Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia

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FOREWORD

Migrant workers are an essential and growing component of most contemporary economies. For destination economies, workers from abroad relieve what would otherwise be chronic labor shortages. For origin economies, emigrating workers contribute considerably to their homelands through the repatriation of remittances and the absorption of occupational skills through overseas experience and, for some, training. As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, well-governed migration is a prerequisite for maximizing the efficient allocation of labor resources.

Against this backdrop, Asia plays a central role. By sheer dint of being so populous, Asia has long accounted for a tremendous proportion of global migration although much of it has been commonly intraregional and usually conducted between developing states. In recent years, this situation has changed. Asians are now the largest diaspora group of those living outside of their continent of birth, and they account for 30% of all global migration. Asia is also enticing migrants from other parts of the world. Total immigration, coming both from outside Asia and from other Asian countries, averages about 1.6 million people every year.

Because Asian labor migration is both preponderant and ascendant, policy dialogues to better comprehend the implications of this trend are more critical than ever before. Since 2011 an annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia has been organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and, since 2013, the International Labour Organization.

The fourth edition of the event, held in January 2014 and titled "Building Human Capital across Borders," focused on the critical role of human capital both in bolstering migrants' employment opportunities in foreign countries and in helping them to reintegrate, with new skills and work experiences, after returning. Experts from the three host organizations and other institutions, as well as officials directly involved in crafting labor migration policy in their respective countries, participated in the roundtable. They shared their views and experiences in a dialogue process that generated lessons to make future policy more effective. Japan in particular, marking its 50th anniversary of membership in the OECD, presented its efforts to attract more skilled foreigners. This report, an outcome of the roundtable, captures key trends in migration in Asia and highlights the challenges of building, and benefiting from, human capital through the migration process.

Recent history demonstrates that human capital development is, and will continue to be, an integral part of the migration process. It is our hope that this report will offer guidance on how countries of origin and destination can best support migrant workers in their quest for quality employment and decent work.

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CHAPTER 1

TRENDS IN LABOR MIGRATION IN ASIA

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1.1 Introduction

The world's stock of international migrants, defined as persons residing outside their country of birth, was estimated at 232 million in 2013 (UN 2013). South–south migration between developing countries was slightly larger than south–north migration, from developing to developed countries (World Bank 2014). Regarding south–south migration, Asia has been a significant origin as well as destination region. In 2013, Asians represented the world's largest diaspora, accounting for 19 million foreign-born persons in Europe, 16 million in North America, and 3 million in Oceania. Asia also hosts 30% of all international migrants (71 million). Since 2000, Asian countries have received 20 million migrants, or 1.6 million per year—more than any other region (UN 2013).

Labor migration from and within Asia is a key component of international migration flows, underlined over several years during the annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Most of Asia's labor migration occurs within the region or in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and mainly comprises lesser-skilled labor. However, Asian migrants remain an essential element of labor markets in Europe, North America, and the Pacific island countries, and contribute significantly to the most-skilled categories thereof.

This chapter summarizes the main trends in migration from and within Asia. The first section provides a discussion of labor migration flows to Asian and Middle East countries. This is followed by a description of flows from Asia to OECD countries. International students—for which Asia is the fastest-growing region of origin—are then discussed, followed by the key characteristics of Asian migrants to OECD countries in terms of skill level and labor market outcomes. Finally, an overview of trends in remittances is provided.

1.2 Labor Migration Flows from Asian to Non-OECD Countries

Asian labor migration consists mainly of movements within the region or to the Middle East. Most of these movements concern semi-skilled or low-skilled workers, although, as economies in the region develop, the demand for higher-skilled labor has increased.

Labor migration outflows from Asian countries seem to have stabilized in 2013 after two years of substantial increase. The Philippines, which has provided the largest number of immigrants to non-OECD countries for five years, recorded a small decrease to just under 1.4 million in 2013 (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2006–2013



Source: National authorities' statistics on deployment or placement of workers. In some cases, this also includes small flows of deployment to OECD countries.

However, emigrant levels are still twice as high as in the mid-2000s and the Philippines remains the dominant contributor to overall Asian flows by far. A similar trend is observed in Pakistan, where the departure of 620,000 workers in 2013 represents a 2% drop compared to 2012, but also a much higher number than any registered until 2011. By contrast, the number of Indonesian workers immigrating to non-OECD countries increased by 2% in 2013 after declining from 2007. With 470,000 labor migrants, Indonesia is now ahead of Bangladesh where the outflow of 400,000 workers in 2013 represented a decrease of almost one third compared to a year earlier.

The Middle East—primarily the GCC countries—is the main destination for Asian workers. However, intra-Asia labor migration remains high due to persisting wage and demographic differences among the countries.

The sizable decline in the outflow of migrants from Bangladesh can be attributed to the much lower number of nationals taking up work in the Gulf countries, especially in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE suspended visa issuance to Bangladeshi nationals in 2012 over concerns regarding fraudulent identity documents. Indeed, in 2013, only 240,000 workers from Bangladesh arrived in the Middle East, half the 2012 figure (Figure 1.2). On the other hand, Bangladeshi labor migration to Asian countries increased by more than 8% from 2012 to 2013. The main destination countries are Oman (134,000), Singapore (60,000), and Qatar (58,000) (Annex Table 4).

The Gulf region is also a major and increasingly important destination for labor migrants from the Philippines. In 2013, 840,000 workers were deployed to the region, an increase of 30,000 from 2012. The flow was more concentrated than in preceding years, primarily directed to Saudi Arabia (380,000) and the UAE (260,000). Singapore and Hong Kong, China are the third and fourth destinations for Filipino workers.

Figure 1.2 Flows of Workers to Gulf Countries, 2013



GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, UAE = United Arab Emirates.
Note: India and Sri Lanka: 2012 and 2011 instead of 2013 and 2012.
Source: National authorities of origin countries.

These two economies received 300,000 Filipinos in 2013, the same as for the previous year. A further 100,000 workers went to other non-OECD Asian economies, particularly Malaysia and Taipei,China. Both economies have been the main destinations for Indonesian workers for the past two years, with a notable rebound of flows to Malaysia from around 120,000 at the end of the 2000s to 150,000 in 2013, as well as increased flow to Taipei,China. But there has also been a sharp drop in the number of Indonesians moving to Saudi Arabia, from 275,000 to 45,000 from 2009 to 2013. Overall, GCC countries received less than a quarter of Indonesian labor migrants in 2013, compared with more than half in 2010. On the other hand, Pakistani labor migration to non-OECD countries is almost entirely directed to GCC countries. While the total placement was relatively stable in 2013, 90,000 fewer workers went to Saudi Arabia, and 90,000 more workers went to the UAE, perhaps in response to the suspension of recruitment from Bangladesh by the UAE.

Compared with flows to Gulf countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region received smaller but still significant migrant flows, led by movements from the Philippines to Singapore and from Indonesia to Malaysia (Figure 1.3). Thailand had its own labor migrants go abroad, primarily to Singapore, and also received others, largely from Myanmar, Cambodia, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. For these three countries, the spontaneous and often irregular nature of migration means that flow data are incomplete.

Figure 1.3 Flows of Workers to ASEAN Countries by Origin and Destination, 2012–2013



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Source: National authorities of origin countries.

1.3 Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries

Although migration from Asia to OECD countries is not of the same order of magnitude as migration to the regions discussed above, Asian workers have nevertheless constituted a major part of the overall migration to OECD countries since the mid-2000s (Figure 1.4). The number of Asian nationals migrating to OECD countries reached a historic peak in 2011, and, despite a 3% decrease represented almost 1.6 million migrants in 2012. About 30% of those who migrated to an OECD country in 2012 were from Asia.

The main origin country of migration to the OECD area is the People's Republic of China (PRC), accounting for almost one in ten immigrants (Table 1.1). The next greatest Asian countries of origin are India, which ranks fourth globally for number of emigrants going to OECD countries, and the Philippines. Outside of Asia, Romania and Poland have become key countries of origin for OECD migration following their accession to the European Union (EU), ranking second and third, respectively. Mexico, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Bulgaria are the remaining top 10 origin countries.

Figure 1.4 Migration Flows from Asia to the OECD, 2000–2012



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Table 1.1 Top 15 Asian Countries of Origin for Migration to the OECD, 2012

	No. of Migrants ('000), 2012	No. of Migrants ('000) Compared to 2011	% of Inflows to OECD	Rank	Change in Rank Compared to 2011
PRC	507	–25	9.6	1	0
India	228	–15	4.3	4	0
Philippines	159	–1	3.0	6	0
Viet Nam	94	–1	1.8	14	0
Pakistan	86	–20	1.6	16	–5
Republic of Korea	70	–1	1.3	19	–3
Thailand	59	5	1.1	27	–2
Bangladesh	42	–8	0.8	35	–6
Japan	36	2	0.7	39	1
Sri Lanka	34	–2	0.6	43	–4
Nepal	33	3	0.6	45	1
Afghanistan	32	3	0.6	47	1
Indonesia	30	2	0.6	49	0
Myanmar	27	4	0.5	50	4
Malaysia	20	3	0.4	64	7
Total Asia	**1,575**	**–46**	**29.7**		

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Table 1.2 Top 15 OECD Countries for Asian Migration, 2012

	No. of Migrants ('000)	No. of Migrants ('000) Compared to 2011	% of Inflows from Asia to the OECD
United States	369	–19	23.4
Republic of Korea	245	–9	15.5
Japan	225	25	14.3
United Kingdom	129	–67	8.2
Canada	129	9	8.2
Australia	116	11	7.3
Germany	92	5	5.9
Italy	73	–1	4.6
Spain	40	–8	2.5
France	23	2	1.5
New Zealand	19	0	1.2
Sweden	17	1	1.1
The Netherlands	16	–1	1.0
Poland	13	2	0.8
Austria	11	2	0.7

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: OECD International Migration Database.

The drop in Asian immigration in 2012, in the context of a stable overall flow to OECD countries, may be explained by a decrease in Asian movements to a small number of specific OECD countries (Table 1.2). The US, by far the main OECD destination, including from Asia, saw an overall decline of 4% (Table 1.2). Lesser flows of Asian citizens, especially from the PRC to the Republic of Korea—the second largest destination country—have also played a role. The UK, a longstanding destination for South Asians, recorded a sharp drop in immigration in 2012. Finally, Asian migrants constitute a small share of migration to Germany, which had the largest increase in immigration among OECD countries in 2012.

In 2012, the UK witnessed the largest drop in Asian migration registered by an OECD country. Only 129,000 Asians emigrated there in 2012, down 30% from a year earlier. South Asian countries accounted for 90% of this drop, with India and Pakistan each sending 25,000 fewer citizens than the previous year. Bangladesh sent 7,000 fewer migrants and Nepal 3,000. The US also received fewer Asians than in 2011 (19,000). This decrease was mainly due to lower numbers from Viet Nam (6,000 fewer) and the PRC (5,000). Nonetheless, the US remains the main destination with 369,000 entries in 2012.[1] These figures are for permanent entries only. The US delivered 106,100 H-1B visas to Asians in 2012 (78% of the total) and 126,200 in 2013 (82% of the total). Most recipients of this visa class were from India, with 99,700 in 2013, up nearly 20,000 from the previous year.

[1] Figures refer to the US fiscal year: 2012 is October 2011–September 2012, and 2013 is October 2012–September 2013.

Canada also receives many Asian migrants and reached a new record of 129,000 in 2012, accounting for more than half of the total migration to the country. In addition to the three main emigration countries (PRC, India, and the Philippines), Pakistan now ranks above the US and France as an origin country for migration to Canada. Australia, another traditional destination country for Asian workers and one with large skilled labor migration programs, also saw a rise in immigration from Asia, by 11,000 to 116,000 persons. However, this increase was smaller than the overall increase in immigration to Australia (15%). Immigration to Japan and the Republic of Korea moved in the opposite direction in 2012, in particular with respect to immigration from Asia. The Republic of Korea is still the second main OECD destination for Asian migrants (15% of total flows), but Japan now only accounts for slightly less at 14%. However, migration from the PRC and Viet Nam to Japan increased, while it decreased to the Republic of Korea. A higher number of migrants from Thailand and Nepal to the Republic of Korea were not enough to compensate for lower inflows from the PRC. Asian migration to New Zealand and Europe was remarkably stable between 2011 and 2012. Even the 5% increase of flows to Germany was small, given that total immigration to that country had leaped by 15%. The Republic of Korea is one of the few OECD countries that has signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Asian countries for admission of low skilled workers. Such arrangements with 15 countries accounted for 47,000 new admissions of temporary labor migrants in 2012 and 54,000 in 2013.

In terms of countries of origin, large countries sent fewer nationals to the OECD area in 2012 than a year earlier. This was the case for the PRC (5% decrease), India (6%), Pakistan (20%), and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines (1%). Lower flows in the UK and the US accounted for the entire decline. The flow of migrants from the PRC to OECD countries has been fluctuating since 2006 at an average of 507,000 persons and estimates are similar for 2013. For the second consecutive year, fewer Indians immigrated to OECD countries, and migration from Pakistan to the OECD area fell sharply in 2012 after two years above the 100,000 level. For both countries, these trends follow closely their flows to the UK, although one could also say that, accounting for a very large proportion of visas, migrants from India and Pakistan have driven the recent fluctuations in migration flows. The Philippines is now sending more migrants to Australia, and fewer to Canada and Europe. Diversification of countries of origin continues. OECD countries received record numbers of migrants from less populous Asian countries such as Thailand (59,000), Nepal (33,000), Afghanistan (32,000), Myanmar (27,000), and Cambodia (15,000) in 2012. OECD countries also recorded around 20% more immigrants coming from Malaysia and Uzbekistan in 2012 than a year earlier.

1.4 Characteristics of Asian Immigrants in OECD Countries

The stock of migrants from Asia living in OECD countries from 2010 to 2011 (when most censuses were conducted) stood at 25 million. Women comprised 52.4% of migrants. About 18% were recent immigrants, having arrived in the previous five years (Table 1.3).

What distinguishes Asian immigrants from others is their relatively high education level. Almost 45% of Asian immigrants obtained a tertiary education (14% above the global average for immigrants), and only 24% are poorly educated[2] compared to the 34% global average. In part, this reflects the proportion

[2] Poorly educated corresponds to ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) levels 0, 1, and 2, or lower secondary education or less.

Table 1.3 General Characteristics of Immigrants in the OECD by Region of Origin, 2010–2011

	Emigrant Population (15+, '000)	Women (%)	Poorly Educated (%)	Highly Educated (%)	Recent (<5 years, %)
Africa	10,660	47.8	40.5	29.2	17.8
Asia	25,040	52.4	24.0	44.7	18.0
Europe	38,100	52.9	32.7	28.9	15.5
North America	2,790	52.7	19.6	47.6	19.6
Oceania	1,390	50.8	22.4	35.5	19.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	27,360	50.4	43.9	18.1	11.3
Total World	**105,550**	**51.6**	**33.9**	**30.4**	**15.1**

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: Mexico is included with Latin America and not with North America.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010–2011.

of Asian migrants coming to OECD countries through selective labor and economic migration channels. Immigrants from Taipei,China have the highest percentage of highly educated persons among Asian migrants, at 71% (Annex Table A2.2), followed by India at 63%. Brunei Darussalam, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines also have a rate of more than 50% highly educated among their emigrants to OECD countries. For the Philippines, this amounts to more than 1.5 million highly educated people. Conversely, only 19% of immigrants from Cambodia and 28% from Viet Nam are highly educated; in terms of emigration rates, the number of highly educated migrants is close to 15% of the highly educated population remaining in the home country.

The stock of highly educated migrants from Asia in OECD countries increased by 80% to 11 million between 2000–2001 and 2010–2011.

The leading position of Asia as a region of origin for educated migrants is even more pronounced for recent immigrants. In 2010–2011, of the 5 million tertiary educated persons who had migrated to the OECD area in the five preceding years (Figure 1.5), 2 million were from Asia.

1.5 Labor Market Situation of Asian Immigrants in Europe, the United States, and Australia

Labor markets in Europe, the US, and Australia have been diversely affected since the beginning of the financial crisis. The labor market situation has deteriorated in the EU, where the unemployment rate (according to OECD harmonized rates) rose from 7% to almost 11% in 2008–2011. In the US, 2009 marked the worst point of the recession and unemployment has since dropped by more than 2% to 7.4%, while in Australia, where the crisis had little impact, unemployment was at 5.7% in 2013.

Figure 1.5 Highly Educated Recent Immigrants to the OECD by Region of Birth, 2010–2011



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010–2011.

Foreign-born workers, in particular Asian immigrants, have not necessarily followed the general pattern in terms of labor market outcomes between 2009 and 2013 (Table 1.4). In Australia, rates of employment and unemployment moved in opposite directions for foreign-born and Australian-born workers. The situation for the foreign-born, including those from Asia, has improved while that for their native-born counterparts has worsened slightly, although remaining somewhat more favorable. In 2009–2013, the employment rate of Asian immigrants increased by 1.6% to 66.7% and unemployment fell 2% to 6.2%. In the US, both foreign-born and native-born benefited from the economic recovery, with unemployment rates falling by 2.8% and 1.7%. The unemployment rate for Asians also fell, to as low as 5% in 2013. However, only the native-born saw an employment rate increase.

In the UK, the labor market outcomes for Asian immigrants improved slightly in 2009–2013, but remain poor compared to the native-born. Across the whole of the EU, however, Asian immigrants perform better in the labor market than the native-born. Their employment rate increased by 3.7% and their rate of unemployment declined by 2.8%—during the same period, these indicators for immigrants from other regions and for the native-born moved in the opposite direction. In 2013, Asian immigrants in the EU had a higher employment rate and a lower unemployment rate than any other group. Nonetheless, almost 10% of Asian immigrants are unemployed.

Overall, the Asian immigrant labor market situation is, in fact, remarkably favorable in the US and in Europe compared not only to that of other immigrants but also to the native-born.

Table 1.4 Labor Market Indicators for Native and Foreign-Born in Selected Countries, Age 15–64, 2009–2013 (%)

		Employment Rate			Unemployment Rate			Participation Rate		
	Region of Birth	2009	2013	Variation	2009	2013	Variation	2009	2013	Variation
Australia	Native-born	73.9	73.5	–0.4	5.4	5.6	0.2	78.1	77.8	–0.3
	Foreign-born	68.3	69.9	1.6	6.7	5.9	–0.8	73.2	74.3	1.1
	Asian-born	**65.1**	**66.7**	**1.6**	**8.2**	**6.2**	**–2.0**	**70.9**	**71.2**	**0.3**
United States	Native-born	67.7	68.4	0.7	9.7	7.0	–2.8	75.0	73.5	–1.5
	Foreign-born	66.1	65.7	–0.4	9.4	7.7	–1.7	73.0	71.2	–1.8
	Asian-born	**70.0**	**69.5**	**–0.5**	**6.8**	**5.0**	**–1.8**	**75.1**	**73.1**	**–2.0**
EU-28	Native-born	64.8	64.5	–0.3	8.4	10.3	1.9	70.7	71.9	1.2
	Foreign-born	62.0	61.3	–0.7	14.3	15.9	1.6	72.3	72.9	0.6
	Asian-born	**62.4**	**66.1**	**3.7**	**12.1**	**9.2**	**–2.8**	**71.0**	**72.8**	**1.9**
United Kingdom	Native-born	70.5	71.3	0.8	7.5	7.5	0.0	76.2	77.1	0.8
	Foreign-born	66.1	67.9	1.9	8.8	8.6	–0.2	72.4	74.3	1.9
	Asian-born	**59.9**	**61.6**	**1.7**	**9.3**	**8.7**	**–0.5**	**66.0**	**67.5**	**1.5**

EU = European Union.

Sources: EU and Australia: labor force surveys; United States: Current Population Survey.

1.6 International Mobility of Students to and from Asia

Movements of international students remain a focus of policy attention, and not only in OECD countries.[3] In addition to providing a source of export earnings, international students represent a growing source of skilled labor migration. Reflecting increasing global tertiary enrollment, international mobility of students has increased steadily since 2000 (Figure 1.6). Globally, the number of students enrolled outside their country of citizenship has more than doubled since 2000, reaching 4.5 million in 2012. Meanwhile, the share of those enrolled in Asia went up from 16% to 18%, and Asia is the fastest-growing region of destination for foreign students.

Europe is the main destination region, hosting almost half of all foreign students, and has recorded a significant increase in recent years. However, Asia has seen the highest growth rate over the last five years (50%) (Figure 1.7). The strong increase observed in Oceania, Latin America, and the Caribbean during the 2000s has reversed, and there are fewer foreign students in these regions in 2012 compared to two years earlier.

At the country level, the market for international tertiary students is still very concentrated, although the global market share of the top five destination countries (the US, UK, Germany, France, and Australia) has fallen from 54% to 47% in the period from 2000 to 2012.

[3] In this section, Asia includes the Middle East.

Figure 1.6 **Number of Foreign Students Enrolled in the World and in Asia**



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Education database.

Figure 1.7 **Foreign Students by Region of Destination, 2007–2012** (Index: 2007 = 100)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: Figures are based on the number of foreign students enrolled in countries reporting data to the OECD and to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. The coverage of these reporting countries has evolved over time; therefore, missing data have been imputed wherever necessary to ensure the comparability of the time series over time.

Source: OECD Education database.

Despite a slight increase in 2012, the United States market share dropped 6% between 2000 and 2012. The shares of Australia and Japan, two countries that traditionally receive a large number of Asian students, fell between 2011 and 2012. This is due in part to competition from Asia, notably from the PRC, Malaysia, and Singapore, all of which have seen sharp increases in international student enrollment. The number of Asian universities in the top global rankings has increased, therefore better able to attract students. For Australia, the tightening of conditions for student visas to limit their use as an immigration channel has also played a role.

Asia is the main source of international students in OECD countries. In 2012, more than 1.5 million students from Asia enrolled at OECD institutions, representing 54% of all international tertiary enrollment (Figure 1.8). This represents twice as many students as those from Europe who study abroad, and six times more than those from Africa. The distribution of international students by region of origin has been remarkably stable since 2010.

Figure 1.8 Distribution of International Students in the OECD by Region of Origin, 2012



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: OECD Education database.

The PRC remains the largest single origin country of international students, and its share of the global international student population has risen from 18.2% to 21.6% between 2008 and 2012. India, the second country of origin, saw its share fall from 7.3% to 5.8%. Other Asian countries saw decreases as well, including the Republic of Korea, which slipped from third to fourth place, with 4.2% of the total. The global share of students from Viet Nam increased from 1.3% to 1.7%.

In Japan and the Republic of Korea, almost all international students come from Asia. However, many non-Asian OECD countries also host a very large proportion of Asian students. In English-speaking countries, they account for more than half of the total, ranging from 53% in the UK to 86% in Australia (Figure 1.9). The majority of foreign university students in Turkey, Greece, and Sweden are also from Asia.

Figure 1.9 **Students from Asia among International Students by Country of Destination** (%)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD Education database.

Students from Asia are concentrated in a few countries, with almost three-quarters of them enrolled in only four countries (Figure 1.9). Their preferred OECD destination, by far, is the US (36% of the total), followed by the UK (15%), Australia (14%), and Japan (9%).

1.7 Remittance Flows to Asia

Asian migration can be classified into two main categories. The first is that of a diaspora of permanent settlers, mostly in OECD countries, who are characterized by high levels of education and skills. The second category is that of migrant workers, most of whom migrate within Asia, and generally have low levels of education. Despite these differences, most migrants remit money to their families (Hugo 2013).

Remittances sent by Asian migrants to their origin countries rose 3.8% to $242 billion in 2013, accounting for nearly 60% of all remittance flows to developing countries (World Bank annual remittance data). Remittance flows to Asia have increased annually since 2000, when they stood at $40 billion.[4] In the two years prior to the global recession of 2009, growth rates exceeded 25% annually. A dip in 2009 was short-lived, with remittances renewing their upward trend soon afterward.

[4] World Bank data on remittance inflows, April 2014 (World Bank staff calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks).

In 2013, South Asia received $111 billion, accounting for nearly half of all remittance inflows to Asia. This is hardly surprising, given that South Asians were the largest group of international migrants living outside of their home region. Of the 36 million international migrants from South Asia, 13.5 million resided in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East (UN 2013). In Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, annual remittances exceed the national foreign exchange reserves. All these countries (most notably Pakistan) have instituted incentives for attracting remittances (World Bank 2013). Pakistan, for instance, launched the Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) in 2009,[5] and offered incentives to domestic banks to increase the official flow of remittances (Amjad 2013). The initiative included improving bank settlement platforms and creating a consumer contact hotline for information and complaints.

Remittances to South Asia have grown since 2005, reaching a peak of more than 32% growth in 2008, and slackening thereafter but never turning negative, even during the years of global recession. India has always been the leading recipient in the region, with 63% of the total for South Asia. East Asia, including the OECD countries of Japan and the Republic of Korea, is also a major player, receiving around 30% of all flows to Asia ($72 billion). The PRC alone accounts for 83% of flows to East Asia.

Southeast Asia receives one-fifth of remittance flows in Asia ($51 billion). Emerging economies in the region such as Malaysia and Thailand are attracting a growing share of workers from other parts of Asia. Central Asian countries receive the smallest amount of remittances in absolute terms, but their share of the total flows to Asia has been rising constantly from 1% to 5% between 2000 and 2013.

The three largest recipient countries of officially recorded remittances in the world are in Asia (Figure 1.10). India and the PRC have been the leading recipients since 2006 and together receive more remittances than the next six countries combined. With remittances amounting to nearly $25 billion in 2012, the Philippines took over the third position from Mexico. India has been the largest recipient in the world since 2008, and received an estimated $70 billion in remittances in 2013. This is larger than its earnings from information technology (IT) exports (World Bank 2013). The increase in remittances has been partly fueled by a sharp depreciation in the rupee in 2013 and by incentives by the country's central bank to attract deposits by non-resident Indians.[6] The PRC is not far behind India at $60 billion, even though it started with relatively lower levels of remittances in 2000 ($4.8 billion compared to India's $12.9 billion). Remittances to the PRC have been growing at a much faster rate than those to India. This growth rate has been above 30% for most years from the late 1990s to the early 2000s.

The three countries in the world in which remittances represented the largest share of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 are in Asia (Figure 1.10). These are Tajikistan at 52%, Kyrgyz Republic at 31%, and Nepal at 25%. Apart from these three, other Asian countries that rely substantially on remittances are Bangladesh (12%), Georgia (11%), the Philippines (10%), Sri Lanka (10%), Viet Nam (7%), and Pakistan (6%).

OECD countries remain a dominant source of remittances for the world. Total remittances received by all countries in 2012 were close to $529 billion (World Bank 2013). The largest share came from migrants in

[5] Launched jointly by the Ministry of Finance, State Bank of Pakistan, and the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis.

[6] The Reserve Bank of India simplified rules on portfolio investment for overseas Indians and removed the ceiling rate on some categories of non-resident external rupee accounts, the so-called non-resident external (NRE) deposits commonly used for remittances (Chilkoti 2013).

Figure 1.10 Top 10 Asian Recipients of Remittances by Amount and Share of Gross Domestic Product



e = estimate, GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks.

OECD countries (63%),[7] and a smaller but significant share came from Asia's developing countries (12%). However, Asia becomes a much more important source of remittances for flows to Asian countries. For instance, in 2012, a quarter of the $226.8 billion received by Asian developing countries came from within Asia, and 45% from OECD countries. In fact, some Asian countries receive most of their remittances from Asia: Malaysia (80%), Indonesia (59%), and Bangladesh (50%). In 2012, Hong Kong, China was the largest sender economy (in absolute terms) in Asia, remitting $17 billion to Asian developing countries.

Overall, the US is by far the main sender to the region in absolute terms with $45 billion flowing to Asian developing countries in 2012. This accounted for almost 37% of all remittances sent globally from the US. This is not surprising, as it is the main destination country for Asian migrants. The other big senders are the UAE ($19.2 billion) and Saudi Arabia ($18 billion), which remit 95% and 65%, respectively, of their total remittances to developing Asia.

Not surprisingly, a very large share of remittances sent from the Republic of Korea (95%) and Japan (56%) goes to developing Asia. Apart from these two OECD countries, those countries with a significant share of remittances directed toward Asia include Canada (50%), New Zealand (43%), and Australia (42%).

[7] Japan and the Republic of Korea have been included in OECD countries.

Table 1.5 Source of Remittances Received by Asian Economies, 2012 (%)

	OECD	Non-OECD Asia	GCC		OECD	Non-OECD Asia	GCC
Afghanistan	31.3	1.6	0.9	Lao PDR	86.1	13.9	0.0
Azerbaijan	16.8	3.6	25.3	Malaysia	20.3	79.3	0.0
Bangladesh	23.1	50.6	0.0	Maldives	63.0	36.6	0.0
Bhutan	17.0	83.0	0.0	Mongolia	99.8	0.0	0.0
Cambodia	91.0	8.9	0.0	Nepal	20.6	37.0	42.2
China, People's Rep. of	53.5	41.6	0.0	Pakistan	32.8	17.4	48.8
Georgia	22.9	0.7	0.0	Philippines	71.1	5.6	21.6
Hong Kong, China	94.7	2.4	0.0	Sri Lanka	36.2	8.0	51.2
India	36.4	15.8	47.1	Tajikistan	14.4	23.7	0.0
Indonesia	25.7	58.7	12.2	Thailand	71.6	25.3	2.8
Kazakhstan	15.3	5.7	0.0	Viet Nam	94.7	5.2	0.0
Kyrgyz Republic	15.6	1.1	0.0				

GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: Data not available for Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Singapore, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Source: Bilateral Remittance Matrix, World Bank.

The six GCC countries together sent nearly $55 billion in remittances to Asian developing countries, constituting a quarter of the total for 2012. These are especially important destinations for workers from South Asia, accounting for half of all remittances received by India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Virtually all labor migrants deployed from India and Pakistan, as well as about 80% of those from Sri Lanka and 75% from Bangladesh, went to a Gulf country in 2012 (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014).

The three largest remittance recipients—India, PRC, and the Philippines—are, unsurprisingly, the leading countries of origin for migrant flows to the OECD countries (Table 1.5). However, they differ considerably in their sources of remittances. India relies heavily on GCC countries (47%), followed by the OECD countries (36%), and intra-Asia flows (16%). The PRC, on the other hand, receives more than half its remittances from the OECD countries (53%), followed by intra-Asia flows (42%), and none from the GCC. More than 70% of remittances received by the Philippines are sent by its migrants in OECD countries, followed by GCC countries (21%), and only a small share come from within Asia (6%). There has been a significant increase in labor migration from the Philippines to non-OECD countries since 2006 (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014).

1.8 Conclusions

After several years of sharp increases, labor migration from Asia to OECD countries has stabilized at high levels. Migration from Asia mostly comprises flows of lesser skilled workers to Middle East countries and higher skilled workers moving to Western countries. Both channels saw increasing flows after 2009, but these seem to have stabilized by 2013. Workers from South Asia account for the majority of labor migration from Asia to the Middle East, although the Philippines is the largest single country with more than 800,000 workers (per year). Intra-ASEAN labor migration has risen substantially in the past two decades with the stock of intra-ASEAN migrants increasing from 1.5 million to 6.5 million between 1990 and 2013 (UN 2013).

In 2012, 1.6 million migrants to OECD countries came from Asia. The PRC, India, and the Philippines account for 57% of the total, but flows from each of these countries declined slightly in 2012. However, a record number of migrants from several less populous Asian countries such as Thailand and Nepal immigrated to OECD countries, providing evidence for a continuing diversification of origin countries.

What distinguishes Asian migrants from others is their relatively high level of education. Almost 45% of the immigrants born in Asia are tertiary educated (14 percentage points above the global average). More than 11 million highly educated immigrants from Asia were living in OECD countries in 2010–2011, 80% more than in 2000.

Over the last five years, Asian immigrants have not followed the general pattern of employment outcomes in their destination countries. In 2013, their labor market situation was more favorable compared to both immigrants from other regions and native-born workers.

Asia is the fastest growing destination region for foreign students, hosting more than 800,000 students in 2012. Asia is also a major region of origin, with 1.5 million Asians enrolled in OECD countries, representing 54% of the total.

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CHAPTER 2

BUILDING HUMAN CAPITAL ACROSS BORDERS

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2.1 Introduction

The process of migration has implications for human capital. Migrants often orient their human capital development strategy to consider emigration, acquiring specific competencies to increase their prospects for recruitment abroad, focusing on skills that are in demand in foreign labor markets, or preparing for a specific overseas assignment.

However, there are other factors in the process. Governments also have a role to play and can take steps to introduce training opportunities. In some cases, bilateral agreements between governments can stipulate training requirements for participants to be implemented by either the origin country government or that of the destination country. It may also occur in the framework of regional mutual recognition agreements.

What happens to human capital during emigration is a crucial question. Workers acquire new skills and competencies, including languages, workplace skills, and even entrepreneurial skills. For migrants who return home, there is a question of how they—and their origin countries—make use of the human capital they have acquired. Finally, international students acquire human capital in a foreign country and then decide whether to stay, return home, or move elsewhere, contributing to the mobility of skills.

2.2 Migration-Oriented Human Capital Strategies

Many countries in Asia have set objectives to increase the number of skilled workers sent abroad and to increase their share relative to less skilled migrants. The reasons for this include origin countries expecting higher remittance levels from better-paid skilled workers and the lower susceptibility of skilled workers to abuse and exploitation after deployment.

A large share of the Asian migrants residing in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are highly educated, as noted in the preceding chapter. However, migration to non-OECD destinations remains largely composed of those who are low skilled. For many origin countries, then, the question is how to provide human capital to less educated workers and those going abroad to work in non-professional occupations.

Most sending countries are proactive in pre-departure training. The Philippines and Pakistan have relatively long histories of migration and of pre-departure training. In the Philippines in particular, where migration for employment is consolidated, training has developed to match the demand in different destination countries through following curricula and preparing for licensing exams, even in the absence of bilateral cooperation. In the past decade, newly emerging emigrant countries like Viet Nam and Cambodia have been laying the foundations for skills development and qualification systems for migrants, although neither country as yet has institutionalized these systems. Cambodia's Manpower Training and Overseas Sending Board, created in 2006, carries out public recruitment services mainly in the framework of the Republic of Korea's Employment Permit System.

Myanmar, by contrast, still has work to do in building a skills infrastructure for labor migration. Part of its national Human Resource Development Program is to enable migrant workers to find decent jobs abroad and to ensure that training providers maintain quality. Yet Myanmar still lacks a unified recognition system and qualification framework, making it difficult to promote quality control or link training with deployment.

Identifying the most likely potential migrants and targeting them with training opportunities is an extension of this strategy. The Government of Bangladesh aims to increase its share of skilled labor overseas by expanding technical and vocational training institutions in economically lagging regions, particularly to train women for work abroad. Several other Asian countries have taken a different approach to increasing the share of skilled female labor migrants deployed, by periodically or definitively limiting or preventing deployment of female domestic workers (i.e., those engaged in household work).

Sri Lanka has reduced the migration of females as domestic workers, partly to reduce vulnerability and partly to favor higher skill migration and investment in human capital. In addition to diversification of destination countries, Sri Lanka has emphasized enhancing skills of migrant workers. In 1994, pre-departure training was made compulsory for all prospective migrant workers, and a training certificate became mandatory for all departing migrant workers. Government policy in Sri Lanka requires that a migrant worker be registered with the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) which facilitates pre-departure training. For workers registering through a recruitment agency, the agency is responsible for training in collaboration with SLBFE. Twenty-one days of pre-departure orientation and skills training for women seeking domestic work in the Middle East is provided by SLBFE. In addition, there are more than a dozen accredited training centers operated by private recruitment agencies licensed under the SLBFE offering the same training, as well as job-specific and country-specific training based on job requirements.

A broader problem for linking training to migration is the relatively undeveloped monitoring of the labor market and evaluation of labor migration needs in the destination countries. A substantial skills gap between workers in origin countries and employers in destination countries is exacerbated by differences in institutions and industrial structure between origin and destination countries.

A specific example of this is the qualifications of caregivers (long-term health-care workers) in origin countries. Long-term care, especially in-home care for the elderly, is a growing occupation for labor migrants in Asia, with more than 700,000 care workers employed in Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China in 2013 alone (Asato 2014). Some origin countries in Asia provide qualifications as caregivers, although these qualifications are not recognized in Canada or in Asian destination economies such as Taipei,China, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China. One of the reasons why origin countries cannot link their caregiver training systems to requisites for employment abroad is the difficulty governments have in understanding the skills demanded in the receiving economies. Resources and technology used to care for the elderly vary widely between developing Asian countries and developed OECD countries, for example. Not only are migrants filling care jobs for which they are considered unqualified, but many migrants are actually nurses in their home countries—in Singapore, this figure is 90% (Asato 2014)—suggesting over-qualification and a waste of human capital.

In addition to different levels of wealth and technology, demography itself is an obstacle. For example, specialized caregivers trained in caring for individuals with dementia are increasingly sought-after in developed economies with aging populations, while dementia is rarely integrated into training curricula in the sending countries where the youth population is large and there are few elderly. Similarly, experience with geriatric care techniques is also relatively limited in origin countries (Asato 2014). In some destination economies, such as Singapore and Taipei,China, domestic care is not regulated by labor law, which results in de-skilling the occupation and limiting the chances to align training systems and ensure that workers depart with certified skills.

To be effective, training curricula should be arranged between both sending and receiving countries in order to match the actual demand in the receiving countries. The institutional framework in origin countries, however, has tended until now to be disregarded in bilateral agreements for semi-skilled and low-skilled migration within Asia. Rather, skills development programs are, in many cases, developed by the private sector in receiving countries. An example is the pre-departure training for construction workers in Pakistan or Bangladesh before being deployed to Singapore. Training is driven by destination-country regulations: employers in Singapore have an incentive to hire workers with home-country training, since they benefit from the reduction of the employment levy for these workers. In Singapore's construction sector, labor migrants must pass a construction safety orientation course, administered in overseas testing centers. There is an incentive to prepare for this course before coming to Singapore, since otherwise they cannot start work and their employer loses the permit authorization.

Japan's temporary industrial trainee and technical internship program, while not a labor migration scheme, treats interns as covered by labor law as employees. The program, which admits participants for training and employment in certain sectors (agriculture, textiles, construction, fisheries, and others) is linked to a training curriculum entirely under the control of Japanese authorities and private sector bodies. This avoids the risk in bilateral agreements where training conducted by third parties may not meet employer expectations. In such cases, employers prefer to train their own recruits, although ensuring program compliance—that is, that employers indeed provide training—can be an issue. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), contract workers sent abroad to work on construction sites are employed by Chinese companies, so their training does not need to reflect demand in destination countries and need only reflect national training approaches, although projects must conform to locally prevailing codes and standards.

One shortcoming of tailor-made training conducted under bilateral agreements is the lack of compatibility within the Asian region. Many migrants move around the region, working in more than one destination economy. Without any systematic recognition, their accumulation of skills goes unrecognized. For example, Singapore has piloted a training course for foreign care workers that involves only 18 hours of training. Thailand has different training programs for care workers, ranging from courses organized by the Ministry of Public Health to university courses, but none are linked explicitly to work opportunities abroad. The number of hours provided in these courses is far below the training requirements in Japan, for example.

An example of a destination country organizing human capital development across borders is Germany. Its Promotion of Vocational Mobility of Young People Interested in Vocational Training (MobiPro-EU) initiative is part of the Skilled Labor Force Initiative launched in 2012 and is focused on other European Union (EU) countries, from which labor migration is unrestricted (indeed, one of the EU policy objectives on employment is to actively reduce unemployment through labor mobility). The program is open to people between 18 and 35 years of age from EU countries who wish to take up company-based vocational education and training in Germany's well-regarded apprenticeship system. Germany provides support for placement, funds German language courses in the country of origin and in Germany, and reimburses travel, apprenticeship, and certain living costs. Most program participants are from Spain. The MobiPro-EU approach has also been extended to recruit non-EU highly skilled workers such as nurses from Viet Nam.

A unique initiative is Australia's program to train potential migrants in their origin country (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 Australia–Pacific Technical College Program

The Australia–Pacific Technical College Program (APTC), started in 2006, is unique among programs for training workers, because it is oriented toward regional skills recognition. The APTC was started with support from the Australian authorities to address the shortage of local skilled workers in the Pacific region due to the lack of resources and access to training. The program helps Pacific islanders gain Australian standard skills and qualifications for local and international employment, particularly throughout the Pacific where skilled employees are in demand. So far, the investments made by Australian Aid to the APTC come out to approximately A$35,000 per graduate. While this cost is higher than that of similar vocational training in Australia, the program is expected to be cost-effective in the long run.

Five APTC schools are located throughout the Pacific islands and share campuses with partner regional training institutions. Together with industry training partners, the schools offer vocational training in occupations that are facing shortages in the Pacific region and Australia, in targeted sectors: automotive, construction, electrical trades, tourism and hospitality, and community services (Schofield et al. 2009). Students undergo training that is aligned with the qualifications sought by regional labor markets and graduates receive an internationally recognized diploma or certificate.

Through early 2014, 5,000 students received qualifications. The program has been successful in terms of high employer satisfaction and growth of the Pacific skills pool. However, international mobility is low at approximately 2%, meaning that graduates have so far not taken full advantage of the overseas employment opportunities.

Providing home-country training is far from simple and, beyond the requirements for training capacity—human and physical infrastructure—it may not be unequivocally beneficial for participants. For example, obligatory skills training might represent an additional migration cost shouldered by the migrants, especially the poorest and most vulnerable of those who are seeking labor migration opportunities. This is even more of a concern when undergoing training does not necessarily lead to successful placement, as when pools of recruits are drawn up and only some candidates are selected.

In certain cases, there may be concern in destination economies that excessive reliance on labor migration negatively affects decisions by locals to pursue skilled trades. One such example is Macao, China, where highly educated non-resident workers take up employment at the high managerial level largely due to a need to recruit foreigners with managerial experience into a rapidly expanding gaming industry. As a result of the increase in foreigners filling high-skilled positions, the locals tend to settle for lower-level employment limited to resident workers, thereby having a negative effect on the growth of local human capital.

The more opportunities to move, the more opportunities workers have to increase their human capital. Regional mobility schemes thus have the potential to increase cross-border human capital formation. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the most important context for such schemes in Asia (Box 2.2).

Box 2.2 Regional Mobility and Skills Development in Southeast Asia

Within Asia, the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 has led to clear implications for the intra-regional mobility of highly skilled persons. There are several institutional mechanisms within ASEAN regarding labor mobility. The first is the ASEAN Labor Ministers Meeting (ALMM), which has been organized every two years since 1975. The major aim of the ministerial meeting is "to prepare the region's labor force to face the challenges of globalization and trade liberalization." This includes labor mobility. More specifically, the objective of the ALMM Work Program 2010–2015 is to improve the quality of life, to promote productive employment, and to protect and promote labor rights, including migrant workers' rights.

Migration has often been on the agenda of the ALMM. The 22nd ALMM, held in Phnom Penh in 2012, was about improving social protection and skills development in the midst of youth unemployment, vulnerabilities, unsafe migration, education, and skills training.

A system for mutual recognition of qualifications can contribute to skill mobility. In 1995, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) was established to promote general service sector liberalization beyond the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments, and to facilitate work abroad through the mutual recognition of professions and employment qualifications. This was meant to improve ASEAN countries' competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency in the global economy and to increase the mobility of workers from low-wage to high-wage countries under GATS Mode 4.

Since then, mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) have been put in place for seven professional categories covered under AFAS. These include engineers (2005), nurses (2006), surveying services (2007), architects (2008), accounting services (2008), medical practitioners (2008), and dental practitioners (2009).

Even with MRAs, language barriers and national licensing systems limit mobility. Furthermore, so far intra-regional mobility is much higher for unskilled workers, such as domestic workers, than for skilled workers. MRAs for non-professional qualifications are a challenge, since few are certified and equivalence may be difficult to demonstrate in the absence of formal qualifications and of similar criteria. These issues still tend to be covered only at the bilateral level of labor agreements.

Most migrants in Asia are not within the few fields covered by the MRAs, and any mutual recognition of work in skilled trades and non-professional occupations is still far off. Even for those covered by the MRAs, a long period of time is required to revise domestic laws, rules, and regulations in order to align them with AEC requirements.

Another aspect to be considered is training in the receiving countries. Under the bilateral agreements—or memorandums of understanding (MOUs)—mentioned earlier, skills training is usually conducted in the sending countries. Training is not usually conducted in the country of employment upon arrival of migrant workers, since it represents additional costs and because receiving countries often already recruit qualified—and sometimes over-qualified—workers. For workers outside of bilateral frameworks who wish to invest in country-specific further training after arrival, there may be little scope. Training cannot be reconciled with full-time employment, and work permit requirements may not allow periods of training.

Many labor migrants in Asia work only for temporary spells abroad, ranging from seasonal work to periods of up to several years, before returning home. Nonetheless, the work experience itself may provide substantial gains in human capital, simply from working in technology-rich environments or in complex organizations. “Overseas Pakistanis not only earn income and send remittances but also learn to apply the latest technologies and earn goodwill for the country. In some cases, they transfer these new technologies to Pakistan and benefit their countrymen” (Ahmed 2014).

Trainee programs may be designed specifically to grant workers skills they can bring home. For example, skills transfer lies at the heart of the internship and trainee programs in Japan, under which technical interns are meant to acquire familiarity with modern means of production and return home to apply them. Employers are required to establish a training plan for participants.

The integration of returning migrants and their skills is thus a key matter. However, there are a number of factors preventing returning migrants from using human capital acquired abroad. Skills recognition upon return is particularly difficult. Currently, post-return recognition is not developed throughout Asia. Some countries in the region, as noted, lack a national qualifications framework. Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) do not cover non-professional skills, as is the case of the ASEAN MRAs. Even workers who have gone through trainee programs may return home with certificates that lack recognition or equivalence, although they will have concrete skills. To help countries make the most of the skills of returning migrants, the International Labour Organization has drafted guidelines for skills recognition of returning migrants (ILO 2010).

2.3 International Students

Youth enrollment in higher education increases according to economic development, particularly in Asia. The future of the world’s international education will be largely affected by the intersection of megatrends in demographic shifts, economic dynamics, changes of political conditions, growth in education provision, advances in digital technology, global workforce demands, skills shortage, and cultural impact. In digital technology for example, the rapid spread of online class availability will have a great impact on educational access and may slow the increase in international study (Tanaka 2014). Professionals and students, especially in East Asia, are interested in taking advantage of the free online education that is offered by top western universities. The growing number of innovations that improve access and quality of learning also lessens the gap between western and eastern education. In addition, demographic changes in major countries will see a sharp drop of youth population, aged 18 to 22 years, particularly in the PRC, where the number of people in that age cohort will fall by an estimated 60 million between 2011 and 2025, followed by the

Figure 2.1 University-Age Population (18–23) in Asia, 1990–2040, Projections ('000)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) World Population Prospects, 2012 Revision.

Russian Federation, Iran, and Viet Nam. The number of university-age young people will fall dramatically in East Asia in the next decade (Figure 2.1). However, as enrollment rates rise, tertiary education growth is still expected in the PRC and especially in India. Furthermore, the number of students from these countries going abroad to study is forecast to increase by more than 100,000 annually from 2011 to 2024.

As youth enrollment in tertiary education has been increasing, more Asians are studying abroad. In addition to traditional OECD destinations, intra-regional international study is increasing. Universities are trying to increase international enrollment through English language education, internationally recognized degrees, cultural support services, and scholarship. Whether graduates stay, return home, or move on to a third economy after graduation is a key question. In most OECD countries where foreign students graduate, governments are increasingly changing their policies to provide easier means to find employment in their country. These include letting the graduates stay for job search, internships, and practical experience, as well as facilitating their access to work permits. What are origin economies doing to support the international education of their youth and to attract them back home? The PRC and India have been active in developing schemes for returning researchers and scholars (OECD 2012). Other countries have focused on residency: the Philippines allows reacquisition of nationality; Malaysia offers accelerated permanent residence for spouses. However, take-up of these return incentives has been very low.

The link between foreign students in higher education and employment is gathering more attention as student migration is closely related to high-skilled migration (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014). Japan, for example, sees international students as a potential pool of recruits for its globalized companies, in which high-skilled persons acting as bridges between Japan headquarters and subsidiaries overseas are in high demand (Shiraki 2014). As discussed in the next chapter, however, international students in Japan are disproportionately enrolled in fields where Japanese employers express little interest, such as the humanities. This contributes to post-graduation job-search difficulty. While stay-rates of international graduates appear quite high at first glance—out of a total of 36,000 foreign graduates in 2009, only 23% went back to their home country immediately—the share who found employment (25%) in Japan upon graduation was much lower than the share (39%) who pursued higher education. The remaining 12% stayed in Japan for other reasons, such as looking for employment.

Taipei,China also promotes international study and has seen growth in enrollment from the PRC, Viet Nam, and Malaysia, yet graduates appear to have difficulty finding employment. The small labor market and lack of wage increases contribute to the unfavorable conditions for foreign graduates working in Taipei,China. In order to retain international talent, the government plans to relax regulatory policies on the hiring and retention of foreign graduates, and to offer more opportunities for employment and training.

While Indian student migration to the United States and the United Kingdom is decreasing due to rupee depreciation, a stricter admission policy, and greater immigration to other countries, international study in India is growing as a result of government efforts. India actively practices the internationalization of higher education by encouraging foreign students to enroll in its higher learning institutes and to create global partnerships with other countries. Recent legal reforms, such as the Higher Education and Research Bill (2011) and the Foreign Educational Institutions Bill (2010) were enacted to facilitate the establishment of branch campuses of foreign educational institutions in India.

International students can be attracted back at a lower cost than recruiting foreign workers, especially in countries that have low immigration due to low wages (Mirrlees 2014). Returning students speak the native language, know the culture, and are not subject to work permit procedures. While students overseas are another aspect of "bridging human resources," the local labor market does not always welcome these graduates home. This is one reason for the stagnation in the number of Japanese students abroad compared to the number of Chinese and Korean overseas students. Japanese companies prefer to hire graduates fresh out of Japanese universities, while those that study abroad take a longer time to find employment after graduation. Young Japanese are consequently averse to the risk of studying abroad (Shiraki 2014).

2.4 Conclusions

The large number of migrants within and from Asia already represents an accumulation of individual human capital. Yet there is still substantial work to be done in Asia to establish an infrastructure for taking full advantage of the potential to build human capital across borders. The challenges depend on the education and skill level of the workers involved. For professionals, MRAs, even where they are in place, are hard to implement due to incompatible national systems, entrenched interests, and administrative delays. For non-professionals, the lack of national qualification frameworks in some countries and widely divergent systems among others make it difficult to even contemplate agreements. Some success has been achieved within the framework of bilateral agreements. Closer links between the training systems in origin countries and the labor market demands in destination countries would help, but bilateral agreements will probably remain the most reliable infrastructure for cross-border skills development in the short term.

Meanwhile, increasing international study within the region will help contribute to mobility of the highly educated. To some extent, international students obviate the need for mutual recognition, as they have host-country qualifications, but can also return home without facing administrative obstacles for employment.

Prospects for the many non-professional workers are less clear. Incentives for formal qualification exist within bilateral agreements and under certain permit regimes. For many, however, the talents they acquire while working abroad are not formally recognized. More work needs to be done to advance the recognition of work experience through employment records, and to put in place systems that recognize the skills of returnees in countries of origin.

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CHAPTER 3

JAPAN'S POLICIES FOR ATTRACTING HIGHLY SKILLED FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS

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3.1 Introduction

Japan is eagerly promoting the employment of foreigners with specialized knowledge and skills, with a view to invigorating its economy and society by promoting diverse values, experiences, know-how, and techniques. This chapter describes the specific measures that Japan is implementing to attract highly skilled foreign professionals.

3.2 Population and Labor Force Dynamics

Japan's labor force is changing rapidly as a result of two major demographic shifts. First, society is aging faster than in any other country, with the share of the population over age 65 expected to increase from 22.7% to 35.6% in the period from 2010 to 2050 (UN 2007; moderate change estimate). Second, Japan has a very low birthrate compared to other countries. The fertility rate (i.e., the number of children born to a woman during her lifetime) reached a record low of 1.26 in 2005. The figure has recovered slightly since then but was still only 1.41 in 2012. One of the factors contributing to the low birthrate is delayed marriage—women who marry later in life give birth to the first child at an older age and have fewer children.

Because of the aging of society and the low birthrate, Japan's working age population is shrinking, and the trend will likely continue for years to come. To address this difficult situation, the Government of Japan is implementing at least three measures to bolster the nation's workforce.

One such measure is encouraging women to work. An analysis of Japanese women by age group shows that the employment rate for women in their late 20s to mid-40s—the period when women bear and rear children—is markedly lower than for women in other age groups (OECD database). If this child-rearing generation of women can strike a balance between work and family, especially child care, they can remain in, or re-enter, the labor market. To help more women participate in the workforce, the government is stepping up support for work–life balance and child care.

Another initiative is promoting youth employment. A substantial number of young Japanese aged 15 to 34 are either so-called *Freeters*, who have only part-time or non-regular jobs, or are *NEET*, that is, "not in employment, education, or training." The government is assisting these young people in developing their careers and encouraging those not working to join the labor market by offering them vocational training and job placement services.

A third government initiative is to expand the employment of older workers. Many elderly in Japan are eager to stay in the workforce. A survey by the Cabinet Office in 2008 showed that, among 3,293 respondents aged 60 and over, about 90% said they want to work up to, or past, the age of 65. The baby boomer generation (born between 1947 and 1949) is now over the age of 65 and is part of the elderly population. The government is implementing measures to promote senior employment (e.g., supporting companies hiring older people) to create a society that enables "life-long work," where people of all ages can work according to their desires and abilities.

In conclusion, the Government of Japan projects that the proportion of the population employed will increase as a result of the above measures and also through expanding economic growth (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Projection of Employed Population to 2030 (million)



Source: For 2010, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Labor Force Survey; for 2020 and 2030, estimate by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

3.3 Basic Policy for Attracting Foreign Human Resources

While Japan seeks to utilize the untapped domestic workforce, the demand for highly skilled foreign professionals is increasing. A growing number of Japanese companies are expanding into global markets and calling for human resources with international competencies.

Japan's basic policy for the acceptance of foreigners consists of three pillars. First, the "status of residence" is issued based on consideration of "the effects on Japanese industries and people's lives." In other words, foreigners who work in Japan must have a status of residence under which employment is permitted.[1] In principle, foreigners may engage only in the employment activities permitted under their specific status of residence.

Foreigners intending to work in professional or technical fields in Japan are granted a status of residence in one of the following categories: engineer, specialist in humanities/international services, intra-company transferee, skilled labor, professor, investor/business manager, legal and accounting services, medical services, researcher, and instructor. The government seeks to attract foreigners who qualify for these categories of residence status.

Second, Japan fosters the employment of foreigners with specialized knowledge and skills. Government-wide efforts are designed to make it easier for these foreigners to and work in Japan. Finally, Japan has a relatively open framework for admission of qualified foreigners. The government imposes no numerical limits or labor market tests on the admission of foreigners.

3.4 Situation Regarding Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals in Japan

The number of foreigners working in Japan in professional and technical fields has been increasing as the government encourages greater acceptance of them. At the end of 2013, approximately 200,000 foreigners were employed in professional and technical fields, about 1.7 times the number of 10 years earlier.

In a survey conducted by the Japan Research Institute and sponsored by the Government of Japan, Japanese companies were asked what they seek when they hire highly skilled foreign professionals. Their responses included "language skills," "approaches to overseas markets," "knowledge of overseas business practices," "planning and development of products and services meeting the needs of customers overseas," and "leadership in global business." This indicates that businesses call for foreign professionals who can act as a bridge between overseas markets and the Japanese office, as their abilities, experience, and knowledge are less likely to be found in Japanese candidates.

As part of its measures to attract highly skilled foreign professionals, the government has been encouraging international students studying in Japan to join Japanese companies. Having learned the Japanese language and culture, these students can be considered as future highly skilled foreign professionals, and the government should help them find suitable jobs with Japanese companies.

An increasing number of international students now study in Japan, with approximately 138,000 of them (including exchange students) as of May of 2012, according to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO). As more international students come to study in Japan, more of them will find employment in

[1] There are exceptions for those who reside in Japan based on their personal status (such as spouse or child of Japanese nationals or permanent residents) or position (e.g., permanent residents).

Japanese companies. Although the number of international students employed by Japanese companies temporarily plunged as a result of the 2010 economic crisis, the figure has since recovered. In 2012, approximately 10,000 international students changed their status of residence for the purpose of working in Japan.

After graduation, international students choose a wide variety of career paths. Some want to return to their home countries while others wish to stay on and work in Japan. How to support those seeking employment in Japan is a crucial policy issue. A 2012 survey of international students by JASSO found that about half the students wanted to work in Japan, while another survey by JASSO indicates that only about 20% were able to do so. This gap highlights the need to support the employment of graduating students who want to work in Japan but cannot find employment.

There are several probable reasons that international students cannot find employment in Japan. One reason is a mismatch between students' skills and company demand. A large percentage of them study in liberal arts disciplines. According to JASSO, the share of foreign students majoring in social sciences is about 40%, followed by the humanities (about 20%) and engineering (about 17%). By contrast, a survey of companies revealed that they want to hire international students majoring in scientific subjects, notably engineering (mechanical, electronics, electro-communications, and others) and pure sciences (biology, physics, and others) (WIL 2011). The reality revealed by this data is that relatively few international students study subjects that companies demand.

The distribution of nationalities of international students in Japan results in another mismatch. Many Japanese companies are expanding in Asian markets, notably Viet Nam, Thailand, India, and Indonesia. Companies are looking in Japan for students from those countries for their potential to contribute to the local business through their knowledge of their homeland's customs and languages. Students from the People's Republic of China (PRC) account for the largest share of foreign students in Japan (62%) and the largest share of international students hired by Japanese companies (63%). Similar figures for students from the Republic of Korea are 14% and 12%, respectively.[2] However, a survey by the Career Gateway to Asia program suggests that the future hiring plans of Japanese companies focus more interest on Viet Nam (18% of future hires of highly skilled professionals), Thailand (15%), and India (14%). Meanwhile, the future share of hires of highly skilled professionals from the PRC will fall to 36%. The lack of international students from regions where Japanese companies aim to expand their business suggests the need for strategic measures to attract students from these areas.

3.5 Measures to Attract More Foreign Talent

The government is implementing three specific measures to attract more highly skilled foreign professionals: (i) attracting more international students, (ii) supporting employment of international students and foreign professionals, and (iii) encouraging foreign professionals to work and settle in Japan.

[2] Data on hiring are provided by the Ministry of Justice. Data on students enrolled in Japan are for 2012.

The Government of Japan is implementing the Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students, which was established in 2008 with the goal of increasing the number of international students in Japan to 300,000 by 2020. At the plan's inception, there were about 124,000 international students. Specific activities conducted under this plan include enhancing publicity to induce interest in studying in Japan; reviewing and providing more information on entrance examinations, admission procedures, and immigration formalities; making universities globalized and prepared for accepting international students; facilitating international students' lives in Japan (e.g., offering dormitories and life-related assistance); and supporting job placement after graduation. A number of ministries, including the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, are cooperating to implement various measures. In 2013, international students in universities numbered about 136,000. To step up its promotional efforts, in 2014 the government assigned international student coordinators to target specific regions, notably, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, East Asia, South America, the United States, and Central and Eastern Europe. They will cooperate with local universities to gather and distribute information in the target regions and network locally.

In addition, the government operates Employment Service Centers for Foreigners, which are public employment agencies specially designed to assist international students and highly skilled foreign professionals to find jobs in Japan. Staff are specialized in issues associated with foreigners and are supported by counselors and interpreters. The centers offer information and job placement services free of charge to foreign nationals seeking employment in Japan.

The Employment Service Centers for Foreigners are linked to Japan's national network of public employment offices to offer extensive assistance to international students in finding employment anywhere in Japan throughout their time studying there, up to graduation. The centers coordinate efforts with universities to encourage and motivate international students to find employment in Japan. Center officials visit career offices at universities to identify international students who have not received job offers, to recommend them to use services available at the centers, and to give employment guidance well before graduation. They also organize internships and career fairs for international students with the goal of building ties between students and potential employers. The centers also coordinate assistance with New Graduates Support Hello Work, which are public employment offices designed exclusively for new college graduates.

Some companies hesitate to hire foreign professionals, even when interested, because they do not know how to recruit them. On the other hand, companies that do employ foreign talent have trouble motivating and retaining them, and handling cross-cultural communication. To help these companies, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare published a manual on the utilization of highly skilled foreign professionals, which provides advice on hiring, deployment, day-to-day communication, and developing competence in the medium to long term. The availability of this booklet to businesses and related institutions is only part of government efforts to better prepare companies to accept highly skilled foreign professionals and ensure the most is made of their abilities.

Another measure used to attract and retain highly skilled foreign professionals is the points-based immigration system, launched in May 2012. Under the system, foreigners engaged in specialized and technical activities are awarded points according to their annual income, education, career background, research conducted, and other achievements as well as other criteria such as Japanese language ability. High-scoring foreigners are given preferential treatment in immigration procedures as they are expected to bring innovation to Japanese industries, promote the development of specialized and technical labor markets, and increase the efficiency of the labor market.

Preferential treatment includes permission to engage in different types of employment, eased requirements for obtaining permanent residency (e.g., a shorter period of stay), and permission to allow a spouse to work, to bring a domestic worker, and to bring parents. To provide enhanced benefits, the points system was revised in December 2013 with respect to qualification requirements and preferential treatment. Foreigners holding Master of Business Administration (MBA) degrees were given additional points, and foreign income is now counted toward the income threshold. The conditions for bringing parents or domestic workers were eased. In addition, in 2014 the government amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to shorten the period of stay required for highly skilled foreign professionals to acquire permanent residence. Japan aims to publicize the benefits of the point system in order to attract excellent human resources from around the world.

An effective indirect measure to attract skilled professionals is to lure foreign companies holding outstanding technologies and know-how to Japan. The government has addressed this issue by providing incentives to attract foreign businesses under the slogan of making Japan "Asia's center for business," codified in the "Asian Business Location Bill," and administered by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Qualified companies that conduct research and development in Japan are awarded preferential treatment such as reduced taxes and lower patent registration fees.

3.6 Possible Measures to Help Foreigners Integrate in Work and Society

Immigration policy measures to encourage the inflow of highly skilled foreign professionals are not by themselves enough; Japan should do what it can to ensure for them a stable life and a comfortable work environment. High priority should be given to supporting Japanese language education because language skills are essential for work and daily life. Another prospective area of focus is simplifying administrative formalities, which foreigners often find complicated. Establishing one-stop offices that provide foreigners with everything from advice on necessary procedures to assistance in completing such formalities would be welcomed. Japan should address accommodation and health-care issues as well, perhaps by building housing, helping foreign professionals find a place to live, increasing the number of medical institutions capable of serving patients in a foreign language, and training more medical interpreters. Moreover, attention should be paid to making life in Japan easier not only for foreign professionals but also for their spouses and children. Establishing more international schools would enhance access to education for these children.

3.7 Conclusions

Japan continues to see its labor force decrease as its society ages and its population declines. Not only should the country implement policies to leverage untapped domestic human resources and encourage them to join the labor market, it should also attract highly skilled foreign professionals who can contribute to revitalizing the Japanese economy. As international competition to attract excellent human resources intensifies in the so-called "war for talent," Japan is implementing various measures to attract highly skilled foreign professionals and should prepare society to accept them.

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CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON FAMILY MEMBERS LEFT BEHIND

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4.1 Introduction

The act of migration does not only affect the migrant but also the family members he or she leaves behind. However, the implications—both negative and positive—of migration on spouses and children have only recently been given adequate attention. It is only in the last decade that researchers, and to some extent policymakers, have started looking into the issue of those "left behind" (Lam, Ee, and Anh 2013; Lam et al. 2013; Mazzucato and Schans 2011).

Kong and Meng (2010) point out that, "the well-being of children is important not just to their parents but also to society as a whole." The positive externalities of a healthy and educated society cannot be underestimated, in particular for Asia's emerging countries. Indeed, if the migration of a parent compromises the development of his or her children, "not only may they fail to reach their potential, but they may also become an economic and social drag on society" (Kong and Meng 2010). Recent public discourse—entertained by governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and international agencies—on family members left behind is part of a broader discussion on raising the awareness of the non-pecuniary costs of migration, identifying and targeting vulnerable groups, and engaging the diaspora (UNICEF 2008). In particular, the feminization of labor migration as it occurs in many Asian countries can have an important impact on children, as women are the primary caregivers in most cultures (Nguyen and Purnamasari 2011; Graham and Jordan 2011). Hence, the design of good migration policies requires a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of migration, including the impact on family members left behind. Migration can affect children in multiple ways: children may migrate alone, they may migrate with their family, or they may be left behind by a migrating parent.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Decent Work Agenda encompasses the need for social protection of families, which includes the families of overseas migrants. Furthermore, migration should be considered a choice that an individual migrant or a family makes and not a necessity. Indeed, Benigno Aquino III, current President of the Philippines, which is one of the world's biggest sources of migrant labor, has said that his government shall be "a government that creates jobs at home, so that working abroad will be a choice rather than a necessity, and when its citizens do choose to become overseas Filipino workers, their welfare and protection will still be the government's priority" (Nicolas 2014).

Families are cognizant of the legal barriers in place; hence many families consider international migration (or *transnationalism*) a strategy for family survival and even social mobility. Indeed, having at least one parent absent due to migration is for many children in the developing world part of their experience of childhood (Rossi 2014). Mazzucato and Schans (2011) indicate that around 25% of children in some countries have at least one parent who is an international migrant. It has been estimated that around half a million children in Thailand and 1 million in Indonesia have one migrant parent (Bryant 2005). In rural Bangladesh, between 18% and 40% of children live in a migrant household. About 35% of all children left behind in the People's Republic of China (PRC) are looked after by the remaining parent, while 59% stay with grandparents and 4% are cared for by other family members (Kong and Meng 2010). The remainder are placed in boarding school. The quality of these alternative care arrangements (the so-called "care triangle") may differ significantly from the care provided by the parent(s) (Kong and Meng 2010; Graham and Jordan 2011). This lack of awareness concerning the specific situation of the children left behind hinders the development of appropriate responses from policymakers (Rossi 2014).

4.2 Evidence of the Impact of Migration on Children

Most of the research on left-behind children has been conducted in Latin America, notably Mexico. African and Asian countries, despite the vast number of children with either one or two migrant parents, have only gradually begun to receive more attention (Kong and Meng 2010). Nevertheless, most of the research on these countries lacks academic rigor. Additionally, the effect of migration on the left-behind wife or husband has so far not been widely studied. The same applies to the impact of adult children migration on elderly parents. This is most likely due to the fact that young children are more often seen as a sensitive sub-population that deserves the attention of the public, researchers, and policymakers.

The consequences of migration are not always clear-cut and research findings can be diverse and contradictory (Kong and Meng 2010). In general, migration always involves a disruption of personal and family relationships (Figure 4.1). Migration can impact the family left behind through two basic mechanisms: firstly, by the absence of one family member in the household and, secondly, via the receipt of remittances.[1] The former can be either positive or negative. In many instances, the most productive and employable member leaves to work abroad. Hence, at least in the initial phase, the household may be without this member's income. Moreover, this absence can have a severe impact on the mental and physical health of those left behind as the migrating parent cannot devote the same amount of care to the education and general well-being of the offspring and spouse.[2] On the other hand, the absence of an abusive mother or father can have a positive effect on the spouse and children left behind.

With the increasing feminization of migration in Asia, children suffer more from the absence of the mother than of the father (Nguyen and Purnamasari 2011). This is because women are the main caregivers in the household and the decision-maker concerning health and education in the family (Cas et al. 2013).

[1] This assumes that children are not migrating together with their parents.

[2] Use of the term "migrant" has a wide range: from legal to irregular, from short-distance to long-distance, and from temporary and seasonal to multiple years. The nature of migration affects the opportunities of the migrant to co-parent and be involved in the lives of their children. Also, not all migration journeys are successful in that the migrant, especially illegal ones, may not be able to send back remittances immediately, if at all.

Figure 4.1 Impact of Parental Migration on Children at Place of Origin



LS = life satisfaction, QoL = quality of life.

Source: Jampaklay (2014).

Financially the family is usually better off because increased income (sent back as remittances) is the primary motivation for migration. Remittances mean that family members[3] left behind can afford better quality health care, education, housing, and other services and commodities.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that migration and remittances are both a matter of degree. Internal migrants are able to visit and communicate with the family more often than international migrants. Moreover, documented—i.e., legal or official—migrants also have a better chance of visiting than undocumented ones. Additionally, some parents manage to stay closely involved in child care from a distance and practice transnational co-parenting with the non-migrating parent or caregiver.

[3] The concept of family has different connotations in different societies and cultures. The contemporary family in most Western societies consists of the nuclear and extended family, with mostly only the former being in charge of raising the children. This trend toward nucleation of the family has also been observed in Indonesia in the last decade (Hugo 2002). In contrast, many African societies employ an "it takes a village" approach to parenting with children often left in the care of the extended family, kin, or (church) community. This understanding is crucial when discussing the effect of parental absence on those left behind.

4.3 Remittances

Remittances are normally discussed as financial remittances, referring to the money sent back home by the migrant.[4] However, there is also what might be termed social remittances. While the former can help the family finance better quality health care, education, and improved housing amenities such as water and sanitation, social remittances comprise values, behavior, and attitudes. Both can be negative or positive.

Evidence in some countries suggests that female migrants show more financial and emotional support to their left-behind families than their male counterparts (de Haas 2007). Other studies arrived at a different conclusion. In the Philippines, according to Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005), male migrants send back more money than their female counterparts, even after controlling for income differentials between men and women.

Furthermore, in its Consumer Expectations Survey for the fourth quarter of 2013, the Central Bank of the Philippines reported that 96% of the remittances received were used to purchase food.[5] The second biggest allocation of remittances was education (72%), followed by medical payments (63%) and debt payments (46%).[6] An increasing share of migrant households puts at least part of their remittances in a savings account—34% in 2012 and 42% the following year. Likewise, the percentage of Filipinos that invested their remittances increased from 5% to 11% in the same period.

4.4 Challenges of Determining the Impact of Migration and Remittances

The socio-cultural and economic impacts of migration and remittances are difficult to distinguish from the more general processes of social change in a country. For instance, a more rigorous hand-washing regime in the origin household of the migrant can be due to remitted knowledge, attitudes, and norms of migrants (i.e., social remittances). Still, it could also be due to the community generally being more exposed to (foreign) mass media or efforts by NGOs or government agencies.

Researchers often rely on subjective assessments by parents, caregivers, and children when measuring the emotional health and sometimes school performance of children from migrant households.[7]

Many researchers note that only a few studies have taken a comprehensive, comparative, and methodologically sound look at the issue. Researchers are confronted with massive methodological issues

[4] The developmental impact of migration and remittances has been widely discussed by both academics and policymakers (de Haas 2007; Adams 2007; Ratha, Mohapatra, and Scheja 2011).

[5] All figures in this paragraph are from Nicolas (2014), who draws on the survey results.

[6] Many migrants have to take out a loan to finance and kick-start their migration journey.

[7] Subjective assessments and self-assessments are often the only way to gather information on emotional and psychological health. The Child Health and Migrant Parents in South-East Asia (CHAMPSEA) studies were the first in the region to systematically address the effects of parental migration (and the care crisis) on the health and educational outcomes of children left behind. These studies were conducted in 2008—2009 in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The "Strengths and Difficulties" questionnaire was used to assess the mental health of the target child. Researchers also used in-depth interviews with the carer and behavioral observations (of the carer and older children) (Lam, Ee, and Anh 2013).

when studying the quantitative effects of migration and remittances, such as the endogenous behavior of migration and the direction of causality.[8] Hence, many studies are descriptive and unable to prove causality. Moreover, the lack of longitudinal data does not allow for a proper assessment of the long-term effect of migration. Data that track family members of migrants over time would allow researchers to overcome issues of selectivity in the analysis of the effects of migration, and better ascertain how decisions and behavior are shaped by the context at home and abroad.

Nicolas (2014) maintains that the scant investigations into the relationship between migration and the impact it has on the family left behind are not comprehensive and "definitive enough to answer with finality the question of whether or not children or families left behind by migrants have better access to education and health services than those without a migrant in their family."

Instead of relying on available survey data that were not specifically designed to investigate the effects of parental migration on children left behind, research should begin by designing an appropriate survey, which at the beginning inquires about family arrangements. If children report that they are not living with their mother and/or father, then the particular reason for the absence should be established, such as desertion, separation or divorce, death (and, possibly the cause of death), temporary internal migration, temporary international migration, or long-term international migration. Additionally, the migration history of the household should be as detailed as possible (duration, destination, legal status, and self-assessment of results or success) to get a comprehensive picture of the family.[9] Only then can research properly establish the statistical probability of multidimensional well-being or deprivation of the various forms of parental absenteeism including, but not limited to, migration.

The following sections focus on the impact migration and remittances have on the health and education of children left behind. The interconnection between health and education has long been established. Children who are healthy and well-nurtured are more likely to do well in school, while better educated people make more informed choices about health and are less likely to work in a field that is detrimental to their physical health, such as construction or farming.

4.5 Effects on Health

Health encompasses both physical and mental or emotional health. The former is easier to measure (e.g., height and weight), while empirical studies that aim to measure mental or emotional health often have to rely on the self-reported mental or emotional health of the children themselves, their parent(s), or their alternative caregiver.

8 The following studies note the severe methodological challenges faced by researchers: McKenzie and Sasin (2007); Kong and Meng (2010); Kuhn, Everett, and Silvey (2011); Mazzucato and Schans (2011); Carling and Tønnessen (2013); McKenzie and Yang (2014); and Rossi (2014).

9 Instead of the exact amount of remittances, a subjective assessment might be better at times. For example, the family might be asked whether the remittances are sufficient to cover school fees and other necessities. As well, the subjective feeling that the migration journey was not in vain can also be used, in part, to judge the emotional impact of the migration.

A growing body of research has linked household migration with children's health and health-care utilization. Frank and Hummer (2002) and Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) established a positive effect of Mexican migration to the United States (US) as children left behind have a lower risk of low birth weight and child mortality. Kanaiaupuni and Donato (1999), on the other hand, find higher rates of infant mortality in Mexican communities that have high US immigration rates; the effect, however, diminishes with the level of remittances.

Children of migrant parents left behind in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines generally enjoy good life conditions (Bryant 2005). Studies of the Philippines show that children of migrant parents are healthier than those from non-migrant families (Nicolas 2014). While one study reported that children of migrant mothers are slightly more susceptible to common ailments and loss of appetite, it did not uncover consequences for the physical health that would alarm policymakers (Nicolas 2014). According to Lam, Ee, and Anh (2013) and Lam et al. (2013), this may be attributed to the better nutritional status of the migrant families (paid for with remittances) as well as the quality of the caregiver.

However, an investigation of 205 Filipino high school students showed that adolescents with a migrant parent, in particular the mother, reported higher levels of loneliness and emotional stress that led to poorer physical health (Smeekens et al. 2012, as cited in Nicolas 2014). This was corroborated by a CHAMPSEA study for Thailand, which found that the absence of the mother causes more emotional stress for children than the absence of the father (Graham and Jordan 2011). The study also found that the quality of the caretaker matters for the well-being of the child. The vast majority of migrants from Thailand are male; hence, children are usually left in the care of the mother.

Graham and Jordan (2011) found that children in Indonesia and Thailand who were left behind by a migrant father had poorer psychological health in terms of conduct than children from non-migrant households. This, however, was not the case for children in the Philippines and Viet Nam. These findings make clear that it is essential to take the cultural context into consideration when examining the consequences of migration on family members (Graham and Jordan 2011). Evidence from the same study also showed that the impact of parental absence on the emotional well-being of the children depends upon who migrates, as well as the age of the child. Young and adolescent children reported missing their migrant parent(s). Even when left in the care of attentive and loving alternative caregivers, such as members of the extended family, they nevertheless wished to be taken care of by their parents, in particular their mother (Graham and Jordan 2011).

In Thailand, where women constituted 16% of Thai workers formally deployed abroad in 2009 (IOM 2011), overseas migration of the mother has a negative impact on the psychological well-being of the children left behind (Jampaklay 2014). This negative effect, however, is not found when it is the father who migrates. These measured impacts are not affected by remittances, the economic status of the household, or child-specific characteristics such as gender or age. The outcome can be attributed to the unpreparedness of the father or the alternative caregiver to care for the children, and points to the gap maternal migration leaves behind.

Kong and Meng (2010) find that the long-term health of children in the PRC is negatively associated with the absence of the migrant parent despite the inflow of remittances.

The majority of studies cited indicate that the physical health of children improves due to the inflow of financial remittances that allow the remaining parent or caregiver to buy higher quality medical care. Still, the physical absence, of the mother in particular, who cannot co-parent from afar causes emotional stress for the children, and in some cases can result in poorer health outcomes such as hygiene-related problems (Edillon 2008; Nicolas 2014).

4.6 Effects on Education

The education of children can be affected by both migration and remittances. Migration can cause emotional turmoil, such as a feeling of abandonment and a lack of parental oversight, both of which can lead to a deterioration in the child's school performance. In addition, the absence of a parent may create a direct demand for the child to work in the household, family business, or family farm. Children of successful, especially low-skilled, migrants can be incentivized to drop out of school to follow in their parents' footsteps, as they may not see the benefit of more formal education. On the other hand, remittances can impact a child's education positively through the income effect. A boost in the household budget may allow parents to send their children to better quality institutions or for longer periods of time.

In essence, migration and the remittances it generates can both kick-start and hinder education (Yang 2004; Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Adams 2006; de Haas 2007; McKenzie 2006).

The 2003 Children and Family Survey in the Philippines indicated that children from migrant households mainly attend private schools and are generally happy at school (Lam, Ee, and Anh 2013). More recent research, which includes Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Viet Nam, shows that at least during primary school, children left behind perform better than children of non-migrants (Lam, Ee, and Anh 2013; Lam et al. 2013; Asis and Ruiz-Marave 2013). Filipino children from migrant households also participate more in academic organizations[10] and extra-curricular activities and are more likely to receive academic and non-academic awards than other children (Edillon 2008).

However, these findings differ from those of the Scalabrini Migration Center in the Philippines, which surveyed 700 school children in 2000. According the survey, children left behind did not excel at school and seemed to suffer emotionally from the separation. A later study on the Philippines by Parrenas (cited in Cortes 2011) corroborates these results. This study also found that teenage daughters are often charged with additional housekeeping duties in the absence of the mother, while teenage sons are more likely to work while also going to school. In many instances, an older child is forced to drop out of school to replace the absent parent and take care of the family, including younger siblings, or the family business (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006; Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Acosta 2006). For Thailand, Jampaklay (2006) found that maternal absence, unlike paternal absence, has a negative effect on the child's education.

[10] Top club memberships are Math Teachers Association of the Philippines training guild, Science Club, and after-school music programs. Other clubs include Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, athletic clubs, and Pupil Government Organization (Edillon 2008).

4.7 The Role of the Migrant Mother

Various studies confirm that households with a migrant mother are more likely to rely on extended family members to care for children left behind (Cortes 2008). Migration, unlike a sudden death or illness, is a pre-planned act that allows women to set up alternative care arrangements. In the Philippines, Parrenas (2004; as cited in Cortes 2008) found that women left behind by their migrant husbands come up with creative ways to adjust for the absence of the father and "expand definitions of mothering to include those typically delegated to men such as the disciplining of children." Children are likely to suffer more in some instances when the mother leaves than when the father does, and when no functioning alternative care arrangement is in place to help maintain a resilient, transnational family (Cortes 2008; Hugo 2002).

Despite the large number of female migrants and the significant role women play in the financial well-being of the family as well as the national economy, women are still assigned the traditional role of the nurturer and caregiver, while the father's primary role is that of breadwinner. Hence, the departure of the mother is much more disruptive to family life and the functioning of the household.

Asian women and men migrate both as documented and undocumented workers. And while the precarious legal status of an undocumented worker can have an even graver impact on the migrant himself or herself than the family, documented workers are also often not able to take leave to see their families on a regular basis. The geographical distance between the (individual) family members can also hinder effective and prompt communication, for instance, in the case of a health emergency. Consequently, fathers need to be equipped with knowledge to act should the mother not be able to return frequently or quickly, and had not been able to put another female family member in charge. Moreover, the trend toward increased nucleation of the family means that there may not be any potential caregivers available.

Some South Asian countries have linked the role of the woman as mother and protector to disincentives, or even barriers, to overseas employment in domestic work. Research is needed to inquire whether such measures protect women or lead to an increase in irregular migration.

In any case, on the grounds of gender equality and freedom of movement such restrictions for adults are not advised.

4.8 Lack of Family Reunification Policies or Alternatives in Labor Migration Governance in Destination Countries

The negative impacts on families left behind can be mitigated by policies in destination countries that facilitate family unification of labor migrants, or by employment contracts that provide benefits for annual home leave and travel. Currently, in most if not all low-skilled foreign worker programs in Asia and the Middle East, family unification is not permitted, and return air-fare provided only at the end of the contract.

Despite the fact that there is no unequivocal right to family reunification in international human rights law, specific instruments such as the ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143) and the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), 2003 call for a facilitation of family reunification on the part of the countries of destination. In a similar vein, employment contracts should include provisions for adequate annual leave and home travel.

4.9 Policies in Place

Policies and institutions are needed to support not only the individual migrant, but also the family of the migrant in order to mitigate the potential negative effects of migration. Countries of origin and destination have a variety of policies in place that aim to protect the (low-skilled) migrant worker (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014). Some of these countries have implemented policies and mechanisms suggesting that they have adopted a more holistic view of migration that encompasses the entire migration cycle. However, such policies generally focus more on the pre-employment and employment stages.

Migrant welfare funds (MWFs) have emerged as a means of providing support services to migrants—in particular those that are in distress—and their dependents. The range of services differs depending on the specific country and can include, among other things, protection to workers while overseas, health insurance including benefits in case of disability or death, and financial support for repatriation of remains, and fares for involuntary return. The funds also offer specific programs that support the entire family, which encompass pre-departure orientation, support for education and training, as well as help accessing credit to finance various projects or purposes including migration itself but also housing and small businesses (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014). Financed by contributions—fixed at about $25 per person—from overseas employers and/or workers, MWFs are administered by public or semi-public agencies such as the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF), the Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), and the Sri Lanka Overseas Workers Welfare Fund (OWWF).

In the Philippines, the Filipino OWWA offers scholarships at all levels for dependents of migrants, even in cases where the migrant is deceased. A major advantage of legal migration from the Philippines is access to mandatory health insurance, PhilHealth, which covers both the migrant and the family members in the Philippines. Similarly, Thailand provides a compulsory migrant health scheme that covers specific categories of registered migrants and their family members.

In Sri Lanka, the National Labor Migration Policy, 2008, the National Policy on Decent Work, 2006, and the National Human Resources and Employment Policy, 2012, all discuss the governance of migration and the connection between migration and development. These polices outline the government's commitment to protecting and empowering migrant workers and their families. The Welfare Division of the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) is mandated to support the welfare of legal labor migrants and their families through a variety of services. The bureau carries out awareness and advisory programs which cover such topics as recruitment, reintegration, and HIV. These programs are held as cluster meetings organized at the community level. The SLBFE's efforts focus on the children of migrant workers and their well-being and include distributing school equipment to children of migrant workers who face financial difficulties, and running an awareness program on child protection. The latter helps the bureau identify children who need special attention such as assistance with school or health care. The bureau also offers scholarships for children of migrant workers (SLBFE 2012).[11] In addition, it runs special ad hoc mobile clinics that take care of the health-care needs of the families of migrant workers.

The Government of India has two insurance schemes to extend social security to migrants: the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana and the Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana. The former was introduced in 2003 and provides social security and health insurance coverage to migrant workers, as well as health insurance for spouses and two dependents left behind.

4.10 Policy Recommendations

Asian countries should adopt a holistic approach to migration governance that takes into account not only the migrant but also the impact of migration on families left behind. The following recommendations suggest measures to mitigate the negative consequences of migration on family members left behind:[12]

a. **Changing perceptions of female migration.** While many, especially younger Asians, consider male labor migration a rite of passage, it is still often viewed as an abnormality when a wife or mother migrates. This can create negative pressure and social stigma in the community of origin, and thus have severe consequences for the children and husbands left behind. Husbands may feel inadequate because they are not able to provide for the family. The government, civil society organizations, and social partners (employers and workers organizations) can promote a more positive image to counter conventional notions.

b. **Creation of long-term support programs.** Countries of origin can develop long-term policies and programs to support the needs of children and spouses left behind. These could include counseling, mentoring, and guidance on how to deal with separation. Migrant centers can be established in communities with a large number of migrant families.

c. **Dialogues.** Migrant centers can also host regular forums attended by affected families, government officials, migrant advocacy groups, and other civil society organizations to discuss challenges faced by those left behind (Salah 2008). Government and community representatives can then decide on measures to address the challenges.

d. **Inclusion of family members in pre-departure seminars.** Inviting family members to mandatory official pre-departure meetings could help them understand the particular challenges they will face. This can allow or encourage each family to discuss the practicalities of the parent or spouse's absence such as the responsibilities of each household member. The use of a facilitator or mediator in this discussion can be included.

e. **Increased support in school.** Teachers can be trained to monitor children whose parents are migrants. Not only young children, but also older children who may be burdened with additional chores should be watched, to prevent them from dropping out of school. Hiring social workers or coordinating

[11] Between 1996 and 2012, the SLBFE granted a total of 24,518 scholarships worth 470 million Sri Lankan rupees to children of migrant workers.

[12] These recommendations are partially inspired by Nicolas (2014).

with the local migration center may be options. If necessary, institutionalized childcare for younger children may be provided. A general fortification of social safety nets may be required.

f. **Better education and training for fathers.** To ensure that children are well taken care of when the mother is absent, fathers need to be trained in hygiene, health care, food preparation, and homework assistance. Regarding health matters, diarrhea, malaria, and malnutrition are still prevalent in many Asian countries and awareness and proper knowledge can save lives. Migrant centers can help by informing fathers about health-care options and providing contact information. More generally, fathers can be assisted to be better able to assess and address the needs of their children. However, fathers must be willing and dedicate the time to these child-rearing tasks.

g. **Investment in Internet infrastructure.** Of the 15 Asian countries that are net senders of migrants, only three (the PRC, the Philippines, and Viet Nam) have over 30% Internet users (World Bank 2014). The percentage of cell phone users is significantly higher in all countries. Providing Internet access to families of migrants can allow them to be "virtually present" and thereby reduce the burden of separation. Migrant centers could be furnished with Internet-enabled computers that would allow families to communicate regularly by e-mail, Skype, or other methods.

h. **Best practices.** The development, testing, compilation, and dissemination of best practices could address issues that migrant-sending families face in terms of health and education.

i. **Improvement of (political) culture, health care, and education infrastructure.** Remitting money by itself does not guarantee the realization of the right of equal access to quality health care and education. Instead, sustainable development through migration and remittances critically depends on the situation in the locale as the prevalent culture of discrimination in the country or community may prevent persons, especially girls and women, from benefiting from the inflow of remittances. A lack of facilities likewise hinders development in this realm.

j. **Family unification policies and leave travel assistance.** In cases where earnings are sufficient to support the family abroad, destination countries should consider allowing families to join the migrant worker. Given that this will not be the case for many workers, particularly domestic workers who are mainly women, from a practical point of view more attention may be put on standard employment contracts that include sufficient annual leave and leave travel assistance.

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ANNEX 1

ECONOMY-SPECIFIC NOTES

BANGLADESH

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	132.4	350	5.9	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	67.6
2013	156.6	625	6.0	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	4.5

Immigration in Bangladesh

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	988	0.76	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2010	1,085	0.73	14				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	**Total**
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	
% of total employment	

Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.6			
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**

Emigration from Bangladesh to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Bangladesh living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	161.9	123.6	285.5	306.3	226.6	532.9
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	33.0	24.4	57.4	75.2	49.0	124.2
15–24 (% of population 15+)	17.2	23.1	19.7	13.0	14.7	13.7
25–64 (% of population 15+)	78.2	73.3	76.1	82.7	80.1	81.6
Total emigration rate (%)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.5
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	2.7	2.0	2.4	3.6	3.6	3.6

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**37.7**	**42.8**	**34.7**	**40.9**	**51.0**	**49.7**	**49.7**	**41.6**
United States	11.5	14.6	12.1	11.8	16.7	14.8	16.7	14.7
Italy	5.8	5.6	5.2	9.3	8.9	9.7	10.3	10.1
Spain	1.9	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.6
Australia	1.4	1.7	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.5
Canada	3.9	3.8	2.7	2.7	1.9	4.4	2.5	2.5
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**11.1**	**11.5**	**11.4**	**12.0**	**13.8**	**15.3**	**16.6**	**16.8**
United Kingdom — Non-resident students	2.0	2.2	2.7	2.8	3.5	4.1	4.1	3.8
Australia — Non-resident students	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.4	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.3
United States — Non-resident students	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.8	3.2

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total							**4,046.2**	
Saudi Arabia					1,000.0		1,315.6	
United Arab Emirates					500.0		1,176.5	
Malaysia						307.4	453.8	
Oman							226.7	
Kuwait							214.9	
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**377.3**	**820.5**	**865.5**	**467.2**	**381.1**	**558.4**	**596.6**	**402.3**
United Arab Emirates	130.2	226.4	419.4	258.3	203.3	282.7	215.5	14.2
Oman	8.1	17.5	52.9	41.7	42.6	135.3	170.3	134.0
Singapore	20.1	38.3	56.6	39.6	39.1	48.7	58.7	60.1
Qatar	7.7	15.1	25.5	11.7	12.1	13.1	28.8	57.6
Bahrain	16.4	16.4	13.2	28.4	21.8	14.0	21.8	25.2
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	−0.44	−1.64	−1.20	−2.90	−4.85	−2.62	−1.94	−1.84
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	5,428	6,562	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,776

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	1,262.6	1,122	8.4	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	70.9
2013	1,357.4	3,583	7.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	4.1

Immigration in the PRC

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated	
2000	508	0.04	50	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
2010	686	0.05	50					
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2012	**Total**							
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	246.4							
% of total employment								
Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	141.1		195.5	223.5	238.2	265.1	292.6	328.3
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	

Emigration from the PRC to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in the PRC living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	976.3	1,089.8	2,066.1	1,790.5	2,137.8	3,928.4
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	217.0	250.7	467.7	343.7	431.3	775.0
15–24 (% of population 15+)	12.3	11.4	11.8	17.7	15.9	18.0
25–64 (% of population 15+)	73.1	73.4	73.3	68.7	70.4	70.0
Total emigration rate (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	1.5	2.3	1.8	1.4	2.1	1.7

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)		**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**438.2**	**505.4**	**519.9**	**533.2**	**462.9**	**511.1**	**531.1**	**505.8**
Rep. of Korea		115.8	161.2	177.0	161.7	117.6	155.3	149.2	127.3
Japan		105.8	112.5	125.3	134.2	121.2	107.9	100.4	107.0
United States		70.0	87.3	76.7	80.3	64.2	70.9	87.0	81.8
United Kingdom		22.0	23.0	21.0	18.0	22.0	28.0	45.0	41.0
Canada		42.3	33.1	27.0	29.3	29.0	30.2	28.7	33.0
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**357.2**	**374.1**	**379.7**	**409.2**	**451.9**	**500.5**	**580.5**	**624.8**
United States	Non-resident students	92.4	93.7	99.0	110.2	124.2	126.5	178.9	210.5
Japan	Non-citizen students	83.3	86.4	80.2	77.9	79.4	86.6	94.4	96.6
Australia	Non-resident students	37.3	42.0	50.4	57.6	70.4	87.6	90.2	87.5

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2012**
Total	**641.0**	**743.0**	**774.0**	**778.0**	**847.0**	**812.0**	**850.2**	**853.0**
Singapore	83.0							
Algeria	35.0							
Macao, China	33.0							
Russian Federation	25.0							
Hong Kong, China	21.0							
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total		**372.0**	**427.0**	**395.0**	**411.0**	**452.0**	**512.0**	**527.0**

Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	–0.04	–0.14	–0.10	–0.35	–0.28	–0.22	–0.21	–0.21
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	27,565	38,395	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	60,000

INDIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	1,042.3	577	4.0	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	51.5
2013	1,252.1	1,165	5.0	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	3.4

Immigration in India

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated	
2000	6,411	0.61	48	9.8	90.2	73.1	3.0	
2010	5,436	0.44	49					
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2001	**Total**							
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	452.0							
% of total employment	0.14							
Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	1.3	12.4					27.5	31.5
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**

Emigration from India to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in India living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	1,027.6	943.0	1,970.6	1,914.4	1,700.4	3,614.9		
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	264.2	226.6	490.8	0.0	0.0	24.3		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	10.2	11.0	10.6	0.0	0.0	9.8		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	80.0	77.7	78.9	0.0	0.0	78.7		
Total emigration rate (%)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	2.9	3.8	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**213.0**	**206.6**	**213.5**	**216.6**	**228.7**	**254.5**	**242.7**	**225.8**
United States	84.7	61.4	65.4	63.4	57.3	69.2	69.0	66.4
United Kingdom	47.0	57.0	55.0	48.0	64.0	68.0	61.0	36.0
Canada	33.1	30.8	26.1	24.5	26.1	30.3	25.0	28.9
Australia	12.8	15.2	19.8	22.7	25.3	23.5	21.9	27.9
Germany	8.4	8.9	9.4	11.4	12.0	13.2	15.4	18.1
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**130.8**	**131.6**	**145.1**	**162.7**	**181.1**	**186.3**	**181.6**	**168.3**
United States Non-resident students	84.0	79.2	85.7	94.7	101.6	104.0	101.9	97.1
United Kingdom Non-resident students	16.7	19.2	23.8	25.9	34.1	38.2	38.7	29.7
Australia Non-resident students	20.5	22.4	24.5	26.5	26.6	20.4	14.1	11.7

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								
Saudi Arabia					1,500.0			
United Arab Emirates					1,300.0			
Kuwait					491.0			
Bahrain					105.0			
Qatar								
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**676.9**	**809.5**	**848.6**	**610.3**	**641.4**	**626.6**	**747.0**	
Saudi Arabia	134.6	195.4	228.4	281.1	275.2	289.3	357.5	
United Arab Emirates	254.8	312.7	349.8	130.3	130.9	138.9	141.1	
Oman	68.0	95.5	89.7	75.0	105.8	73.8	84.4	
Qatar	76.3	88.5	82.9	46.3	45.8	41.7	63.1	
Kuwait	47.4	48.5	35.6	42.1	37.7	45.1	55.9	
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	0.01	−0.03	−0.09	−0.36	−0.51	−0.37	−0.29	−0.18
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	28,334	37,217	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,969

INDONESIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	208.9	1,086	4.9	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	62.7
2013	249.9	1,810	5.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	6.6

Immigration in Indonesia

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated	
2000	292	0.14	48	19.6	66.0	33.0	46.0	
2010	123	0.05	45					
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	**Total**	Manuf.	Construction	Trade	Community, social, and personal services			
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	102.3	26.6	12.4	21.0	12.4			
% of total employment	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1			
Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	2.0	4.7	5.3	5.3		6.4		7.2
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**

Emigration from Indonesia to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Indonesia living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	162.3	177.3	339.6	158.6	196.5	355.1		
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	22.0	26.4	48.4	17.9	26.4	44.3		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	13.7	11.3	12.4	11.0	8.2	10.6		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	65.4	61.8	63.5	64.6	68.6	66.8		
Total emigration rate (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	3.2	4.2	3.6	2.2	2.9	2.6		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**35.1**	**30.7**	**26.7**	**31.6**	**22.5**	**24.9**	**28.6**	**30.2**
Japan	12.9	11.4	10.1	10.1	7.5	8.3	8.4	9.3
Rep. of Korea	10.2	6.9	5.2	9.7	3.3	5.3	8.1	8.3
United States	3.9	4.9	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.6
Australia	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.5
Germany	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**23.6**	**23.3**	**24.1**	**24.4**	**24.5**	**24.6**	**24.5**	**25.4**
Australia — Non-resident students	9.3	9.1	10.5	10.2	10.2	10.1	9.7	9.4
United States — Non-resident students	8.1	7.8	7.5	7.7	7.4	6.9	6.8	6.9
Japan — Non-citizen students	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.2

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**2,700.0**		**4,300.0**			**3,256.0**	
Saudi Arabia							1,500.0	
Malaysia		1,300.0					917.9	
Taipei,China							146.2	
Hong Kong, China							140.6	
Singapore							106.0	
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total		**690.4**	**636.2**	**629.6**	**567.1**	**594.2**	**459.9**	**468.7**
Malaysia		222.2	187.1	123.9	116.1	134.1	134.0	150.2
Taipei,China		50.8	59.5	59.3	62.0	78.9	81.1	83.5
Singapore		37.5	21.8	33.1	39.6	47.8	41.6	34.7
Hong Kong, China		30.0	30.2	32.4	33.3	50.3	45.5	41.8
Saudi Arabia		257.2	234.6	276.6	228.9	137.6	40.7	45.4
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	−0.25	−0.37	−0.20	−0.49	−0.64	−0.56	−0.53	−0.51
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	5,722	6,174	6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	5.4	375	5.8	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	76.9
2013	6.8	751	8.1	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	1.4

Immigration in the Lao PDR

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated	
2000	22	0.41	48	21.5	70.4	49.5	8.2	
2010	19	0.30	48					
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2001	**Total**							
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	200.0							
% of total employment								
Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
							6.9	

Emigration from the Lao PDR to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in the Lao PDR living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	132.8	131.4	264.1	127.9	134.8	262.7		
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	4.4	5.8	10.2	3.2	5.7	8.9		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	13.8	13.7	13.8	2.7	3.3	3.2		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	81.2	79.0	80.1	88.1	86.5	87.2		
Total emigration rate (%)	8.3	8.1	8.2	6.0	6.2	6.1		
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	23.8	29.2	25.9	13.8	16.6	15.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**1.7**	**4.1**	**3.9**	**3.5**	**3.0**	**2.5**	**2.5**	**2.5**
United States	1.2	2.9	2.6	2.2	1.7	1.2	1.0	0.9
Japan	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8
Rep. of Korea	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Australia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1
France	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**0.62**	**0.68**	**0.72**	**0.69**	**0.75**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.72**
Japan — Non-citizen students	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.25
Australia — Non-resident students	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.18
France — Non-citizen students	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.11

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total								
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total						**8.4**	**8.1**	**13.6**
Thailand						8.4	8.1	13.6
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	0.01	–1.98	–5.12	–6.17	–2.46	–2.24	–2.05	–1.89
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	4	6	18	38	42	110	59	64

MALAYSIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	23.4	4,862	8.9	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	63.5
2013	29.7	6,990	4.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	3.1

Immigration in Malaysia

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	1,554	6.7	45	23.0	70.6	91.3	5.9
2010	2,358	8.4	45				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2011	Total	Agriculture and fishing	Manuf.	Construction	Services
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	1,573.0	451.4	580.8	223.7	132.9
% of total employment	12.8	32.0	26.1	19.7	2.0

Stock of international students ('000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	44.4	47.9	69.2	80.8	86.9		90.0

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011

Emigration from Malaysia to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Malaysia living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	98.6	115.7	214.3	131.9	161.3	293.2
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	16.9	18.8	35.7	29.5	33.9	63.4
15–24 (% of population 15+)	23.9	19.0	21.2	18.2	14.6	16.5
25–64 (% of population 15+)	71.2	75.3	73.5	73.0	76.5	74.8
Total emigration rate (%)	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.5
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	5.7	6.7	6.2	5.1	5.3	5.2

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	**10.5**	**12.2**	**20.3**	**24.3**	**20.1**	**22.0**	**17.1**	**20.3**
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	8.0	11.0	7.0	9.0	4.0	6.0
Australia	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.0	5.4
United States	2.6	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.7	2.3	2.6
Japan	0.0	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.5
Rep. of Korea	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total		**38.2**	**37.9**	**40.8**	**43.3**	**46.6**	**46.7**	**46.1**	**45.4**
Australia	Non-resident students	15.6	15.4	17.7	18.6	20.0	19.6	18.3	17.0
United Kingdom	Non-resident students	11.5	11.4	11.8	11.7	12.7	12.5	12.2	12.8
United States	Non-resident students	6.4	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.5

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total								

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–90	1990–95	1995–00	2000–05	2005–10	2010–15	2015–20	2020–25
	5.13	3.07	3.60	3.99	4.79	3.06	1.58	1.48

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013e
	1,365	1,556	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,320	1,443

PAKISTAN

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	143.8	597	4.3	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	50.7
2013	182.1	806	6.1	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	5.1

Immigration in Pakistan

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	4,243	2.9	45	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2010	4,234	2.3	45				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	Total
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	
% of total employment	

Stock of international students ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011

Emigration from Pakistan to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Pakistan living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	375.0	293.7	668.7	669.6	514.5	1,184.0
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	79.8	60.4	140.2	150.9	103.6	254.5
15–24 (% of population 15+)	13.9	15.4	14.5	14.3	13.7	14.0
25–64 (% of population 15+)	80.3	78.2	79.3	79.5	79.0	79.3
Total emigration rate (%)	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.0
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	3.1	3.6	3.3	6.1	7.0	6.5

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	**74.5**	**84.1**	**74.7**	**76.3**	**76.9**	**100.4**	**105.9**	**85.1**
United Kingdom	16.0	31.0	27.0	17.0	17.0	30.0	43.0	19.0
United States	14.9	17.4	13.5	19.7	21.6	18.3	15.5	14.7
Spain	12.4	8.2	10.6	13.4	10.6	21.7	16.9	12.0
Canada	13.6	12.3	9.5	8.1	6.2	5.0	6.1	9.9
Italy	6.5	4.1	3.5	5.7	7.9	10.8	7.5	8.8

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total		**17.4**	**18.9**	**20.6**	**23.2**	**25.8**	**27.3**	**28.1**	**26.5**
United Kingdom	Non-resident students	6.5	7.9	9.3	9.3	9.6	9.8	10.1	8.8
United States	Non-resident students	6.6	6.0	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.5
Australia	Non-resident students	1.3	1.5	2.1	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.8

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total						3,290.5		
Saudi Arabia					1,200.0	1,500.0		1,700.0
United Arab Emirates					738.0	1,014.1		1,200.0
Omar					152.0	162.7		200.0
Kuwait					150.0	149.1		150.0
Qatar					83.0	85.0		n.a.

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	**179.5**	**282.2**	**424.8**	**396.3**	**358.2**	**453.4**	**634.7**	**620.1**
Saudi Arabia	45.6	84.6	138.3	201.8	189.9	222.3	358.6	270.5
United Arab Emirates	100.2	139.4	221.8	140.9	113.3	156.4	182.6	273.2
Oman	12.6	32.5	37.4	34.1	37.9	53.5	69.4	47.8
Bahrain	1.6	2.6	5.9	7.1	5.9	10.6	10.5	9.6
Qatar	2.3	5.0	10.2	4.1	3.0	5.1	7.3	8.1

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–90	1990–95	1995–00	2000–05	2005–10	2010–15	2015–20	2020–25
	0.27	−2.36	−0.28	−2.33	−2.23	−1.81	−1.15	−0.75

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013e
	5,121	5,998	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,006	14,626

PHILIPPINES

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	77.7	1,061	4.4	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	59.7
2013	98.4	1,581	7.2	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	7.0

Immigration in the Philippines

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated	
2000	323	0.4	49	30.3	63.0	54.8	11.9	
2010	435	0.5	51					
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	**Total**							
Number of foreign workers ('000s)								
% of total employment								
Stock of international students ('000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	
						4.3	3.3	
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
	11.6	12.7	11.8	11.3	13.1	15.7	20.91	14.48

Emigration from the Philippines to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in the Philippines living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	745.8	1,192.1	1,938.0	1,141.8	1,873.3	3,015.1
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	107.5	168.8	276.4	163.4	283.1	446.5
15–24 (% of population 15+)	13.9	9.6	11.3	12.4	7.7	9.7
25–64 (% of population 15+)	75.7	80.5	78.6	75.9	79.6	78.5
Total emigration rate (%)	3.1	4.8	3.9	3.6	5.8	4.7
Emigration rate for the high-educated (%)	5.3	8.1	6.8	6.2	9.7	8.1

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**192.4**	**173.2**	**169.0**	**158.4**	**164.5**	**167.7**	**160.8**	**157.4**
United States	60.7	74.6	72.6	54.0	60.0	58.2	57.0	57.3
Canada	17.5	17.7	19.1	23.7	27.3	36.6	35.0	32.7
Japan	63.5	28.3	25.3	21.0	15.8	13.3	13.6	15.4
Australia	4.8	5.4	6.1	7.1	8.9	10.3	10.7	12.8
Italy	5.5	4.4	4.0	7.8	10.0	10.7	10.4	9.9
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**6.7**	**7.1**	**7.1**	**7.8**	**8.8**	**9.8**	**10.3**	**9.7**
United States Non-resident students	3.7	3.9	3.8	4.2	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.1
Australia Non-resident students	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.1	2.4
United Kingdom Non-resident students	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.8	1.7	1.3

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**2,366.0**	**2,476.2**	**2,812.5**	**2,965.3**	**3,198.9**	**3,624.8**	**3,850.9**	**3,238.0**
Saudi Arabia	976.4	1,001.3	1,046.1	1,072.5	1,138.6	1,482.2	1,530.2	1,159.6
United Arab Emirates	231.8	291.4	493.4	541.7	576.0	606.4	658.4	722.6
Qatar	78.0	115.9	189.9	224.0	258.4	290.3	329.4	172.0
Kuwait	103.1	133.4	129.7	136.0	145.2	160.6	180.1	207.1
Hong Kong, China	166.5	121.6	116.1	125.8	140.0	141.2	156.6	176.9
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**686.8**	**716.4**	**870.4**	**991.1**	**1,032.6**	**1,196.2**	**1,409.9**	**1,374.2**
Saudi Arabia	223.5	238.4	275.9	291.4	293.0	316.7	330.0	382.6
United Arab Emirates	99.2	120.7	193.8	196.8	201.2	235.8	259.6	261.1
Singapore	28.4	49.4	41.7	54.4	70.3	146.6	172.7	173.7
Hong Kong, China	96.9	59.2	78.3	100.1	101.3	129.6	131.7	130.7
Qatar	45.8	56.3	84.3	89.3	87.8	100.5	104.6	94.2
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	−1.03	−2.11	−2.11	−2.76	−2.75	−1.43	−1.13	−0.70
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	15,239	16,285	18,628	19,726	21,369	23,058	24,641	25,351

SINGAPORE

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	4.0	24,288	9.0	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	64.1
2013	5.4	36,898	3.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	2.8

Immigration in Singapore

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	1,352	33.6	55.5				
2010	1,967	40.7	56.0				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2012	Total	Construction
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	1,268.3	293.4
% of total employment	37.7	66.4

Stock of international students ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
					40.4	48.6	47.9	53.0

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011

Emigration from Singapore to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Singapore living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	48.5	58.1	106.6	61.0	75.8	136.8
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	9.1	10.8	19.9	11.6	14.6	26.2
15–24 (% of population 15+)	19.3	17.0	18.0	18.3	16.2	17.1
25–64 (% of population 15+)	76.2	78.0	77.2	75.1	76.0	75.7
Total emigration rate (%)	3.0	3.6	3.3	3.0	3.8	3.4
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	8.6	11.3	9.9	8.3	10.9	9.5

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	**7.5**	**7.1**	**6.7**	**6.6**	**5.4**	**6.7**	**9.1**	**9.5**
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0
Australia	4.1	3.6	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.8
United States	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7
Rep. of Korea	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6
Japan	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total		**18.7**	**17.9**	**17.5**	**17.7**	**18.8**	**19.2**	**20.0**	**20.6**
Australia	Non-resident students	10.1	9.6	9.4	9.7	10.4	10.1	9.8	9.4
United Kingdom	Non-resident students	3.6	3.3	3.2	2.9	3.2	3.7	4.4	5.3
United States	Non-resident students	3.9	4.1	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.4

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total								

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–90	1990–95	1995–00	2000–05	2005–10	2010–15	2015–20	2020–25
	8.37	15.32	13.80	20.71	18.77	14.96	10.28	4.84

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013e
	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

SRI LANKA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	19.1	1,052	6.0	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	50.5
2013	20.5	2,004	7.3	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	4.8

Immigration in Sri Lanka

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	395	2.1	50	18.1	63.8	41.8	13.4
2010	340	1.7	50				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	**Total**
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	
% of total employment	

Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
			0.3	0.1			0.4	0.4

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**

Emigration from Sri Lanka to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Sri Lanka living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	169.2	147.7	317.0	303.5	275.3	578.8
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	26.7	30.5	57.2	55.1	52.8	107.8
15–24 (% of population 15+)	14.6	15.2	14.9	10.6	10.1	10.4
25–64 (% of population 15+)	79.8	76.8	78.4	82.4	80.7	81.7
Total emigration rate (%)	2.4	2.1	2.3	3.5	3.2	3.3
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	27.2	28.7	27.7	8.0	5.6	6.7

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**28.3**	**28.3**	**20.7**	**33.4**	**33.5**	**41.7**	**35.7**	**34.0**
Italy	3.9	3.7	3.8	6.6	6.3	7.1	6.8	7.1
Australia	3.0	3.3	3.8	4.8	5.3	5.8	4.9	6.1
Rep. of Korea	5.0	4.1	2.5	4.8	1.7	4.2	5.9	4.7
United Kingdom	6.0	6.0	0.0	5.0	7.0	11.0	6.0	4.0
Canada	4.7	4.5	3.9	4.5	4.3	4.2	3.1	3.2

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**8.3**	**9.3**	**11.1**	**12.2**	**13.2**	**13.4**	**13.2**	**12.5**
United Kingdom	Non-resident students	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.5
Australia	Non-resident students	2.1	2.5	3.6	4.1	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.4
United States	Non-resident students	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Total	**1,221.8**	**1,446.1**	**1,642.5**	**1,800.0**			
Saudi Arabia	380.8		517.7		600.0		
Kuwait	202.1		308.5		200.0		
United Arab Emirates	171.6		238.6		150.0		
Qatar	118.6		133.4				
Lebanon	93.4		117.0				

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**201.9**	**218.5**	**250.5**	**247.1**	**267.5**	**263.0**	**282.4**	**293.1**
Saudi Arabia	61.4	60.5	67.4	77.8	70.8	68.6	98.0	80.8
Qatar	35.9	38.9	39.5	43.9	54.7	52.6	57.5	80.7
Kuwait	36.2	41.0	46.9	42.4	48.1	50.7	44.2	42.7
United Arab Emirates	36.4	39.0	51.2	39.6	42.3	39.3	38.3	48.5
Jordan	8.3	8.4	10.4	9.0	9.4	13.1	10.4	

Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	–1.64	–2.88	–4.31	–1.03	–3.77	–2.99	–2.26	–2.20

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	2,167	2,507	2,925	3,337	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,690

TAIPEI,CHINA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2011	n.a.
2012	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2011	n.a.

Immigration in Taipei,China

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2010	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2012	Total	Agri, forestry, and fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Health and social services
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	445.6	9.3	230.6	3.0	202.7
% of total employment	4.1	1.7	7.8	0.4	48.3

Stock of international students ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
		3.9	5.3	6.3	7.8	8.8	10.1	11.6

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

Emigration from Taipei,China to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Taipei,China living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	191.6	238.3	429.9	203.6	266.8	470.4
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	42.5	54.0	96.4	42.9	58.9	101.8
15–24 (% of population 15+)	22.4	17.4	19.6	12.1	8.8	10.2
25–64 (% of population 15+)	73.7	78.5	76.4	79.4	83.7	81.8
Total emigration rate (%)	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.4
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	5.3	7.0	6.0	4.0	4.9	4.4

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	**17.0**	**18.6**	**19.9**	**22.0**	**23.9**	**20.3**	**17.8**	**17.1**
Japan	0.0	4.5	4.9	5.5	5.4	6.6	5.6	6.6
United States	9.2	8.1	9.0	9.1	8.0	6.7	6.2	5.3
Rep. of Korea	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6
Canada	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.5	2.8	1.9	1.2
Australia	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	**32.9**	**34.8**	**31.0**					
United States	15.5	16.5	14.9					
United Kingdom	9.2	9.7	7.1					
Australia	2.7	2.9	2.6					

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total								

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–90	1990–95	1995–00	2000–05	2005–10	2010–15	2015–20	2020–25
	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013e
	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

THAILAND

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	62.3	2,206	4.8	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	71.4
2013	67.0	3,438	1.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	0.7

Immigration in Thailand

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	792	1.3	48	16.8	56.9	84.7	9.9
2010	1,157	1.7	48				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2010	**Total**	Agriculture and fishing	Construction	Services	Domestic workers
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	1,335.2	359.6	223.4	243.5	129.8
% of total employment	3.5	2.1	10.7	25.9	35.1

Stock of international students ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
	4.3	5.6	8.5	10.9	16.4	19.1	20.2	20.3

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**

Emigration from Thailand to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Thailand living in OECD countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	90.8	180.0	270.8	148.1	375.3	523.4
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	15.8	33.9	49.7	25.2	87.4	112.7
15–24 (% of population 15+)	38.7	21.8	27.5	27.7	12.2	16.5
25–64 (% of population 15+)	59.6	76.3	70.7	68.7	84.5	80.3
Total emigration rate (%)	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.4	1.0
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	2.4	3.1	2.8	2.0	3.2	2.7

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total	**47.0**	**51.7**	**48.1**	**47.4**	**47.3**	**50.7**	**53.4**	**58.1**
Japan	9.0	8.7	9.0	10.5	9.9	10.9	13.6	15.4
Rep. of Korea	13.7	15.8	10.5	8.6	5.8	6.9	10.3	13.8
United States	5.5	11.8	8.8	6.6	10.4	9.4	10.0	9.5
United Kingdom	4.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	6.0	3.0	4.0
Germany	4.7	4.2	3.6	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**21.9**	**22.3**	**22.9**	**22.7**	**23.1**	**23.8**	**23.2**	**22.3**
United States	Non-resident students	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.0	8.6	8.5	8.1	7.4
United Kingdom	Non-resident students	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.2	4.7	5.4	5.8	6.1
Australia	Non-resident students	4.9	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.3

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Total			**450.0**				

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**108.2**	**121.9**	**122.7**	**110.8**	**106.3**	**109.3**	**98.3**	
Taipei,China	62.1	52.2	45.1	35.9	40.9	47.8	39.1	
Singapore	15.1	16.3	14.9	14.0	12.7	11.5	11.9	
United Arab Emirates	3.6	9.9	13.0	9.6	8.3	9.6	7.3	
Malaysia	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.9	3.6	4.3	4.4	
Qatar	7.5	5.8	10.7	10.4	6.1	3.4	2.6	

Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	1.86	–3.83	1.96	3.45	–2.15	0.30	0.29	0.28

Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	1,333	1,635	1,898	2,776	3,580	4,554	4,713	5,555

VIET NAM

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (Millions)	GDP per capita (Constant 2005 $)	GDP growth rate (Annual, %)	Labor market indicators (Percentages)	
2000	77.6	475	6.8	Employment / population ratio (15+), 2012	75.5
2013	89.7	1,029	5.4	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2012	2.0

Immigration in Viet Nam

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ('000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low-educated	% high-educated
2000	56	0.07	37	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2010	69	0.08	37				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2011	Total
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	78.4
% of total employment	

Stock of international students ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	2.1		3.2	3.4	4.2	3.3	3.7	4.0

Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

Emigration from Viet Nam to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Viet Nam living in OECD countries	2000 Men	2000 Women	2000 Total	2010/11 Men	2010/11 Women	2010/11 Total
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	747.4	768.6	1,515.9	923.0	1,016.5	1,939.5
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	63.0	86.1	149.1	62.0	89.9	151.9
15–24 (% of population 15+)	12.5	12.1	12.3	7.9	7.7	8.2
25–64 (% of population 15+)	81.1	79.9	80.5	81.5	80.8	80.9
Total emigration rate (%)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	3.0	2.8
Emigration rate of the high-educated (%)	17.1	19.8	18.2	10.1	11.1	10.6

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total		**78.0**	**82.2**	**88.6**	**98.6**	**77.0**	**87.8**	**94.7**	**93.4**
United States		32.8	30.7	28.7	31.5	29.2	30.6	34.2	28.3
Rep. of Korea		18.0	20.0	21.2	24.0	16.4	22.9	27.9	24.7
Japan		7.7	8.5	9.9	12.5	10.9	11.9	13.9	19.5
Australia		2.5	2.9	3.4	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.8	4.8
Poland		1.9	1.7	1.8	2.8	3.0	2.4	2.1	4.0
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)		**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Total		**16.6**	**20.2**	**24.6**	**29.5**	**37.3**	**41.3**	**46.3**	**48.2**
United States	Non-resident students	3.8	4.8	6.2	8.8	12.6	13.0	14.6	15.1
Australia	Non-resident students	2.8	3.1	4.0	5.4	7.6	9.6	10.6	11.1
France	Non-citizen students	3.7	4.7	5.2	5.1	5.8	5.8	6.2	5.6

Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total		**500.0**						
Taipei,China		90.0						
Malaysia		75.0			74.8			
Russian Federation		72.0						
Lao People's Democratic Republic		14.5						
Saudi Arabia		11.5						
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total		**64.0**	**53.1**	**44.2**	**57.5**	**59.8**	**80.0**	
Taipei,China		23.6	31.6	21.7	28.5	38.8	14.0	
Malaysia		26.7	7.8	2.8	11.7	10.0	3.6	
Lao People's Democratic Republic		3.1	3.1	9.1	5.9	4.3		
Saudi Arabia		1.6	3.0	2.5	2.7	3.6		
Macao, China		2.1	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.0		
Net migration rate (per thousand)	**1985–90**	**1990–95**	**1995–00**	**2000–05**	**2005–10**	**2010–15**	**2015–20**	**2020–25**
	–1.02	–1.09	–0.82	–1.86	–2.02	–0.44	–0.42	–0.41
Remittance inflows (current $ million)	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013e**
	3,800	6,180	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000

GENERAL NOTES

1. All tables with top three/five destinations are ranked in decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
2. Data on remittances for 2013 are estimates.
3. "n.a." data not available.
4. Educational attainment levels are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997). "Low-educated" persons have completed at best lower secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2). "Medium-educated" have completed at best post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 3/4). "Highly-educated" persons hold at least a first stage tertiary degree (ISCED 5/6).
5. The definition of non-citizen students was only used for the countries for which no data on non-resident students were available.
6. Data on international students in the Asian economies are only for degree programs (undergraduate and upwards) and does not include short-term language courses.
7. Stock of foreign workers in [economy] by sector reports figures for the four largest employers of foreign workers.

In general, the totals for legal migrant flows differ slightly from what was printed in the last publication because these have been sourced from IMD. The only exception is in case of India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand where important individual country data were missing, and so these data were taken from the diaspora publication and the totals changed accordingly.

DATA SOURCES

Data	Source
Immigrant population in [economy]	
• Total immigrant population 0+ (thousands)	UN International Migrant Stock, the 2008 Revision
• % of total population 0+	UN International Migrant Stock, the 2008 Revision and World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision, and national data sources were used for the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar.
• Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	
• Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	UN International Migrant Stock, the 2008 Revision and UN World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision
• Age structure (2000, %) (population 15+):	DIOC-E 2000
• Education (2000, %) (population 15+):	DIOC-E 2000
Emigrant population: persons born in [economy] living abroad	DIOC-E 2000, DIOC 2000, DIOC 2005/06, UN World Population Prospects, the 2006 Revision, Barro and Lee (2010) and Lutz et al. (2010)
Stock of international students	UIS database (except for Taipei,China)
Legal migrant flows	OECD International Migration Database (IMD)
International students from [economy] in OECD countries	UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat (UOE) Database
Net migration rate	World Population Prospects (2012 Revision), United Nations
Remittance inflows	World Bank

METADATA		
Emigration to non-OECD destinations	**Comments**	**Source**
Bangladesh		
Stocks of workers overseas in non-OECD countries		Population and Housing Census 2011; "Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia," ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 (original source: Community Welfare Attache of the respective Middle East country)
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include the category "others"	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET)
China, People's Republic of		
Stock of foreign workers		Country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security)
International students in OECD	Figures include those for Taipei,China	
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries	Figures for 2006 are up to June 2006. The total number at the end of 2006 was 675,000. Figure for 2008 is approximate, based on information on the Ministry of Commerce website.	Country report, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol. 17, Nos. 3–4 (2008) (original source: Ministry of Commerce)
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		Ministry of Commerce
India		
Stock of foreign workers		2001 Census
Stocks of workers overseas in non-OECD countries		"Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia," ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 (original source: Community Welfare Attache of the respective Middle East country)
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA, Annual Report 2012–13)
Indonesia		
Stock of foreign workers	Trade includes wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		(i) ILO news 17 December 2010, based on BNP2TKI available at http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm, (ii) Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, cited in IOM Report (2010) "Labour Migration from Indonesia," (iii) World Bank presentation "Malaysia-Indonesia Remittance Corridor"; news reports
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include the category "others"	BNP2TKI
Lao People's Democratic Republic		
Stock of foreign workers		IOM, available at http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/asia-and-the-pacific/lao-pdr.html
Inflows of foreign workers	Number of work permits issued in 2011	Department of Skills Development and Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare

Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	2012 refers to 2011–12	Country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable; Department of Skills Development and Employment
Malaysia		
Stock of foreign workers	Figure for agriculture includes plantation	Country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable; presentation by Deputy Director-General, Labour Department, Malaysia "Migration of Labour to Malaysia," presentation to the ASEAN Services Employees Trade Union Council (ASETUC) at the National Advocacy Workshop: "ASETUC for ASEAN Community – From Vision to Action," 8–9 June 2010, Kuala Lumpur; LFS Malaysia 2011
Pakistan		
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		Amjad et al. (2012): "Explaining the Ten-fold Increase in Remittances to Pakistan 2001–2012," PIDE/IGC preliminary study
	Figures are for stocks of Pakistanis overseas (including workers, students and other categories). We assume that for the Gulf countries, most of this figure represents migrant workers.	Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis
Flows of workers deployed		Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
Philippines		
Inflows of foreign workers	Number of alien employment permits issued	Department of Labour and Employment
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		POEA
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	Only landbased overseas Filipino workers deployed abroad. 2012 total may include flows to OECD countries and thus be overestimated.	POEA
Sri Lanka		
Inflows of foreign workers	Number of visas issued to foreigners working in Sri Lanka	Institute of Policy Studies (2008): "International Migration Outlook, Sri Lanka" (original source: Department of Immigration and Emigration)
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		Institute of Policy Studies (2008): "International Migration Outlook, Sri Lanka" (original source: Bureau of Foreign Employment); "Sri Lanka Country Study" by Judith Shaw (original source: SLBFE 2005); "Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia," ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	2012 figures are provisional	SLBFE; Annual Statistical Report on Labour Employment 2012
Singapore		
Stock of foreign workers	End of December 2012	Yearbook of Manpower Statistics 2013

Taipei,China		
Stock of foreign workers	Health and social services includes nursing and home-maids	Bureau of Employment and Vocational Training
Stock of international students		Ministry of Education
International students in OECD countries	Number of students obtaining visas from foreign nations	Ministry of Education
Thailand		
Stock of foreign workers		Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour
Inflows of foreign workers		Migration Information System in Asia (original source: Office of Foreign Workers' Administration)
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries	Includes illegal workers	Bank of Thailand (2009): "Thailand's Experiences on Compilation of Compensation to Employee and Workers' Remittance Statistics," presentation, available online
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		Asian Research Centre for Migration (original source: Department of Employment)
Viet Nam		
Stock of foreign workers		MOLISA
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		MOLISA, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	2012 figures only until June 2012	Department of Labour, MOLISA; country presentation

ANNEX 2

COMPARATIVE TABLES

Table A2.1 Inflows from Asia to the OECD by Nationality ('000)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Afghanistan	17	20	15	13	13	16	15	11	13	18	24	29	32
Azerbaijan	1	2	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	6	4	4
Bangladesh	23	24	19	22	30	37	42	34	40	50	50	50	42
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	9	14	13
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	4	5	5	5	6	7	11	9	10	9	10	12	15
China, People's Rep. of	282	334	335	322	367	438	503	518	530	460	508	531	507
Georgia	1	2	7	7	8	11	10	9	8	8	8	9	10
Hong Kong, China	10	12	13	12	10	8	10	8	8	6	9	7	6
India	113	151	161	145	192	213	206	213	215	227	253	243	228
Indonesia	29	32	33	31	27	35	30	27	31	22	25	29	30
Japan	34	38	39	35	36	42	34	32	29	34	32	34	36
Kazakhstan	5	4	17	15	12	9	8	7	7	7	8	9	7
Korea, Republic of	59	69	62	54	57	66	68	72	79	78	76	71	70
Kyrgyz Republic	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3
Lao PDR	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	2
Malaysia	11	14	12	13	16	11	12	20	24	20	22	17	20
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	6	6	4	7	8	11	15	15	15	9	10	9	10
Myanmar	2	3	3	3	3	5	11	10	10	23	19	24	27
Nepal	4	3	5	6	8	9	14	17	19	23	25	30	33
Pakistan	54	59	49	47	73	74	83	74	76	77	100	106	86
Philippines	165	188	195	192	211	192	173	169	158	164	168	161	159
Singapore	6	6	6	5	6	7	7	7	7	5	7	9	10
Sri Lanka	23	21	22	24	23	28	28	21	33	33	41	36	34
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Taipei,China	16	21	21	15	20	17	32	33	22	24	20	18	17
Thailand	32	35	34	35	36	47	51	48	47	47	50	53	59
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Uzbekistan	8	6	8	11	8	9	11	12	20	13	16	16	19
Viet Nam	52	60	64	55	66	78	82	88	98	76	87	95	94
Total	**960**	**1,117**	**1,139**	**1,083**	**1,245**	**1,379**	**1,470**	**1,465**	**1,511**	**1,449**	**1,593**	**1,621**	**1,575**

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Table A2.2 General Characteristics of Emigrants from Asia in the OECD, 2010–2011

Origin	Emigrant Population 15+ ('000)	Women (%)	Low Educated (%)	Highly Educated (%)	15–24 (%)	65+ (%)	Recent (<5yrs) (%)
Afghanistan	394	43.3	45.3	23.0	24.6	5.9	19.7
Azerbaijan	86	56.6	22.1	43.6	17.0	11.4	17.9
Bangladesh	533	42.5	37.0	37.9	13.7	4.7	23.3
Bhutan	7	45.9	58.0	18.2	22.6	4.3	67.9
Brunei Darussalam	13	50.6	9.3	52.4	29.6	3.9	31.3
Cambodia	277	54.1	46.2	19.2	5.3	11.4	7.1
China, People's Rep. of	3632	54.6	27.3	43.8	18.4	12.3	21.3
Georgia	180	58.7	28.2	33.2	11.0	13.1	20.0
Hong Kong, China	296	52.7	12.8	56.8	12.4	8.9	9.2
India	3615	47.0	17.8	62.7	9.8	11.5	24.3
Indonesia	355	55.3	19.8	44.4	10.6	22.6	12.7
Japan	654	63.3	8.3	55.9	11.1	12.1	23.7
Kazakhstan	1007	53.3	34.2	16.1	16.4	10.7	2.8
Korea, Republic of	1773	57.3	13.8	48.0	13.5	13.3	14.2
Kyrgyz Republic	18	65.8	14.6	54.3	19.1	2.7	30.6
Lao PDR	263	51.3	41.2	19.9	3.2	9.6	3.4
Malaysia	293	55.0	12.9	59.4	16.5	8.7	22.1
Maldives	2	38.4	16.8	31.4	13.0	7.2	43.8
Mongolia	23	62.5	16.0	46.3	24.6	1.5	45.8
Myanmar	125	49.9	38.6	35.1	15.0	13.2	36.2
Nepal	153	43.6	21.7	45.8	25.9	1.5	60.7
Pakistan	1184	43.5	37.4	38.8	14.0	6.7	21.7
Philippines	3015	62.1	13.2	52.3	9.7	11.8	15.0
Singapore	137	55.4	13.4	55.8	17.1	7.2	19.6
Sri Lanka	579	47.6	31.7	35.3	10.4	7.9	19.0
Tajikistan	13	53.0	13.7	46.7	18.8	7.0	9.7
Taipei,China	470	56.7	6.9	71.5	10.2	7.9	21.4
Thailand	523	71.7	35.3	31.5	16.5	3.3	21.9
Turkmenistan	12	64.3	26.3	38.9	19.9	7.7	36.4
Uzbekistan	149	54.5	16.0	47.0	16.3	10.7	12.4
Viet Nam	1939	52.4	33.5	28.5	8.2	10.9	8.1
Total	**21,720**	**53.7**	**23.6**	**45.3**	**12.8**	**10.8**	**18.0**

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010–2011.

Table A2.3 Emigration Rates to the OECD by Level of Education, 2000–2001 and 2010–2011

	Total (%)		Highly Educated (%)	
	2010–2011	2000–2001	2010–2011	2000–2001
Afghanistan	2.0	1.1	5.7	3.2
Azerbaijan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bangladesh	0.5	0.4	3.5	2.6
Bhutan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Brunei Darussalam	4.1	3.7	16.8	15.4
Cambodia	2.7	3.1	14.8	52.7
China, People's Republic of	0.4	0.3	1.9	2.1
Georgia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hong Kong, China	4.4	6.6	12.9	16.5
India	0.4	0.3	3.5	3.0
Indonesia	0.2	0.2	2.6	3.6
Japan	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.9
Kazakhstan	8.0	3.8	7.0	4.8
Korea, Republic of	4.2	3.8	4.5	4.4
Kyrgyz Republic	0.4	1.2	1.7	2.2
Lao People's Democratic Republic	6.1	8.0	14.9	25.3
Malaysia	1.5	1.4	5.2	6.3
Maldives	0.6	0.3	10.2	6.9
Mongolia	1.1	0.3	2.9	1.3
Myanmar	0.3	0.2	1.5	1.5
Nepal	0.8	0.2	8.9	2.2
Pakistan	1.0	0.8	6.5	3.3
Philippines	4.8	3.9	8.1	6.8
Singapore	3.4	3.3	9.6	9.9
Sri Lanka	3.4	2.1	6.7	4.1
Tajikistan	0.3	0.5	1.8	2.3
Taipei,China	2.4	2.4	4.4	6.0
Thailand	1.0	0.6	2.7	2.8
Turkmenistan	0.3	n.a.	1.0	n.a.
Uzbekistan	0.7	n.a.	2.1	n.a.
Viet Nam	2.8	2.8	10.6	18.3
Average	**2.1**	**2.0**	**6.2**	**8.0**

n.a. = not available, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2000–2001 and 2010–2011.

Table A2.4 Outflows of Workers from Asia by Destination (no. of workers)

	Bangladesh			India		Indonesia			Nepal		Pakistan			Philippines			Sri Lanka		Thailand	
	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2011	2012
Gulf Cooperation Council countries																				
United Arab Emirates	282,739	215,452	14,241	138,861	141,138	39,917	35,571	44,505	44,464	54,482	156,353	182,630	273,234	235,775	259,546	261,119	39,320	38,234	9,569	7,312
Saudi Arabia	15,039	21,232	12,654	289,297	357,503	137,835	40,655	45,394	71,116	80,455	222,247	358,560	270,502	316,736	330,040	382,553	68,552	97,993		
Oman	135,265	170,326	134,028	73,819	84,384	7,306	8,836	10,719	2,442	3,163	53,525	69,407	47,794	15,029	16,048	16,577	5,379	4,889		
Kuwait	29	2	6	45,149	55,868	2,723	2,518	2,534	15,187	24,575	173	5	229	65,603	75,286	67,856	50,635	44,229	2,786	1,792
Bahrain	13,996	21,777	25,155	14,323	20,150	4,379	6,328	5,384	4,647	5,865	10,641	10,530	9,600	18,230	22,271	20,546	5,423	4,533		1,100
Qatar	13,111	28,801	57,584	41,710	63,096	16,616	20,380	16,237	102,966	105,681	5,121	7,320	8,119	100,530	104,622	94,195	52,743	57,478	3,366	2,629
Other Middle East																				
Jordan	4,387	11,726	21,383		1,819	1,413					178	279	345				13,112	10,387		
Lebanon	19,169	14,864	15,098		288				151	243	30	23	15	896	1,227	2,874	5,153	3,945		
Israel									273	574							1,481	1,768	9,333	5,059
Asia, OECD																				
Japan	770	420	41			2,508	3,293	3,042	603	1,144	48	62	44	9,285	9,947	10,936	99	112	9,302	8,596
Korea, Republic of	2,021	1,447	2,121			11,390	13,593	15,374	3,728	5,627	12	7	12	10,943	8,979	11,664	7,406	5,629	10,964	10,329
Asia, non-OECD																				
Singapore	48,667	58,657	60,057			47,786	41,556	34,655			62	47	42	146,613	172,690	173,666	1,078	980	11,461	11,864
Malaysia	742	804	3,853		21,241	134,120	134,023	150,236	105,906	98,367	2,092	1,309	2,031	16,797	38,407	34,088	2,459	2,691	4,321	4,441
Taipei,China						78,865	81,071	83,544						41,896	41,492	41,145			47,839	39,128
Thailand				27	9	1,113	1,035	1,041									2	2		
Hong Kong, China						50,301	45,478	41,769			26	17	20	129,575	131,680	130,686	366	449	2,834	2,533
Brunei Darussalam	22,593	5,038	5,971			10,804	13,146	11,269			79	74	67	15,406	14,907	17,000	12	11	3,354	2,697
Indonesia				22	11															
India						519											85	97	2,619	2,391
China, People's Republic of						1,072	1,967	2,055			180	220	155				5	6		

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: National sources.

Table A2.5 **Migrant Remittance Inflows in Asia, 2000–2013** ($ million)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013e
Afghanistan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	104	152	331	247	385	385
Azerbaijan	57	104	182	171	228	623	790	1,268	1,518	1,255	1,410	1,893	1,990	2,194
Bangladesh	1,968	2,105	2,858	3,192	3,584	4,315	5,428	6,562	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,776
Bhutan	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	4	5	8	10	18	19
Brunei Darussalam	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cambodia	121	133	140	138	177	164	184	186	188	142	153	160	256	278
China, People's Rep. of	4,822	6,539	10,293	14,542	19,578	23,626	27,565	38,395	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	60,000
Georgia	209	222	230	236	303	446	627	883	1,065	1,112	1,184	1,547	1,770	2,056
Hong Kong, China	136	153	121	120	240	297	294	317	355	348	340	352	367	388
India	12,883	14,273	15,736	20,999	18,750	22,125	28,334	37,217	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,969
Indonesia	1,190	1,046	1,259	1,489	1,866	5,420	5,722	6,174	6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614
Japan	1,374	1,984	1,821	1,078	931	905	1,177	1,384	1,732	1,595	1,684	2,132	2,540	2,651
Kazakhstan	122	171	205	148	166	62	84	143	126	198	226	180	171	221
Korea, Republic of	4,858	4,832	5,530	6,304	6,570	6,505	6,054	6,599	9,074	7,278	7,058	8,373	8,474	8,765
Kyrgyz Republic	9	11	37	78	189	313	473	704	1,223	982	1,266	1,709	2,031	2,290
Lao PDR	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	6	18	38	42	110	59	64
Malaysia	342	367	435	571	802	1,117	1,365	1,556	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,320	1,443
Maldives	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	8	6	5	3	3	3	3
Mongolia	12	25	56	129	203	180	181	178	225	200	266	279	320	343
Myanmar	102	116	105	84	117	129	115	81	55	54	115	127	127	127
Nepal	111	147	678	771	823	1,212	1,453	1,734	2,727	2,985	3,469	4,217	4,793	5,210
Pakistan	1,075	1,461	3,554	3,964	3,945	4,280	5,121	5,998	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,006	14,626
Philippines	6,961	8,769	9,735	10,243	11,471	13,561	15,239	16,285	18,628	19,726	21,369	23,058	24,641	25,351
Singapore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sri Lanka	1,166	1,185	1,309	1,438	1,590	1,976	2,167	2,507	2,925	3,337	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,690
Tajikistan	...	...	79	146	252	467	1,019	1,691	2,544	1,748	2,306	3,060	3,626	3,960
Taipei,China	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Thailand	1,697	1,252	1,380	1,607	1,622	1,187	1,333	1,635	1,898	2,776	3,580	4,554	4,713	5,555
Turkmenistan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Uzbekistan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Viet Nam	1,340	1,100	1,770	2,100	2,310	3,150	3,800	6,180	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000
Total	**40,558**	**45,996**	**57,515**	**69,551**	**75,719**	**92,062**	**108,535**	**137,694**	**173,043**	**167,921**	**19,1691**	**222,309**	**235,749**	**244,978**

... = data not available, e = estimate, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Note: All numbers are in current $.

Source: World Bank.

Table A2.6 **Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 population)**

	1980–1985	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015
Afghanistan	–56.7	–29.3	44.4	–6.5	1.2	–5.6	–2.6
Azerbaijan	–1.3	–3.4	–2.8	–3.0	0.3	0.2	0.0
Bangladesh	–1.9	–0.4	–1.6	–1.2	–2.9	–4.9	–2.6
Bhutan	0.4	0.6	–32.9	0.1	11.5	4.9	2.7
Brunei Darussalam	1.6	0.0	0.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	0.8
Cambodia	–2.5	–1.9	8.3	5.1	–1.1	–5.4	–2.3
China, People's Rep. of	–0.1	0.0	–0.1	–0.1	–0.4	–0.3	–0.2
Georgia	–0.7	–2.3	–20.7	–15.9	–13.4	–6.8	–5.8
Hong Kong, China	3.2	5.7	5.2	18.5	–1.2	1.3	4.2
India	0.1	0.0	0.0	–0.1	–0.4	–0.5	–0.4
Indonesia	–0.2	–0.2	–0.4	–0.2	–0.5	–0.6	–0.6
Japan	0.4	–1.0	0.7	0.0	1.0	0.7	0.6
Kazakhstan	–4.7	–7.7	–19.1	–17.6	0.6	–0.1	0.0
Korea, Republic of	1.6	2.1	–2.9	–2.3	–0.4	1.4	1.2
Kyrgyz Republic	–2.1	–5.7	–12.1	–1.4	–9.7	–4.9	–6.3
Lao PDR	–2.0	0.0	–2.0	–5.1	–6.2	–2.5	–2.2
Malaysia	2.1	5.1	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.8	3.1
Maldives	0.0	–2.6	–2.7	–0.9	–0.1	0.0	0.0
Mongolia	0.0	0.0	–7.9	–4.5	–1.2	–1.1	–1.1
Myanmar	–0.3	–0.7	–0.6	0.0	–4.1	–3.1	–0.4
Nepal	–1.3	–2.5	0.5	–1.2	–5.3	–6.4	–2.9
Pakistan	3.1	0.3	–2.4	–0.3	–2.3	–2.2	–1.8
Philippines	–0.7	–1.0	–2.1	–2.1	–2.8	–2.8	–1.4
Singapore	10.8	8.4	15.3	13.8	20.7	18.8	15.0
Sri Lanka	–5.1	–1.6	–2.9	–4.3	–1.0	–3.8	–3.0
Tajikistan	–1.0	–1.5	–10.4	–10.9	–3.0	–1.7	–2.5
Taipei,China	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Thailand	1.4	1.9	–3.8	2.0	3.4	–2.2	0.3
Turkmenistan	–1.7	–2.0	2.2	–2.8	–5.0	–2.3	–1.0
Uzbekistan	–1.3	–3.9	–2.5	–3.1	–6.1	–3.3	–1.4
Viet Nam	–1.1	–1.0	–1.1	–0.8	–1.9	–2.0	–0.4

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, n.a. = not available.

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia

This report summarizes major policy and practical issues discussed by international and Asian experts at the Fourth Roundtable on Labor Migration: Building Human Capital across Borders. The event was co-organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Tokyo from 27 to 28 January 2014.

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