation of skills development and RPL interventions. Clearly, the existing population would also benefit from the same programme of skills recognition and skills development to meet their vocational training and TVET needs.

### 3.8.4 Labour market demand in South Sudan

Estimates of South Sudan’s formal labour market suggest that it is very small. In 2013, the formal private sector was estimated to employ approximately 20,000 domestic and foreign workers (Eissa, 2013). In 2019, based on the South Sudan NGO Forum's data, the donor and NGO sector in South Sudan employs about 22,500 national and 1,850 international staff (South Sudan NGO Forum, 2018). Search for a labour market survey for South Sudan was not successful. The last census including South Sudan was carried out in 2008 as part of the CPA, and though dated, it provides some labour market data for analysis.

Key features of the labour market are identified in a study by Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati (2011) based on the 2008 census data. In 2008/9, very low proportions of the South Sudanese workforce occupied salaried employment in South Sudan. Overall, only 9.4 per cent of employed youths held salaried jobs (Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati, 2011). Yet, in comparison, there is a very large difference between rural and urban chances of finding a waged job. Adults aged 15 to 64 years who worked as paid employees constituted 13.1 per cent of the employed. This gives an indication of how restricted the opportunities are for any working-age young person to find wage-earning employment in the formal sector. Nonetheless, a TVET graduate would have strong aspirations for having a paid job.

The data further reveals that being employed as a paid employee was – and surely still is – a highly privileged status, enjoyed in 2008 by under 10 per cent of working youths aged 15–24 years. By comparison, just over 60 per cent of young workers were unpaid; while the “own account worker” would, at best, be taking piece work and casual labour opportunities. Table 23 below provides a perspective on the disparities in chances of obtaining employment across sectors.
The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD Region

Table 22. Youth employment (ages 15–24 years), by employment category and urban/rural location (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment category</th>
<th>% of all youth employment</th>
<th>% of all urban youth employment</th>
<th>% of all rural youth employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household production¹</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other²</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
¹ Household production includes: undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private households;
² Other includes: mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water, extra-territorial organizations

Source: Adapted from Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati, 2011.

Consistent demand for higher skills from employers in South Sudan is clearly reflected in data showing that a wage premium is offered for workers possessing certain qualifications. For instance, based on 2008 data, those with primary education attracted wages that were 22 percentage points higher than those with no education. Data is not available from the 2008 census on the wage premium associated with higher levels of education (Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati, 2011). Though dated, this information suggests that market forces operated strongly in favour of workers with higher levels of education.

The critical take away from this discussion for the research is that even as tiny as the group of waged workers is, this goal will dominate the imagination of young and old. Yet it is clear – notwithstanding poor data – that young people who have attained formal or non-formal vocational training skills, and especially TVET graduates, will struggle to find the jobs that they aspire to. Several sectors are identified as potential sources of demand for vocational training and TVET skills in South Sudan. It is clear that the public sector has shortages in capacity, which is highlighted in documents such as the South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013. Public sector employment is driven by policy rather than the market, and limits to government income restrict employment in that sector. Information about skills shortages in government departments and public enterprises is more readily available than information about shortages in the private sector. It is appropriate to touch first on how limitations on private sector growth impact on skills demand in that sector.

South Sudan’s private sector has been growing sluggishly over some time, due to conditions of civil war not conducive to market operations, lack of investment in the economy, low levels of education in the population, and high proportions of the population involved in low or no-wage subsistence agriculture. Responding to underdevelopment and the low employment absorptive capacity of the private sector, the Government has moved to implement strategies to catalyse growth in that sector. For example, projects at the micro or enterprise level have been launched in the country, with the aim of strengthening credit bureaus, making
guaranteed loans available to small and medium enterprises, and up-scaling microfinance institutions to support youth startups. Initiatives such as these, including financial backing from the World Bank, have not reaped convincing rewards. Recently, the World Bank proposed an intervention to tackle the issue of access to microfinance in the country through the “South Sudan Private Sector Development Project”, a US$9 million Emergency Recovery Loan to the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Investment, with the goal of generating improved access to finance for private sector development and increased employment opportunities in South Sudan (World Bank, 2017b).

At the macro level, the key factor remains the fluid political situation in the country. It has been observed that after the CPA, foreign companies, mostly from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, and also South Africa, made investments in construction, manufacturing, consumer goods, power, and telecommunications, mostly in Juba. Recently there has been pull-back on the depth of involvement of investors operating in the country. This may have negatively affected employment.

The reasons for ambivalence about committing to business in South Sudan are varied. It is about relationships and trust building. Taking a wider perspective, JICA (2012, p. 2-9) observed that “it is generally the case that the private sector is not fully developed and is also in the process of post-conflict reconstruction in conflict-affected countries, the development of a mechanism to collaborate with the private sector in the process of reconstruction is a real challenge for any project.”

Understanding approximate shifts in demand for skills in Juba can be related to phases in the process according to which the capital can be recovered economically after conflict. The schema in figure 6 below is presented to show successive evolution or emergence of markets in Juba for different services and commodities. How these changes emerged was influenced by the expansion of investment into viable markets, such as for accommodation (hotel construction) and telecommunications infrastructure.

**Figure 6. Phases of market emergence in Juba**

![Figure 6](image)


Successive phases in the evolution of Juba’s economy produced associated sectoral and occupational demands, such as for: vehicle mechanics; construction workers; hotel and restaurant workers; IT and connectivity; security; and so forth. Whereas some companies
recruited and conducted training and upskilling internally, TVET and vocational training programmes offered in Juba by various agencies were shaped to meet the changes in demand sketched above. Shifts in demand and supply for different TVET skills within the modern high consumption market of the relatively small Juba city formal economy took place concurrently with demands for services and goods in the informal sector (e.g., motorcycle taxis, fisheries, retail food outlets, tailoring, and traditional trades).

Research suggests that such small markets are actually very diverse in the selection of goods and services that they are constituted from. One facet that is strongly manifested, based on the outcome of a recent market assessment in South Sudan (see UNESCO, 2018c), is that the markets are consistently biased more towards goods than services, which are less in demand; so business propositions on the services side of the market would have to be carefully considered before embarking on a business venture.

3.8.5 Skills recognition of refugees and migrants in South Sudan

The willingness of local employers and of jobseekers to participate in the activities of innovations in the labour market is likely to influence the impact of RPL activities. In 2009, the ILO established Labour Offices in Malakal, Juba, and Wau with the purpose of “enabling the socio-economic environment for creating sustainable employment opportunities and productive livelihoods” (ILO, 2009, p. 4). This intervention also included support for vocational occupations, matching jobseekers and vacancies, and the intention of enhancing the capacity of Labour Officers. In the report on the Labour Office project, the Ministry of Labour and offices at the state level noted the limited performance of the employment services. It was agreed that the willingness of both employers and jobseekers was limited due to attitudes and lack of trust (ILO, 2009). Few jobseekers went to register, and few employers used the centres’ services. The report argued that more effort would have to be put into a campaign to familiarize the public with the aim of the service and its benefits. These observations suggest that the innovation of RPL to facilitate employment access to refugees and IDPs envisaged in this project will need to make efforts to depoliticize these services and work towards improving the trust and participation of jobseekers and employers. Thus, suspicion of people regarding the motives of Government may impact on the numbers of people participating in the skills recognition facets of the project. However, if testing centres for RPL are presented as independent, concerns about involvement may be reduced.

Another factor that contributed to restricted use was the well-established informal practice of hiring employees in the labour market. It was observed that “[t]here are very few formal jobs in the area (valid for Wau and Malakal), and it is a common practice for enterprises to hire employees either directly using their informal networks or from elsewhere (Uganda or Juba for states other than Central Equatoria)” (ILO, 2009, p. 15).

Even though skills recognition in principle aims to improve market conditions that both jobseekers and employers can benefit from, it might not have positive effects if informal hiring preferences prevail. Clearly the influence of ethnic, clan, language, religion, gender, and other affinity characteristics will influence employment chances to a greater or lesser degree in any context, subject to legal measures to prevent such. The success of a skills recognition system will depend on employers’ convictions that objective measures of skills,
such as RPL or validated qualifications and certificates, are important criteria for selection, assuming sufficient desire on the part of the employer to sustain or improve productivity.

The practices referred to above would have particular impact on returnees and on IDPs. This phenomenon of real or perceived identity gaps would be influenced by historical experiences of previous animosity or perceived status between groups. The issues may be more pressing in some contexts but not others. To take a single example, the arrival of Dinka IDPs in the Yei region was complicated because they could not speak the Kakwa dialect of the Bari language spoken by YeI’s largest indigenous community (Sluga, 2009). This has affected parents, but also the early generation of Dinka children at the start of their post-displacement lives (Sullivan, 2018).

In Juba, the labour market included foreign workers. Frequent reference is made to the availability of “many Kenyan, Uganda, Ethiopian, and Eritrean workers” (Kosar, 2013, p. 4) and also Sudanese and Somali migrants. Circumstantial evidence suggests that in many instances, foreign workers are preferred. The status of foreign workers in the city, and to an extent in other state capitals, has over some time been a matter of contention. The donor and development sector, which employs more than 20,000 people (ReliefWeb, 2019) in South Sudan, has been accused of favouring foreign nationals in their hiring practices. It is important to establish the extent to which foreign labour is competing with or “temporarily” substituting qualified citizens. What contributes to tension about access to jobs is that regulations governing foreign workers are loosely implemented. The situation reflects the existence of networks of firms and foreign workers through which employment opportunities are brokered. These practices are taken up in response to the instability of a labour market where possession of formal qualifications is limited and where parties to employment have low levels of trust in each other. Higher trust is leveraged through hiring workers on recommendation of current employees who are regarded as trustworthy.

However, there are other angles on why the private sector is wary of employing South Sudanese citizens. According to the AfDB, many employers, both national and foreign, complain that the youth attitude to work is very poor. From the employers’ point of view, local youths seek much higher wages than are merited by the level of productivity they are able to achieve. Furthermore, many jobseekers see themselves as the equals of the better-organized, more experienced, and better-paid youths from neighbouring countries (AfDB et al., 2012).

The presence of foreign workers remains controversial. In January 2019, the Government began, through the Interior Ministry, to register foreigners to ascertain the number of foreign residents and to establish screening centres in all the states to verify the status of foreigners (Lumara, 2019). However, the porosity of these borders and the extent to which border partners are inclined to control them is a potentially important factor in the capability of a country to protect and shape its labour market, particularly when this needs to be achieved in favour of nationals and skills in demand.

### 3.8.6 Overarching observations: South Sudan

The key question for this research is how the returnee population movement has contributed and, more importantly, will contribute in the future to the acquisition of TVET and vocational
training skills. Based on evidence accumulated thus far in this project from visits to other IGAD countries, it is apparent that the TVET system in South Sudan has developed more slowly than its peers. The decades-long civil war with concomitant industrial stagnation, sectorally and occupationally restricted labour markets, stunted TVET institutional development, and limited government coordination has contributed to suboptimal collaboration between stakeholders in the TVET environment. The disabling circumstances of South Sudan's TVET development have been extreme, leaving the country with a TVET system that will take time to mature. Clearly, the vocational training and TVET needs of the existing population would also benefit from programmes of skills recognition and skills development.

We recommend that South Sudan institutes a curriculum development process focused on developing viable vocational training and TVET programmes on sustainable livelihoods. TVET is very limited in its ability to meet demand for vocational training skills that unlock sustainable livelihoods in rural areas engaged in pastoral or arable production; improving the availability of vocational training programmes that provide young people with skills that will enable them to achieve a sustainable livelihood in a pastoral, survivalist environment is necessary.

Although the population of migrants, refugees, and IDPs in South Sudan is very large, it cannot be assumed that the proportions of this population holding intermediate- and higher-level TVET skills is particularly high. This argument is based on our knowledge that the majority of the population movement that takes place within South Sudan consists of citizens of that country, as indicated earlier in the discussion. It is argued that the sooner migrants can be integrated into the labour market in the receiving country, the sooner they can contribute meaningfully. This would be difficult to achieve for South Sudan, which has a very small and slow-growing private sector formal labour market, apart from a public sector and informal sector, neither of which skilled migrants would find attractive.

The aim of integrating migrants early may only be achievable on a longer timescale in South Sudan's labour market. The timing of returnee migration in relation to the slower process of integration could create an immediate bottleneck. Since the economy in South Sudan will grow slowly, there will be concomitant slow growth in upsurge of demand from the labour market (also because education system change is slow). The default tendency of taking a supply-side approach in the design and provision of TVET skills opportunities needs to be balanced by an approach based on an improved understanding of skills and TVET availability on the ground.
Chapter 4. Findings and recommendations

4.1 Introduction

This final chapter presents a broad set of findings and recommendations based on the review of the literature and the fieldwork conducted in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, and Uganda in December 2017. The findings are limited to the insights gained by the research team and are not meant to be exhaustive. Additional engagement with key actors, both in the countries and internationally, will assist to further develop these recommendations.

The key research questions that formed the basis for this scoping study will be revisited in this chapter:

1. What is the fit between the skills of a migrant and demand in the destination labour market?
2. How does the type of migration (forced, voluntary) impact on whether the migrant can prepare by doing training or ensuring they have proof of qualification available/with them?
3. How can people who migrate internationally, but equally those who migrate within their own country, benefit from recognition systems to have their personal basket of skills formally recognized?
4. What skills training and/or recognition service is offered to returning migrants to facilitate their reintegration in the national labour market?

The next section presents an overview of the cross-cutting findings, followed by a set of recommendations specifically focusing on skills recognition for labour mobility, and is followed by a final section of concluding comments.

4.2 Cross-cutting findings and recommendations

The development of a robust migration governance architecture for IGAD forms the basis for the recommendations that are presented in this section. Some of the components of the architecture are being developed, while others have yet to be identified. The Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration Regional Programme in Africa, known as the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP), is an important Africa-wide initiative that aims to achieve greater development, adoption, and implementation of harmonized systems of free movement of and coherent national migration policies regarding the workforce in regional economic communities. It also aims to extend social security to migrants to access compatible portability systems and resolve shortages of skills (AU, 2017).
IGAD-specific processes are critical, including the normative instruments developed as part of the IGAD regional migration policy framework, such as:

- the Regional Consultative Process on migration;
- the Regional Migration Coordination Committee and National Coordinating Mechanisms in each of the Member States; and

Current consultations on a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons are also important to recognize, as well as the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework that was launched in November 2017 and is being applied in IGAD to promote out-of-camp support to refugees.

One of our main findings from the research is that despite the advances in constructing overarching frameworks for migration in IGAD, setting priorities for action, and making interventions, Member States are not mainstreaming labour migration in development planning. Our view, drawing on the review presented in this study, is that bolt-on interventions, in a region with relatively low capacity to offer quality education and training to its own citizens, will further place strain on Member States, and ultimately will not be sustainable or realistic.

The findings presented below all contribute in some way towards the migration governance architecture for IGAD, and in particular to the potential role of skills development and skills recognition to support and extend the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility. The findings and recommendations are presented within a broader three-part approach:

1. Stable national systems form the basis for any regional process and must be supported at all costs.
2. IGAD, as a regional body, can play an effective role by setting common procedures and standards with regard to qualifications and skills, as well as by developing normative policy instruments.
3. Between these two levels, there exists a unique opportunity to draw on innovative new measures being developed in other parts of the world. Considering that such interventions are also being driven by international priorities, the opportunity to adapt them to IGAD is very real and will also be cost effective.

### 4.2.1 Integrate migrants early in skills development and employment

While this first finding may seem quite obvious, it is also the most problematic in IGAD countries. Findings from the case studies strongly corroborated international research that the sooner migrants can be integrated into the labour market in the receiving country, the sooner they can contribute meaningfully: “The earlier migrants enter the labour market, the better their integration prospects in the long run” (OECD, 2016, p. 18).

A point related to the informal economy is also important here. Even though the informal economy hosts large parts of the workforce in IGAD countries, certificates or qualifications might be of less value than in the formal economy, and informal employment is usually characterized by decent work deficits. The lobby for migrants to receive access to formal
training and/or recognition services would likely fail in its purpose unless the migrant qualification holder were given access to the formal labour market – a condition currently being negotiated through the IGAD Free Movement Protocol. Following the ILO Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation, 2015 (No. 204), all IGAD Member States are called upon to promote transitions of enterprises and workers through both better incentives, including skills development, and better monitoring and enforcement.

**Recommendation 1.1:** A comprehensive migration architecture for IGAD requires careful planning and strong political support across countries and the region. The early integration of migrants in skills development and employment should be an important strategic priority in such a process.

### 4.2.2 Take stock of migrants’ skills

Our second finding is just as obvious, and also just as weakly implemented in IGAD. Migrants, and more so refugees, are unlikely to have documentary evidence of their formally acquired skills and even less so for non-formal learning. Even when migrants have evidence, the maturity of the systems wherein the learning took place, combined with less-developed credential evaluation capabilities in the receiving country, does not allow for any substantial verification in the host country. Prior skills assessment (or RPL) has been used for this purpose for many years in more developed countries, specifically in Canada, but also increasingly for the purposes of migration (see Singh, Idris, and Chehab, 2018, which looks at the use of RPL in recognizing the competences of Syrian refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey). Unfortunately, the ability of receiving countries in IGAD to effectively assess foreign qualifications and skills is limited, and systems would have to be developed systematically. This emphasis on RPL is in line with the AUC directive that RPL be considered for returning migrants.

While migration is an imperative under conditions of globalization and climate change, it is also a phenomenon that can mutually benefit contiguous nation States, since it can offer greater absorption of labour force if managed correctly.

**Recommendation 2.1:** Strengthen points of entry data-capturing mechanisms. Countries should capture migrant, refugee, and asylum-seekers’ demographic profiles for planning and provisioning purposes. Such processes will rely heavily on the available documentation, which in many cases are not available. Processes further rely on the existence of such points of entry, which in many cases are not in place, or at least, are not functionally in place. Despite this weakness across IGAD, the ability to capture adequate and reliable data is the only long-term solution for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD region. It is strongly recommended that the strengthening of this obvious capacity is not neglected in favour of alternative solutions that focus more on immediate pressure points. This will be informed by the ILO Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration (ILO, 2018b).

**Recommendation 2.2:** Develop a centralized RPL facility in IGAD, working with the AUC, that is able to support other Member States and provide guidance and instruments for the recognition of skills. Ideally, this should involve the identification of an existing centre of excellence in one of the Member States. An alternative option would be to establish some capacity in this regard on an IGAD level, with at least one RPL expert from the region based at
or seconded to) the IGAD Secretariat. It is proposed that the RPL facility focus specifically on the recognition of work experience for employment purposes. This should involve planning based on pilot sites in large urban centres and perhaps at migration entry points at national borders.

4.2.3 Approach skills recognition in its multiplicity

There exist different forms of recognition, many of which are being used in the international context, including long-established approaches to more modern ones to approaches that are only starting to gain traction. IGAD has the opportunity to leapfrog other countries and regions by learning from these developments and contextualizing the application thereof in the region.

Overall, the research team's country visits point to the need for a combination of common regional standards, strengthened national systems, and innovative projects. Qualifications frameworks, while not uncontested, provide one option for IGAD countries to facilitate harmonization and become party to the African and international community that has been developing frameworks for nearly three decades. Provided the pitfalls are observed and there is guidance from the ILO and other international agencies, the IGAD region could, in a short space of time, have regional systems in place to recognize learning across countries. This regional system could act as a proxy for national systems that may not exist, be underdeveloped, or may even not be necessary due to the size and ability of the particular country to develop its own system. The establishment of a regional TVET qualifications framework in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a good comparative example in this regard. We are of the view that a higher-level meta-framework, also referred to as a reference framework, may be less relevant in the IGAD context where NQFs are less developed, possibly with the exception of some countries. Greater regional cooperation and sharing of resources, also in terms of qualifications, can be a cost-effective manner through which the quality of training can be improved. The regional suite of qualifications should draw on existing qualifications that are offered in Member States and that are well recognized by employers. After some consultation and contextualization, these qualifications can be offered regionally. We are not suggesting that these qualifications should be developed from scratch.

It is recognized that regional standards can be developed without establishing a regional qualifications framework. Examples include regional competency standards in ASEAN. In Central America, national training institutions have developed regional standards, allowing each country to adapt the standards to their own requirements by keeping the minimum standards equal and then changing up to 20 per cent of the profile. The decision to weigh up the options of developing regional standards with or without a regional qualifications framework will need to be made by IGAD in consultation with Member States.

While it is accepted that credential evaluation is not well developed in IGAD (with the possible exception of Ethiopia), the potential to learn from credential evaluation agencies in other parts of the world is an opportunity that should not be ignored. As noted earlier in this report, the influx of refugees into Europe has forced European credential agencies to strengthen their approaches to allow for new complexities and also to develop new innovative approaches (OECD and ILO, 2018).
Recommendation 3.1: The feasibility of a regional qualifications framework for IGAD should be explored, along with its potential benefits and costs. This framework should not replace similar initiatives by COMESA, ECOWAS, or the AUC, but can act as an important contributor and catalyst for change. IGAD countries should consider their contribution to an IGAD framework as sufficient enough to not necessarily warrant the development of a more intricate national qualifications framework. Regional standards, as part of such a regional process and that draw on existing, well recognized qualifications offered in Member States, could potentially address many of the challenges faced in terms of skills recognition across Member States. They can also contribute to qualifications obtained in IGAD countries being recognized outside of the region. Setting up a task group to investigate and report on options towards prioritizing the functions of national and regional qualification frameworks against a timescale could be considered. Part of the brief of the team would be the formalizing of quality assurance in the TVET systems and developing RPL procedures to diagnose skills gaps and to calibrate progress towards basic TVET skills.

Recommendation 3.2: A more detailed review of the innovations being introduced by credential agencies in Europe is warranted, on both national and sector-specific levels. NOKUT, in particular, can provide insights into the same processes in IGAD. The NOKUT pilot project based on the idea of a qualifications passport may be able to be used in IGAD without the burden of very expensive setting up costs. Such a review of RPL approaches in this context would be useful.

Recommendation 3.3: The potential role of the Addis Convention in promoting skills recognition across IGAD countries should be explored by the IGAD Secretariat. The recent recommendation on the recognition of refugees’ qualifications under the Lisbon Recognition Convention for higher education (Council of Europe and UNESCO, 2017) is a very good example of how skills recognition can be promoted under the broader ambit of a regional convention. The IGAD Secretariat is encouraged to raise this option with the UAC and other continental bodies.

Recommendation 3.4: In addressing the central challenges of generating skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility, it is necessary to recognize the pivotal role of social partners in the skills systems of IGAD. Through having workers and employers’ organizations actively involved at different levels is key to ensure the usefulness, relevance and quality of skills development and recognition systems. Recent research has been undertaken to improve understanding of how trade unions and employer bodies have engaged in development of national skills policies (Bridgford, 2017; ILO, 2018c).

4.2.4 Develop inclusive labour market information systems

The concept and practical application of a labour market information system lie at the heart of skills development and skills recognition for supporting and extending the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility. Improving skills access for migrants and the means of identifying and accrediting their skills, in turn, enable migrants to search for and secure gainful employment. Across the country case studies, we observed that in different configurations various institutions in each IGAD country generate information relevant to the labour market and employment as part of their internal processes. This information is not necessarily made public, nor is it known to be shared between government agencies and
ministries. Nor is the information as yet shared in the public space as a service to employers and jobseekers. Yet, these data and databases could form the foundations of a nascent national labour market information environment.

Across several of the IGAD countries we also observed some of the following database elements to be in existence, and these elements might typically be included in, or established in the future, as part of a national labour market information system – in addition to labour force surveys and other household or enterprise surveys:

- register of graduates of national TVET colleges (owned by: colleges and relevant ministries);
- public employment services database that contains employer job vacancies and jobseekers' information (owned by: Ministry of Labour);
- unemployment insurance registration and fund (owned by: Ministry of Labour);
- register of jobseekers and graduates, register of career and advisory services facilities (owned by: TVET agency; Education Ministry);
- register of TVET qualifications (or selected high-demand qualifications) (owned by: ministries of Education or Labour; TVET agency; NQF agency); and
- register of validated accreditations of qualifications and partial qualifications (including RPL), through assessment and competency centres (owned by: Ministry of Labour, TVET agency; or NQF agency).

Public facilities such as information offices/bureau would be needed to disseminate the information available. These could be linked to one of the above institutions. Institutions should also be empowered to collect qualitative data on specific skills needs in priority sectors or occupations, adding skills identification and anticipation concerns to the menu of options for labour market information systems (e.g., applying the ILO's Skills for Trade and Economic Diversification approach).

Information is a vital resource in migration governance. Many different organizations and role players, including governments, multilateral development agencies, and local NGOs possess data on migrants and refugees as this relates to their core businesses. Different kinds of data are generated through monitoring and evaluation, tracer studies, demographic surveys, and administrative processes in government. The conditions in which information about refugees and migrants is created, updated, administered, stored, quality assured, secured, shared, and applied are often less than ideal.

Government agencies are located at the forefront in dealing with the multifarious needs of refugees and migrants: from regulating their physical access into a country to addressing their entire well-being. Meeting these needs requires contributions from different government services (e.g., Health) and adherence to due process under regulations administered by other government departments (e.g., Immigration). We have observed that information systems in IGAD related to refugees and migrants across government departments need to be better managed. Information tends to proliferate in isolation in different forms in computers and on desks. Clarity is needed on which ministry or authority is globally responsible for refugees and migrants, and also on which ministry or authority is responsible for overall management and coordination of data related to refugees and migrants. Where at all possible, data capture should be based on a unique identifier for every individual.
Recommendation 4.1: It is apparent that labour market information systems are in development in the IGAD countries in association with the institutions with which they are associated. It would seem reasonable to consider the collection of refugee and migrant information in relation to the national initiatives.

Recommendation 4.2: Standardized information systems must be developed within a sufficient institutional base that can provide support, continuity, and quality. A reliable labour market information system can provide information on skills in demand and the supply of skills – for both countries of origin and destination – so that migration becomes a win–win situation for both countries. It would seem that the logical custodians of this responsibility would inevitably be governments. Our contention is that the creation of information systems without an institutional base will be unsustainable. In this regard, data and information sharing across the ministries in a specific country; the involvement of organizations of employers and workers; and the sharing of data and information across IGAD countries is strongly recommended. This is possible if sufficient institutional bases are in place in Member States.

Recommendation 4.3: The general strategic approach would be to include refugee and migrant data into existing systems, such as, for example, the health and schooling systems. This would acknowledge that refugee and migrant labour market data is inevitably related to and incorporated within the national and local labour markets. In this regard it is proposed that a Centre of Excellence should be established to focus on skills for labour migration and economic integration. A function of the centre would be to initiate a labour market research programme. Such a programme could potentially become the basis for systematic evaluation studies – including tracer studies – such as to investigate the impact of the TVET system on employment, wage income, and its relevance to economic and social needs.

Recommendation 4.4 proposes that it is key to strengthen the capacities of national statistical offices and other target institutions in IGAD countries to improve their understanding of international statistics standards and International Conference of Labour Statisticians guidelines concerning statistics on international labour migration.

4.2.5 Use new technology to automate migrant data collection

Following the coming into force of the Vital Events Registration and National Identity Card Proclamation (Amendment Proclamation 1049/2017) in Ethiopia at the end of 2017, the government refugee agency, together with the UNHCR and partners, is working to launch the civil registration (the recording of all vital events including births, deaths, and marriages) of refugees in Addis Ababa. The Government will then continue to roll-out the services in the different refugee camps (UNHCR, 2017c). This initiative provides an important example of how migrant data collection can be done effectively with the aid of new technology.

In the future, the ultimate aim could be a regional skills and labour market information management system based on technological advances and that includes refugees and migrants. However, for this ideal to be reached, much development work would need to be done at the national level on national labour market systems and the skills requirements to operate such systems. An overwhelming challenge for host government systems is to find the resources to capture and document refugees and migrants. Newly available technologies for automating identification of humans, such as biometric methods (including iris recognition),
are being tested in Ethiopia with support from the UNHCR. This innovative approach also involves storing each individual’s information in the cloud, of course with the appropriate data security measures. This means that all data related to an individual can be kept in one place and can be simply and accurately accessed through iris recognition. This can be done from any authorized networked device located anywhere in one or more countries. The work of NOKUT mentioned above, as well as of NGOs working in Germany, provides a wide range of examples that can be explored by IGAD. A biometric system is also used for refugees in Uganda.

**Recommendation 5.1**: Initiate a project to learn more from the technology-driven solutions that are currently being developed internationally, and examine how these could be used for a wide range of migrants within the IGAD context. As refugees are the most vulnerable, it is proposed that such a project should start with a focus on regular labour migrants in specific countries, followed by regular labour migrants outside these specific countries, followed by undocumented and irregular migrants. Recent UNESCO research in this area can provide a useful point of departure (UNESCO, 2018a).

### 4.2.6 Develop tailor-made approaches for skills development and skills recognition for migrant workers and refugees

It is evident from the research that skills development opportunities for citizens in IGAD countries are very limited. To expect that these opportunities would in some way be able to also cater for migrants is unrealistic. The general ability of national education systems, and specifically TVET sectors, to provide relevant training to refugees and migrants is not evident. Over and above this, there are further essential conditions that must be fulfilled so that a refugee/migrant is indeed in a position to enrol in some TVET-related programme.

Systematically developed skills programmes for migrants and refugees is the only viable option, should IGAD want to take this process forward. Again, there are examples of this being done in some European countries, which could be explored. These include the Dutch Foundation for Refugee Students; universities in Greece located close to the ports where refugees arrive that have dropped the usual admission test for refugee students; and an online university for refugees in Germany called Kiron that provides free tuition and awards internationally accredited degrees in cooperation with a number of partner universities (OECD, 2016). At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the importance of differentiating and focusing skills development and skills recognition opportunities for low- and intermediate-skilled migrants.

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) presented alongside the September 2016 New York Declaration, mandates development of a comprehensive refugee response that protects and promotes the rights of refugees according to international law, while at the same time easing the pressure on the host country. The application and development of this framework lead to the December 2018 adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees. The CRRF was launched in November 2017 and is being applied in IGAD. It “promotes out-of-camp support to refugees and supports their integration into host communities to sustain peaceful co-existence” (UNICEF, 2017b, p. 2). The CRRF is an important initiative, especially for its emphasis on out-of-camp support, which will require that greater attention must be given to how refugees can be skilled and prepared to productively and sustainably participate in the host country labour market.
It is also important to note that the trend seems to be to locate refugee accommodation in school/education facilities in local communities rather than in the camps, so that there can be integration and development of social cohesion in shared facilities. Refugee camps differ in their facilities, depending on their purpose (i.e., what populations they serve); how well and long established they are; and the quality of collaboration of government agencies, of donor agency support, and of NGO involvement. The education-related efforts made in the camps and surrounding communities is relevant to this project, as the camp-based initiatives reflect particular views on the immediate needs of those living there and how these needs should be met.

Reports about refugee camps suggest that the central beneficiaries of education work there should be pre-school and school age children who are provided with schooling. Recently, NGOs prominent in this space began advocating that schools should all be built outside of the camps in the local communities to foster social cohesion and to also serve the local communities' children. The form of education and training most often provided in camps to adults is based on informal and non-formal methods and focuses on “empowerment” and “self-reliance” (UNHCR, 2017c). The challenge is that neither government, nor donor agencies, nor NGOs necessarily agree on the meaning and appropriateness of approaches based on self-reliance, livelihoods, and resilience. Further, as we have noted, there are counter arguments that more effort must be placed on formal TVET skilling and on recognition of qualifications.

**Recommendation 6.1:** Consider at least one tailor-made skills training initiative in IGAD as a pilot project in an area that has the best chance of success. We propose that this decision is based on an existing well-functioning skills training initiative already present in one or more IGAD Member States. Two potential examples are identified from the country case studies:

1. Worker’s PAS (PAS = Practically Acquired Skills), which is a partial qualification after undertaking modular assessment in a given occupation, most especially for apprenticed individuals in the informal sector in Uganda; and
2. Walk-in trade centres in Kenyan counties to assess individuals for a particular modularized skill/trade.

We caution that the work should not be limited to these two examples, as they are provided as examples only.

**Recommendation 6.2:** Explore the option of specific multilateral recognition arrangements for specific relevant sectors or occupations most affected by migration across IGAD. In this regard it would be important to identify some quick wins, as well as strategic levers. Collaboration with other regions across the world – notably Europe and also CARICOM – could fast-track such a process by leveraging on existing solutions that could be customized for the IGAD context.

**Recommendation 6.3:** TVET skilling should be mainstreamed as far as possible for groups that have experienced conflict. Skills training offered to demobilized combatants and equally to civilians traumatized by the conflict and insecurity over long periods, must include more than TVET skills: such as modules that transfer social and psychological knowledge and skills to negotiate reintegration with the world of work or to secure alternative livelihoods.
4.2.7 Extend the benefits of more open policies on access and rights

Policy development with respect to migration needs to be informed by a commitment on the part of all parties to ensuring that the rights to access key opportunities, resources, and statuses are progressively extended through reference to fundamental principles and rights at work and social protections in the globalized context. These include:

- rights to access (e.g., citizenship);
- rights to work (e.g., work permits);
- rights at work;
- protection of fundamental principles;
- rights to study (e.g., student visas);
- naturalization of refugees; and
- freedom of movement (e.g., access to the cities).

A lack of coordination between these functions seems to be experienced by migrants. In this regard, Uganda is a good example where refugees are not compelled to be interned in refugee camps and migrants are claimed to be able to integrate freely and also have rights to buy land. Uganda also intends to waive work permits for refugees. Yet there is little evidence thus far as to the outcomes of this more liberal approach.

Recommendation 7.1: A case study focusing on the process in Uganda will be of benefit to other IGAD countries. Similarly, the ILO lessons learned from Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey could also be of value (ILO, 2018d). The study should include a focus on government communication concerning matters related to foreign workers. In many IGAD countries, the regulation and administration of migrant worker affairs has been provocative and poorly communicated. Public exchange between various interested parties about the status of foreign workers provides cause for concern, as this contributes to the instability and insecurity of foreign workers in the region.

4.2.8 Prioritize the development of TVET systems in Member States

While this is another obvious finding, it must be stated clearly. The TVET systems in Member States tend to be underdeveloped in relation to social needs and economic skills demands. TVET system components at different sector levels tend to be built in isolation, with limited account taken for the need to embed occupational paths through qualifications systems. In addition, the supply of TVET has only addressed an insignificant percentage of all age groups, but gets worse with higher levels of education, which makes it necessary to establish, facilitate, and equip more and more TVET institutions (EduKans Foundation, 2012).

A robust migration governance architecture for IGAD is very dependent on the TVET capacity in Member States, and vice versa. While bolt-on interventions in the region may have some short-term gains, they will ultimately not succeed. Government systems – specifically the skills development system represented by TVET centres, schools, and colleges – is a critical component needed to improve labour market functioning. Support from donors, as was
widely evident in the scoping study, is important but must be integrated into government processes and strategies.

**Recommendation 8.1:** IGAD Member States must prioritize systematic, long-term, and well planned TVET infrastructure and capacity development. The current systems, which are mostly institutionally underdeveloped in terms of physical provision on the ground, require careful planning and redesign due to the fact that conflict conditions continually degrade TVET institutions’ capabilities to provide service, maintain facilities, and ensure the quality and continuity of programmes.

**Recommendation 8.2:** Investment growth should be focused not merely on growth for its own sake, but on growth in labour absorbing capacity of the economy. Since labour is a key input into every business, even if financing is available for business startups in IGAD countries, labour availability can become a binding constraint. It is recommended that countries in a low skills equilibrium be encouraged to move forward with investment and policy designed to encourage enterprises in viable sectors to demand a broader range of skills from the labour market. This context also requires industry analysis of value chains to identify and support employers that as value chain partners are committed to enhance products or services in those value chains. Investment in sectors that are appropriate to the needs of the economies of IGAD countries and that are labour absorbing – such as low technology manufacturing and agricultural commodity processing – can make a meaningful difference.

### 4.2.9 Listen to migrants

While we recognize the importance of consultation with employers on skills-related issues, as well as with worker organizations, it is not evident that any substantial effort is being made to engage migrants directly. While such limitations to direct interaction persist, any intervention mechanisms developed will be incomplete. Clearly this is a political issue. How to address migrants is mostly done on an ad hoc basis by governments because they cannot afford – or have no practical means within the law – to formally engage with migrants in any way. Marginalized groups of citizens could also be deeply antagonized by any sign of government engagement with migrants, particularly informal, irregular, and undocumented migrants. This is why huge numbers of migrants are marginalized from decision-making processes involving the State. We strongly encourage more open and transparent processes to avoid this happening.

**Recommendation 9.1:** Conduct focused research using participatory methods, and preferably conducted by a neutral agency, to better understand the needs of migrants and how they can be supported. The complexities associated with different languages should be considered, including the ability of interpreters to gather reliable information.

### 4.2.10 Take a broad view of the role of IGAD

Refugee and migration phenomena are multilateral; therefore, it makes sense for affected countries that share common borders and, therefore, common economic interests to work collaboratively. This is the fundamental premise of IGAD. Admittedly, IGAD can be put forward
as the preeminent unit for dealing with migration and refugee events, because these events traverse the entire region. There are also other complementary dimensions for collaboration that countries might find functionally compelling, and that could pay dividends in the efforts to counter the negative impacts of migration and to encourage the positive outcomes of migration.

The IGAD Secretariat, in collaboration with development partners and governments, is in a strong position to support collaborative processes to enhance interaction and collaboration among key partners within and between countries. It is evident from the research conducted that coordination between governments and donor-funded NGO and FBO TVET service provision needs to be improved in virtually all the countries included in the study. A key focus in this regard should be improving interaction between government or NGOs/FBOs with the private sector. The convening of TVET ministerial groups for a specified period to clarify government positions, mandates, roles, and responsibilities is an option that could be considered by Member States. The importance of coordinating the regulatory, monitoring, and enforcement environment regarding refugee, migrant, and IDP integration should be integral to such a process. IGAD could provide a blueprint for the collaborative process, and also provide additional capacity where needed.

Recommendation 10.1: Strengthen the multilateral approach and support the coordination role of IGAD by making use of and strengthening the existing migration governance architecture of IGAD, such as the IGAD Regional Consultative Process and the Regional Migration Coordination Committee. In addition, look beyond IGAD to take further efforts to enhance coordination with similar structures of other regional economic communities.

Recommendation 10.2: IGAD needs to closely examine existing protocols and programmes of other regional economic communities that its Member States are party to. This complexity needs to be carefully examined and managed.

Recommendation 10.3: Enhance bilateral initiatives and programmes among IGAD Member States, including collaboration arrangements among Member States themselves within the broader scope of regional integration and development.

4.3 Concluding comments

Given the centrality of good data systems, the ILO is presently supporting AU Member States – including members of IGAD – to develop regional and country roadmaps for the implementation of a Labour Market Information System Harmonization and Coordination Framework. This will be a useful instrument in taking full account of the forms of migration, including:

- the many semi-skilled workers who are mobile within the IGAD region and further afield;
- returnees from countries within IGAD and the Middle East;
- those repatriated from the EU and from the diaspora; and
- vulnerable pastoralists who have lost access to their traditional lands through climate change.
Despite the advances in constructing overarching frameworks, setting priorities for action, and making interventions, we have argued that a failure in Member States’ tactics toward migration is that they are not “mainstreaming labour migration in development planning” (Global Migration Group, 2010). While a full mapping exercise that follows the route of a migrant worker, for example, from outside the IGAD region is beyond the scope of this assessment, taking such a perspective highlights the many layers that a migrant must traverse to reach the point where they interact with the TVET system, either perhaps as a student or as an RPL applicant. What this implies is that there are numerous potential barriers to labour migration/migrants’ access to free flow of labour in Member States. Corresponding to the experience of a migrant, governments face the challenge of developing a coherent set of responses that involve coordinating different levels and internal functions of government while simultaneously engaging meaningfully with neighbouring States to support overarching enabling conditions for skills development and labour market access for migrants. This would involve strengthening the discussion about how to improve policy coherence among labour migration, education/training, and employment. The ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (2006) forms the foundation of such attempts.

The value chain of free movement transactions leading to labour market access must have full integrity; otherwise it can fail to achieve its purpose or work at less than optimal efficiency. Alternatively, even if opportunities were created for migrants to gain RPL, migrants might find that employers would not accept their paper credentials, either because employers lack of awareness of the validity of those credentials or because they prefer to employ informal migrant labour at an extortionate lower rate due to lack of enforcement by the authorities to discourage this practice. (Singh, Idris, and Chehab, 2018). Skills development and skills recognition have the potential to support and extend the impact of a regional system of regulated labour mobility within and between Member States of IGAD, but only when the interrelationships between the concepts are understood and then developed and implemented in a coordinated and realistic manner.
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